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Education and Testimonial Knowledge

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Israel Scheffler begins his book, The Conditions of Knowledge: An Introduction to Epistemology and Education, by stating that “the development and transmission of knowledge are fundamental tasks of education (1965, p. 1).” This makes clear the deep and important connection between epistemology and education and, even more specifically, between testimony and education. When education develops and transmits knowledge, this is often done through teaching, and teaching crucially involves testimony. (For views about the nature of testimony itself, see Ross (1975), Sosa (1991), Coady (1992), Fricker (1995), Audi (1997), Graham (1997), and Lackey (2006, 2008).) Educators use books and articles, slides, verbal instruction, and even gestures to communicate information to students, all of which involve testimony. The epistemology of testimony is, therefore, central to understanding education. As Harvey Siegel notes, “the epistemology of testimony, in all of its social glory, addresses the...

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Lackey, J. (2020). Education and Testimonial Knowledge. In: Peters, M. (eds) Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_709-1

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