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Internalism and Externalism

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Introduction

An important issue in analyzing the concept of epistemic justification concerns the proper characterization of the factors that ground such justification. This also constitutes the central question of the internalism-externalism controversy. Epistemic justification is generally thought of as that which is capable of turning a true belief into knowledge (when combined with other conditions in order to take care of the Gettier cases), and it is this feature of epistemic justification that distinguishes it from other species of justification like pragmatic and moral justification. Although there are currently a number of alternative accounts of epistemic justification on offer, they can be divided into deontological and nondeontological theories. Deontological theories (currently out of favor) take epistemic justification to involve the fulfillment of epistemic duties while the latter (standard) accounts seek to highlight the truth-conducive character of epistemic...

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Correspondence to Hamid Vahid .

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Vahid, H. (2020). Internalism and Externalism. In: Peters, M. (eds) Encyclopedia of Educational Philosophy and Theory. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-287-532-7_690-1

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