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Handbook of International Investment Law and Policy pp 2375–2394Cite as

China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on the changes and trends in Chinese bilateral investment treaties and relatedly investment rules of China’s free trade agreements. It analyzes a number of questions: what is the changing context of China’s bilateral investment rulemaking? How to understand the evolution of China’s bilateral investment treaties? What are the major features in China’s recent practice? What are the shifts on investment dispute settlement?

Keywords

  • Chinese bilateral investment treaties
  • Chinese free trade agreements
  • Investment rules
  • Changing context
  • Features
  • Investor-State dispute settlement

James Clark, Piero Craney, Wenna Shao, Melissa Vogt and Shirley Zhang provided research assistance for this chapter.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    For the analysis of China’s approach to the BRI, see, e.g., Wang H (2019) China’s approach to the belt and road initiative: scope, character and sustainability. J Int Econ Law 22:29–55.

  2. 2.

    Notwithstanding, China has participated in the heated discussions on the potential modernization of the Energy Charter Treaty and proposed amendments to the ICSID Rules.

  3. 3.

    Baldwin R (2011) 21st century regionalism: filling the gap between 21st century trade and 20th century trade rules, 2011, at 18, available at Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR).

  4. 4.

    Chaisse J, Olaoye KF (2020) The tired dragon: casting doubts on China’s investment treaty practice. Berkeley Bus Law J 17:134, 137, 138; Chaisse J, Kirkwood J (2020) Chinese puzzle: anatomy of the (invisible) belt and road investment treaty. J Int Econ Law 23:245, 250, 252.

  5. 5.

    Chaisse, Olaoye (2020) Berkeley Bus Law J 137:138

  6. 6.

    Id. at.

  7. 7.

    Berger A (2019) The political economy of Chinese investment treaties. In: Handbook on the international political economy of China (ed: KA Zeng). p 163

  8. 8.

    Tao J (2019) TPP and China: a tale of two economic orderings? In: Megaregulation contested: global economic ordering after TPP (eds: Kingsbury B, et al). p 95

  9. 9.

    Chaisse, Kirkwood (2020) J Int Econ Law 250.

  10. 10.

    Bath V (2016) “One belt and one road” and Chinese investment. In: Legal dimensions of China’s belt and road initiative (eds: Wolff L-C, Xi C). p 181

  11. 11.

    Id. at, p 186.

  12. 12.

    UNCTAD Investment Policy Hub, China (2020) Available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/42/china

  13. 13.

    Shi J (2018) The belt and road initiative and international law: an international public goods perspective. In: International governance and the rule of law in China under the belt and road initiative (ed: Yun Zhao). p 28

  14. 14.

    Bath (2016) “One belt and one road” and Chinese investment 184, 186 (Indonesia has faced at least six ISDS cases); Chaisse, Kirkwood (2020) J Int Econ Law 268

  15. 15.

    Dahlan MR (2018) Dimensions of the new belt & road international order: an analysis of the emerging legal norms and a conceptionalisation of the regulation of disputes. Beijing Law Rev 9:87, 89

  16. 16.

    Berger A (2013) Investment rules in Chinese PTIAs – partial “NAFTA-ization”. In: Preferential trade and investment agreements: from recalibration to reintegration (eds: Hofmann R, et al). pp 297–333

  17. 17.

    Wang H (2017) The RCEP and its investment rules: learning from past Chinese FTAs. Chin J Glob Gov 3:160, 160–181

  18. 18.

    Notably (2019) 16 Chinese BITs were terminated or replaced by newer treaties. For a full list of Chinese treaties, see UNCTAD, International Investment Agreement Navigator. https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/countries/42/china

  19. 19.

    The “older-generation” (or the “first-generation”) investment treaties refer to the majority of IIAs concluded before 2010, most of which contain broad and vague formulations. https://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciimem4d14_en.pdf.

  20. 20.

    Shan W, Chen H (2016) China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In: Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press, p 224; Bungenberg M, Chi M (2015) Chinese investment treaties. In: Bungenberg M, Griebel J, Hobe S, Reinisch A (eds) International investment law: A handbook. Hart, pp 223–225

  21. 21.

    The authors admit that scholars have different classifications. For example, Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press. pp 35–42. Chaisse J, Kirkwood J (2020) Chinese puzzle: anatomy of the (invisible) belt and road investment treaty. J Int Eco Law 23:250

  22. 22.

    Congyan C (2009) China–US BIT negotiations and the future of investment treaty regime: a grand bilateral bargain with multilateral implications. J Int Econ Law 12(2):457, p 459. Schill S (2007) Tearing down the great wall – the new generation of investment treaties of the People’s Republic of China. pp 78–79. Shan W, Gallagher N (2013) China. In: Brown C (ed) Commentaries on selected model investment treaties. Oxford University Press, p 132. Cohen T, Schneiderman D (2017) The political economy of Chinese bilateral investment treaty policy. Chin J Comp Law 5(1):115

  23. 23.

    See Art 18 of the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. Other Chinese laws and regulations regarding FDI include the Chinese-Foreign Equity Joint Venture Law, the Chinese-Foreign Contractual Join Venture Law, the Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprises Law, etc. See Shan W, Gallagher N (2013) China. In: Brown C (ed) Commentaries on selected model investment treaties. Oxford University Press, pp 134–135

  24. 24.

    See Shishi LI (1988) Bilateral investment promotion and protection agreements: practice of the People’s Republic of China. In: International law and development (eds: de Waart P, Peters P, Denters E). p 165. Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, pp 35–36

  25. 25.

    Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 36; Cohen T, Schneiderman D (2017) The political economy of Chinese bilateral investment treaty policy. Chin J Comp Law 5(1):116

  26. 26.

    For example, Thailand (1985) was the first developing country to sign a BIT with China. In 1994, China signed its first BIT with another socialist economy, Romania. As pointed by Gallaher and Shan, “Chinese BITs started to spread, from merely Western Europe to reach Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa” during that period, see Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 36.

  27. 27.

    According to Cohen and Schneiderman, the majority of Chinese BITs with non-developed countries in earlier years were concluded for “deepening ties with strategic allies for geo-political purposes.” Cohen T, Schneiderman D (2017) The political economy of Chinese bilateral investment treaty policy. Chin J Comp Law 5(1):117.

  28. 28.

    Shan W, Gallagher N (2013) China. In: Brown C (ed) Commentaries on selected model investment treaties. Oxford University Press, p 132

  29. 29.

    Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 37

  30. 30.

    Bungenberg M, Chi M (2015) Chinese investment treaties. In: Bungenberg M, Griebel J, Hobe S, Reinisch A (eds) International investment law: A handbook. Hart, p 226

  31. 31.

    For example, the first Chinese BIT with Sweden-which remains in force today- provides MFN protection but no national treatment. The China-UK BIT (1986) and the China-Japan BIT (1988) provide national treatment, but that was qualified “in accordance with laws and regulations” of the host State. See Wang G (2009) China’s practice in international investment law: from participation to leadership in the world economy. Yale J Int’l L 34:577. Shan W, Chen H (2016) China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In: Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press, p 225.

  32. 32.

    Ibid.

  33. 33.

    For example, Kidane W (2016) China’s bilateral investment treaties with African states in comparative context. Cornell Int Law J 147; Yongjie LI (2014) Factors to be considered for China’s future investment treaties. In: Shan W, Su J (eds) China and international investment law: twenty years of ICSID membership. BRILL, p 174

  34. 34.

    China formally signed the ICSID Convention on 9 February 1990 and ratified it on 7 January 1993. The significance of China’s accession to the ICSID Convention is to make it possible for investment treaty negotiators to make direct reference to ICSID jurisdiction. Shan W, Gallagher N (2013) China. In: Brown C (ed) Commentaries on selected model investment treaties. Oxford University Press, p 39. Kidane W (2016) China’s bilateral investment treaties with African states in comparative context. Cornell Int Law J 149.

  35. 35.

    Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 39. Burger A (2011) “The politics of China” investment treaty-making program. In: Broude T, Busch M, Porges A (eds) The politics of international economic law. Cambridge University Press, p 174. Gallagher N (2014) China’s BIT and arbitration practice: progress and problems. In: Shan W, Su J (eds) China and international investment law: twenty years of ICSID membership. BRILL, p 182. In accordance with Article 25(4) of the ICSID Convention, China notified the Center when ratifying the Convention that it would only consider submitting to ICSID jurisdiction for disputes over compensation for expropriation.

  36. 36.

    Cohen T, Schneiderman D (2017) The political economy of Chinese bilateral investment treaty policy. Chin J Comp Law 5(1):121. Davies K p 5; Berger A. China’s new bilateral investment treaty programme. p 6

  37. 37.

    Cohen T, Schneiderman D (2017) The political economy of Chinese bilateral investment treaty policy. Chin J Comp Law 5(1):122–123

  38. 38.

    Shan W, Chen H (2016) China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In: Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press, pp 225–226. Berger A Chin’s new bilateral investment treaty program. p 10. Schill S. p 76

  39. 39.

    The China-Barbados BIT (1998) Art 8.

  40. 40.

    The China-Netherland BIT (2001) Art 3 (3). The China-Germany BIT (2003) Art 3 (3)

  41. 41.

    The China-Netherland BIT (2001) Art 9 (1)-(2). The China-Germany BIT (2003) Art 9 (1)-(2)

  42. 42.

    Shan W, Gallagher N (2013) China. In: Brown C (ed) Commentaries on selected model investment treaties. Oxford University Press, p 132

  43. 43.

    Hu Jintao, for the first time declared that China would “implement free trade area strategy, strengthen bilateral and multilateral economic and trade cooperation.” See Congyan C (2009) China–US BIT negotiations and the future of investment treaty regime: a grand bilateral bargain with multilateral implications. J Int Econ Law 12(2):457, p 460

  44. 44.

    Bungenberg M, Chi M (2015) Chinese investment treaties. In Bungenberg M, Griebel J, Hobe S, Reinisch A (eds) International investment law: A handbook. Hart, p 229. Valentine Vadi pp 711–713

  45. 45.

    The typical examples of the newer generation investment treaties arguably modelled after the 2004 Model BITs of the USA and Canada.

  46. 46.

    Berger (2019) The political rconomy of Chinese investment treaties. 157

  47. 47.

    Shan W, Chen H (2016) China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press; Shan W, Wang L (2015) The China–EU BIT and the emerging “Global BIT 2.0”, ICSID Review – Foreign Invest Law J 30(1)

  48. 48.

    UNCTAD WIR 2014.

  49. 49.

    Shan W, Chen H (2016) China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In: Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press, pp 227–228

  50. 50.

    Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Part of China on some Major Issues Concerning Comprehensively Deepening the Reform, adopted by the third Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in Beijing on 12 November 2013.

  51. 51.

    See Article 6 of the Foreign Investment Law.

  52. 52.

    Zeng K, Lu Y (2016) Variation in bilateral investment treaty provisions and foreign direct investment flows to China, 1997–2011. Int Inter 42:5, 820–848, p 823; Shen W (2018) Evolution of non-discriminatory standards in China’s BITs in the context of EU-China BIT negotiations. Chin J Int Law 800–801

  53. 53.

    Levine M (2019) Towards a fourth generation of Chinese treaty practice: substantive changes, balancing mechanisms, and selective adaption. In: China’s international investment strategy. p 219; Wang H The RCEP investment rules and China: learning from the malleability of Chinese FTAs, see id. at 252–257, (ed: Chaisse J)

  54. 54.

    Shan W, Chen H (2016) China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In: Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press, p 228

  55. 55.

    Berger A (2013) Investment Rules in Chinee preferential trade and investment agreements: is China following the global trend towards comprehensive agreements? DIE, pp 10–11

  56. 56.

    See Potter P (2003) Globalisation and economic regulating in China: selective adaptation of globalised norms and practice. Washington Univ Glob Stud Law Rev 2(1):119. Shan W, Chen H (2016) China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press, pp 247–251

  57. 57.

    Wang H (2020) Selective reshaping: China’s paradigm shift in international economic governance. J Int Econ Law 23 (forthcoming)

  58. 58.

    For example, Art 3 of the China-Finland BIT. Notably, this qualification has been removed in the new Finland BIT in 2004.

  59. 59.

    Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 130

  60. 60.

    Article 5 (1) of the China-Mexico BIT (2008).

  61. 61.

    The China-Canada BIT (2012) Art 4.

  62. 62.

    Art 2 of the China-Colombia BIT (2008).

  63. 63.

    Art 4 (2) of the China-Canada BIT (2012).

  64. 64.

    Art 5 (1) of the China-Japan-Korea TIT (2012).

  65. 65.

    The 2012 US Model BIT provides that FET includes the obligation not to deny justice in accordance with the principle of due process and further defines the term “customary international law” in Annex A as “all customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and interests of aliens.” The EU provides an “expansive” list of measures that may constitute a violation of FET – namely, “a breach of any future element of the FET obligation adopted by the Parties” – see Art X.9 of CETA.

  66. 66.

    Shan W, Wang L (2015) The China–EU BIT and the emerging “global BIT 2.0. ICSID Rev – Foreign Invest Law J 30(1)

  67. 67.

    For example, Art 6 of the China-Uzbekistan BIT.

  68. 68.

    For example, Annex B.10 of the China-Canada BIT (2012) Art 6 (2) of the China-Tanzania BIT (2013).

  69. 69.

    For example, Annex B.4 of the 2012 US Model BIT; Annex 8-A.2 of the CETA.

  70. 70.

    Art 6 (3) of the China-Tanzania BIT provides: “Except in rare circumstances, such as where the measures adopted substantially exceed the measures necessary for maintaining reasonable public welfare, legitimate regulatory measures adopted by one Contracting Party for the purpose of protecting public health, safety and the environment, and that are for the public welfare and are non-discriminatory, do not constitute indirect expropriation.” Similar provision in China-Canada BIT.

  71. 71.

    For example, Art 6 (1)(c) & (d) of the 2012 US Model BIT.

  72. 72.

    See Art 10 of the China-Canada BIT.

  73. 73.

    Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 173

  74. 74.

    Sauvant KP, Nolan MD (2015) China’s outward foreign direct investment and international investment law. J Int Econ Law 18(4):922

  75. 75.

    Article 3 (3) of the China-Finland BIT.

  76. 76.

    See e.g., Article 4 of the China-Tanzania BIT, Article 5 of the China-Canada BIT.

  77. 77.

    Sauvant KP, Nolan MD (2015) China’s outward foreign direct investment and international investment law. J Int Econ Law 18(4):923. See e.g., Article 3 (2) of the China-Malta BIT (2009); Article 3 of the China-Uzbekistan BIT (2011); Article 3 (2) of the China-Tanzania BIT (2015).

  78. 78.

    Article 3 (1) of the China-Korea BIT; Article 6 of the China-Canada BIT.

  79. 79.

    Article 3 (2) of the China-Korea BIT. Similar provision see Art 3 (3) of the China-Korea-Japan TIT.

  80. 80.

    Bonnitcha, Poulsen, Waibel. The political economy of the investment treaty regime. Oxford University Press, p 18

  81. 81.

    Bonnitcha, Poulsen, Waibel. The political economy of the investment treaty regime. Oxford University Press, p 103

  82. 82.

    As noted, the BITs and PTIA concluded by China after 2007 all offer pre-establishment MFN.

  83. 83.

    Mann H (2007) Investment liberalization: some key elements and issues in today’s negotiating context, issues in international investment law: background papers for the developing country investment negotiators’ forum, 5.

  84. 84.

    See e.g., Article 3 (3) of the China-Finland BIT.

  85. 85.

    See e.g., Article 9 of the China-Canada BIT; Article 7 of the China-Korea-Japan TIT.

  86. 86.

    Levine M (2019) Towards a fourth generation of Chinese treaty practice: substantive changes, balancing mechanisms, and selective adaption. In: Chaisse J (ed) China’s international investment strategy: bilateral, regional, and global law and policy. Oxford University Press, p 213

  87. 87.

    Shan W, Chen H (2016) China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In: Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press, p 233

  88. 88.

    Shan W, Wang L (2015) The China–EU BIT and the emerging “Global BIT 2.0”. ICSID Rev – Foreign Invest Law J 30(1):262

  89. 89.

    For example, Art 8.9 of the CETA.

  90. 90.

    For example, Article 1 of the China-Mexico BIT, Article 1 of the China-Uzbekistan BIT, Article 1 (1) of the China-Tanzania BIT, Article 1 of the China-Japan-Korea TIT, and Article 1 of the China-Canada BIT, etc.

  91. 91.

    Articles 18 - 21 of the China-Japan-Korea TIT.

  92. 92.

    Article 8 of the China-Canada BIT.

  93. 93.

    Sustainable development orientation is also a key feature of substantive clauses in new generation of IIAs, see UNCTAD, Taking Stock of IIA Reform: Recent Development, IIA Issues Note (June 2019), p 2.

  94. 94.

    Article 10 of the China-Tanzania BIT. Similar provisions see also Article 18 (3) of the China-Canada BIT, Article 23 of the China-Japan-Korea TIT. For general discussion on Chinese BIT practice on environmental protection.

  95. 95.

    Article 33 of the China-Canada BIT.

  96. 96.

    For example, Preamble of the China- Uzbekistan BIT and the China-Tanzania BIT.

  97. 97.

    For example, the China-Canada BIT contains 14 provisions on establishing the investor-State arbitration mechanism (Part C Articles 19–32), in addition to ad hoc arbitration with a three-member tribunal for State-State disputes (Article 15).

  98. 98.

    For general discuss see Weeramantry JR (2012) Investor-State dispute settlement provisions in China’s investment treaties. ICSID Rev 27(1):192–206.

  99. 99.

    Cai C (2006) Outward foreign direct investment protection and effectiveness of Chinese BIT practice. J World Invest Trade 7(5):621, p 646

  100. 100.

    Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 320.

  101. 101.

    Notification of China, 7 January 1993.

  102. 102.

    For example, Article 22 of the China-Canada BIT.

  103. 103.

    Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 332.

  104. 104.

    Article 21 (2) of the China-Canada BIT.

  105. 105.

    For example, Article 21 (2) and Annex C. 21 of the China-Canada BIT.

  106. 106.

    In Maffezini v Spain, for example, the tribunal applied the MFN provision to permit the claimant to proceed directly to international arbitration without having to attempt to resolve the dispute in the local courts for 18 months as stipulated in the basic treaty.

  107. 107.

    For a general discussion see Shen W (2011) The good, the bad or the ugly? A critique of the decision on jurisdiction and competence in Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, Chin J Int Law 10(1):55–95.

  108. 108.

    For example, Article 5 (3) of the China-Canada BIT, Article 4 of the China-Japan-Korea BIT, Article 4 (3) of the China-Uzbekistan BIT, etc.

  109. 109.

    Shan W, Wang L (2015) The China–EU BIT and the emerging “Global BIT 2.0”. ICSID Rev – Foreign Invest Law J 30(1):264. Shan W, Chen H (2016) “China–US BIT negotiation and the emerging Chinese BIT 4.0. In: Lim CL (ed) Alternative visions of the international law on foreign investment: essays in honour of Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah. Cambridge University Press, pp 246–247

  110. 110.

    6 cases initiated by Chinese investors include Jetion and T-Hertz v Greece (2019, Pending), Sanum Investments v Laos (2017, pending), Beijing Urban Construction v Yemen (2014, settled), Ping An v Belgium (2012, decided in favour of State), Bejing Shougang and others v Mongolia (2010, decided in favour of state) and Tza Yap Shum v Peru (2007, decided in favor of investor). 3 cases against China are Hela Schwarz v China (2017, pending), Ansung Housing v China (2014, decided in favour of State), and Ekran v China (2011, settled).

  111. 111.

    Ming Du, Wei Shen (2019) The future of investor-State dispute settlement: exploring China’s changing attitude. In: Julien Chaisse et al (eds) Handbook of international investment law and policy 4

  112. 112.

    See e.g., Trakman L (2015) Geopolitics, China and Investor-State Arbitration. In: Toohey L, Picker C, Greenacre J (eds) China in the international economic order: new directions and changing paradigms. Cambridge University Press, p 280; Wang G (2011) Chinese mechanisms for resolving investor-State disputes. Jindal J Int Aff 1(1):204–233; Global Arbitration Review, First ICSID case filed against China, 26 May 2011; Pathiranan D (2017) A look into China’s slowly increasing appearance in ISDS Cases. Investment Treaty News. Sauvant KP, Nolan MD (2015) China’s outward foreign direct investment and international investment law. J Int Econ Law 18(4):931–932

  113. 113.

    Gallagher N, Shan W (2009) Chinese investment treaties: policies and practice. Oxford University Press, p 349

  114. 114.

    See UNCTAD (2019) Taking stock of IIA reform: recent development, IIA issues note., pp 3–4

  115. 115.

    Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS)- Submission from the Government of China, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.177. https://undocs.org/en/A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.177

  116. 116.

    Du & Shen (2019) 22.

  117. 117.

    Roberts A, John T (2019) UNCITRAL and ISDS reform: China’s proposal, EJIL:Talk!, 5 August 2019. https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-chinas-proposal/

  118. 118.

    Roberts A, John T (2019) UNCITRAL and ISDS reform: China’s proposal, EJIL:Talk!, 5 August 2019. https://www.ejiltalk.org/uncitral-and-isds-reform-chinas-proposal/. Shan W, Wang L (2015) The China–EU BIT and the emerging “Global BIT 2.0”. ICSID Rev – Foreign Invest Law J 30(1):265–267

  119. 119.

    Du & Shen (2019) 23.

  120. 120.

    Mainland-Hong Kong CEPA investment agreement, Articles 19, 20 (2017).

  121. 121.

    UNICTRAL Working Group III (2019) Possible reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Submission from the government of China: Note by the Secretariat. p 5

  122. 122.

    Wei D (2012) “Bilateral investment treaties: an empirical analysis of the practices of Brazil and China. Eur J Law Econ 33(3):663

  123. 123.

    Du & Shen (2019) 24.

  124. 124.

    Bath (2016) “One belt and one road” and Chinese investment. 189

  125. 125.

    See, e.g., Trakman LE (2017) China’s regulation of foreign direct investment. In: Asia’s changing international investment regime: sustainability, regionalization, and arbitration (eds: Chaisse J, et al). pp 84–88

  126. 126.

    Berger (2019) The political economy of Chinese investment treaties. p 162

  127. 127.

    Levine (2019) pp 213–217.

  128. 128.

    Sauvant KP, Nolan MD, (2015) China’s outward foreign direct investment and international investment law. J Int Econ Law. 18(4):934

  129. 129.

    Trakman (2017). 91.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Herbert Smith Freehills China International Business and Economic Law (CIBEL) Centre, Faculty of Law, the University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, Australia

    Heng Wang & Lu Wang

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  1. Heng Wang
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  2. Lu Wang
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Correspondence to Lu Wang .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Law, City University of Hong Kong, Kowloon, Hong Kong

    Prof. Julien Chaisse

  2. School of Business and Law, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, UK

    Prof. Leïla Choukroune

  3. Institute of Malaysian and International Studies, National University of Malaysia, Bangi, Selangor, Malaysia

    Dr. Sufian Jusoh

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Wang, H., Wang, L. (2021). China’s Bilateral Investment Treaties. In: Chaisse, J., Choukroune, L., Jusoh, S. (eds) Handbook of International Investment Law and Policy. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-3615-7_37

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