Frankena’s Model for Analyzing Philosophies of Education

Synonyms

Aims of education; Analysis; Analytic philosophy of education; Normative philosophy of education; Practical syllogism; Values

Introduction

William Frankena (1966) has suggested a model for analyzing philosophies of education based on practical syllogism which goes back to Aristotle. Even though the deductive method in philosophy of education was the subject of attacks, Frankena’s model has been influential as it has been appealed to in religious education studies (e.g., Cohen 2010), applied branches of education (e.g., Martin 2011), as well as philosophical reflection on education (e.g., Covaleski 2007). Frankena’s model helps students to analyze philosophies of education and acquire a proper understanding of values education (Litke 1976), teacher education (Ainsworth and Johnson 2005), and workplace education (Hager 1999).

Frankena’s Model

According to Frankena (1956/1969), there have been three types of philosophizing called speculative, normative, and analytical. In the speculative activity, one attempts to combine scientific findings with the results of moral, aesthetic, and religious experiences to present a picture of the world and humans’ position in it in a way that it provides a meaning for human life. In the normative activity, the aim is to determine goals, norms, and standards for human personal and social behavior to orient human beings’ actions. Finally, in analytical or critical activity, the aim is to analyze and explore the concepts, assumptions, and methods used by philosophers, scientists, and ordinary people.

Therefore, Frankena talks of three research methods in philosophy of education. By considering education as a discipline, he takes the philosophy of education to be a philosophy of the discipline of education. Then, he divides this discipline into three parts:

• 1. The experimental science of education that deals with real things.

• 2. The normative part of education that is concerned with educational and management goals and advices.

• 3. The analytical part that analyzes the concepts related to experimental science of education (such as intelligence) and the concepts discussed in the normative part (e.g., justice), and explores the methods for justifying the advices given in these parts.

Philosophy’s relation to these parts becomes somehow clear because the three activities mentioned by Frankena respond to these three parts. The studies in philosophy of education are, in fact, connecting or utilizing philosophy in the respected parts of education as it is explained below.

In the light of the first part of philosophical activities and education, it can be said that theoretical philosophical activities can affect the experimental science of education; for instance, the image by which humans are presented can be used as an assumption in education. Frankena holds that as far as the empirical science of education is dependent on philosophical assumptions, it is in fact philosophical in nature (Frankena 1969, p. 289).

In the second part, on the normative activity in philosophy and the science of education, the relation of philosophy and education is apparent as well, because the normative view in philosophy can be used in the normative issues of education, in a way that Frankena believes that the normative part of education is nothing but a branch of normative philosophy. He considers this part as “the heart of philosophy of education” (p. 289). In his opinion, the method used in this part of the philosophy of education is practical syllogism. In this method, two premises are combined to achieve a conclusion in the form of a normative advice related to aims or methods of education: one normative premise obtained from, for instance, the philosophy of ethics and a factual or realistic one obtained from the common sense, science, or philosophy. Frankena presents the following example. Any kind of advice on religious education in schools is dependent, on the one hand, on the goals of education related to the moral or social philosophy (the normative premise), and on the other hand, it is dependent on the credibility of the religious beliefs and the significance of religious teachings (the realistic premise).

Finally, in the third part, concerned with the analytical activity in philosophy as well as education, the relation between philosophy and education can be seen in using the methods of philosophical analysis in educational concepts.

Therefore, in Frankena’s opinion, three kinds of research can be carried out in the philosophy of education:

• 1. A theoretical research that attempts to provide assumptions concerning the human beings and the world in relation to the process of education.

• 2. A normative research on goals, principles, and methods that can be used in the education.

• 3. An analytical research that aims at explaining the concepts used in education.

Frankena holds that from among these three, only the second one, the normative research, is the heart of education. In this type of research, a practical syllogism is used.

However, it is worth mentioning in passing that Frankena takes the theoretical syllogism as the proper method in relation to the first type of research. A theoretical syllogism contains two declarative premises and one declarative conclusion. When philosophers of education reach a declarative conclusion, they provide scientists of education with negative heuristics that prevent them from following hypotheses that are incompatible with that conclusion as well as with positive heuristics that encourage them to pursue the hypotheses compatible with it.

Although Frankena (1956) had previously suggested three kinds of philosophies of education, in his later article (Frankena 1966), without mentioning the theoretical research, divides the philosophies of education into two major kinds: normative and analytical. Frankena’s main attempt is to show how one can analyze the normative philosophies of education. Hence, he holds that his work is itself an analytical one: “Since I am here seeking to show how to analyze a philosophy of education, this essay is itself an example of analytical philosophy of education” (Frankena 1966, p. 8).

Frankena suggests a model for this purpose. The first notion discussed in this model is that there are two types of propositions required in the normative philosophies of education: normative and factual. Normative propositions, which are prescriptive, are themselves of three types:

• 1. Propositions related to the fundamental goals and principles of education.

• 2. Propositions related to the knowledge, skills, or viewpoints that should be formed during education.

• 3. Propositions related to the methods and practical procedures that should be used in education.

On the other hand, the factual propositions concerning the relations between things are of two types:

• 1. Propositions that indicate what kinds of knowledge, skills, or viewpoints are required to achieve the fundamental goals or for following the basic principles.

• 2. Propositions that indicate the required methods for acquiring the abovementioned kinds of knowledge, skills, or viewpoints.

Factual propositions can consist of explanatory hypotheses, psychological theories, experimental findings, predictions, etc. They can also consist of epistemological, metaphysical, or theological propositions. In addition, there might be some analytical points beside each one of the five types of propositions. Based on these five types of propositions, three types of normative philosophies of education are possible.

The first type is more philosophical and general in which the details are left to the educationists. In this type, the structure of philosophy of education is a combination of normative propositions of the abovementioned first or the second type, on the one hand, and a factual proposition of the first type on the other hand. In this combination, the premises include a normative proposition of the first type and a factual proposition of the first type and the conclusion is a normative proposition of the second type. For instance, in Aristotelian philosophy of education, the two premises and the conclusion are as follows:

• (a) The main goal of education is to have a good life including inherently valuable activities such as thinking and reflection (A normative proposition of the first type).

• (b) A good life is achieved through dispositions such as moderation, practical wisdom, and knowledge of mathematics, physics, and philosophy (A factual proposition).

• (c) To achieve the good life, dispositions such as moderation, practical wisdom, and knowledge of mathematics, physics, and philosophy should be cultivated (A normative proposition of the second type).

The second type of normative philosophies of education is less philosophical, since the starting point of this type is the list of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that should be cultivated in individuals, while this list is not obtained from a deduction like before, rather it might be borrowed from a philosophical work, it might come from eclectic sources, or merely what the society or the government requires. This kind of philosophies of education has a structure that is a combination of two normative propositions of the second or the third type and a factual proposition of the second type. In this combination, the premises include the normative proposition of the second type and the factual proposition. The following is an example for the second type of philosophy of education:

• (a) Mathematics is a branch of knowledge that its disposition should be cultivated in individuals.

• (b) The method X is effective or helpful in teaching mathematics.

• (c) To cultivate mathematical disposition in individuals, the method X should be used.

The third type of normative philosophies of education has a perfect or complete form that combines the two former types. In Frankena’s opinion, to understand a philosophy of education fully, one should follow these steps:

• 1. One must first look to see what dispositions it says education should foster (Box C).

• 2. Next, one must try to determine the rationale given to show that education should foster those dispositions. To do this one must:

  • (a) See what its basic normative premises are – its basic values, principles, or ends (Box A).

  • (b) See what factual premises are brought in (implicitly or explicitly), empirical, theological, or philosophical (Box B).

  • (c) See how these go together to make a line of argument of the ABC pattern to show that the dispositions listed I should be cultivated.

• (3) Then one should look for recommendations about ways and means of teaching, administering, etc. (Box E)

• (4) Fourthly, one must seek to discover the rationales for these recommendations. To do this one must:

  • (a) See what factual statements based on observation and experience are brought in (possibly borrowed from psychology, etc.) (Box D).

  • (b) See if any premises from Boxes A or B are used here.

  • (c) See how these go together to make a line of argument (or a battery of separate arguments) to show that the ways and means recommended should be used in the cultivation of the dispositions listed (Pattern CDE).

• 5. All along, of course, one should notice any definitions or bits of analysis that occur and see how they fit into the discussion (Frankena 1966: 13). (Boxes A–E)

Using The Model for Analysis

Frankena’s model is very useful in analyzing philosophies of education. In this model, the fundamental goals or values are the basis of the chain of syllogisms that follow them but they are not the subject of justification themselves. Frankena, of course, alludes that in providing reasons for why the fundamental goals should be followed, different views bring about some philosophical premises into the structure of argument but he does not see these premises logically necessary:

It is in this part of a philosophy of education that epistemological, ontological, and theological premises most often appear, but they are not logically necessary. What is logically required is, first, some normative premises stating basic goals or principles…and second, factual claims stating that certain dispositions are conducive to the achievement of those goals or to the following of those principles…(Frankena 1966, p. 10)

Thus, what is important for Frankena as the first step is to give some basic premises about the fundamental values. However, it is a serious question to ask while methods of education or dispositions to be cultivated need to be justified, why should the fundamental goals be taken beyond justification? In answering this question, one might state that in Aristotelian practical syllogism, which is presupposed by Frankena, it is envisaged that the practical reason is concerned with the means to goals not goals themselves. This notion is based on the interpretation of some of Aristotle’s writings in which he has said that the practical reason is for thinking about means not goals (Aristotle 1925, 1145a5-6) or reflection is for means not goals (Aristotle 1925, 1112b13, 1112b34-35).

However, this interpretation is controversial. Some (e.g., Dahl 1984, p. 39) believe that Aristotle has taken some roles for practical reason in relation to goals as he states: “If therefore to have deliberated well is a characteristic of prudent men, deliberative excellence must be correctness of deliberation with regard to what is expedient as a means to the end, a true conception of which constitutes prudence” (Aristotle, 1142b31-34). Therefore, the practical reason would play a role in determining the goals as well as using the suitable means to reach these goals. According to Dahl (p. 42), in Aristotle’s view, the role of the practical reason in determining the goals is played by inductive reasoning, through which the reason uses its experiences of good deeds as especial cases to reach a generalization and an understanding of virtues, as it is mentioned in some cases (Aristotle, 1143a35-b5).

Thus, it seems that a further and more preliminary practical syllogism should be added to Frankena’s model in order to justify the fundamental goals. This preliminary syllogism would be like this:

• I ought to live and be alive.

• Being alive requires having a good life (as a bad life destroys the life altogether).

• Therefore, I ought to have a good life.

Again, a further syllogism might be needed to show what a good life requires.

• I ought to have a good life.

• A good life requires having permanent goals.

• Therefore, I ought to have permanent goals.

For making clear what is a permanent goal, as Frankena stated, philosophical premises arrive at; however, contrary to what he holds, these are necessary for arriving at a conclusion which plays a vital role in choosing a philosophy of education.

As it is clear, the conclusion of the last syllogism was the final stage in Frankena’s chain of syllogisms back from methods of education through the required dispositions. By the added syllogisms, we take some further steps to reach the fundamental goals. The premises of these practical syllogisms again include a normative and a factual proposition. The first normative proposition includes an “ought” in relation to answering the humans beings’ essential needs. This might be called the fundamental “ought.” This proposition is the most fundamental “ought” of the living human beings, the response to which gives rise to human endeavors. In other words, there is no more fundamental purpose for humans than what is stated in this proposition, therefore, it can be said that this value is the most fundamental one for humans. It should be especially noted that in practical syllogisms, there might be a question concerning the conclusion of the syllogism to be taken whether as a “hypothetical imperative” or as a “categorical imperative.” If the conclusion is hypothetical, it is not required to be carried out and one only carries it out when one decides to do it. However, when the fundamental “ought” comes into consideration, the conclusion would be decisive and unavoidable.

However, some believe that a practical syllogism as a practical inference should not contain premises consisting of psychological states such as demands and needs, because inference should be valid and validity lies within the purely logical relations. For instance, Gem Anscombe (2005) in criticizing G. H. Von Wright has stated that there is no difference between practical and theoretical syllogism and both should contain descriptive propositions in order to be valid based on the logical necessity of truth relationship (p, p → q: q). Therefore, she holds that practical syllogism should not contain premises consisting of individual demands and needs, except the ones that express something peripheral that does not affect the functionality of the logical inference. As Anscombe states, setting a goal is required in practical syllogisms, however, propositions related to the goal cannot be considered as the essential premises for the syllogism. She mentions the following example:

• Everyone who intends to kill their parents should get rid of this intention by meeting a psychiatrist.

• I intend to kill my parents.

• If I meet up with a psychiatrist, I would get rid of this intention.

• A is a psychiatrist.

• Then, I will meet up with A.

Anscombe means that the expressed intention in the second proposition plays no role in the logical validity of the inference and it is in fact, a historical notion. The only thing that is logically significant is the truth relationship. Von Wright (Schipp and Hahn 1989) points out two notions in his response. First, practical syllogisms express the necessary means for goals, not any means that accidentally might result in achieving the goals. Therefore, the necessity of the goal is transferred to the means as well, making them necessary too. He believes that Kant also agrees with this notion, since Kant holds that anyone who wants to reach a goal will want the means that are inevitably related to that goal and are at their access. Second, one should not restrict the acceptable logical relationships to relations of truth among propositions because in that case there would be no doxastic logic, of the sort we have got today, in which the logical relations among propositions of believes are at stake.

One might say that the first “ought” proposition is about a fact containing “is” and amounts to saying that: “It is the case that every human tells oneself: ‘I should have a good life.’” If so, then the normative proposition turns to be a factual one and combining this proposition with another factual proposition will prevent from achieving a normative goal. However, it should be noted that to change an “ought” proposition to an “is” proposition in this way would be like substituting a completely different proposition. Naturally, substituting another proposition will change the conclusion as well. Based on the “substitutivity principle,” only if a proposition is substituted with its equivalent, can one expect that the conclusion will remain the same. Therefore, to substitute the mentioned descriptive proposition with the prescriptive one is tantamount to assembling another syllogism; it does not mean that the previous syllogism (containing the prescriptive and descriptive propositions) does not result in a prescriptive or normative proposition (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1