Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy

Living Edition
| Editors: Henrik Lagerlund


  • Maarten J. F. M. HoenenEmail author
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1151-5_19-2


Albertism is a movement within late-medieval Aristotelianism that distinguished itself from other contemporary philosophical schools by taking Albert the Great as the most reliable interpreter of Aristotle. Its main representatives were Johannes de Nova Domo (Paris) and Heymericus de Campo (Cologne). Albertism was very critical of Nominalism and challenged Thomism and Scotism on a number of issues in the field of logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. Its main center throughout the fifteenth century was the Bursa Laurentiana at the University of Cologne, which housed Johannes Hulshout of Mechelen, Gerardus de Harderwijck, and Arnoldus Luyde de Tongeris. They were active in the writing of Albertist manuals and commentaries on Aristotle, most of which were printed in large numbers and distributed at many different universities. In these writings, the Albertists took a well-defined stand on a number of issues without, however, developing an independent, all-embracing philosophical system – an observation that also applies to the other schools of thought. In the modern period, it lost much of its attraction because of its critical attitude toward Nominalism and due to the fact that, unlike Thomism and Scotism, it lacked support from the religious orders. Some of its ideas nevertheless survived within different Thomistic and Scotistic schools.

What Is Albertism?

Albertism is a philosophical and theological movement that was primarily active in the fifteenth century and which, in sources of the period, was called the via alberti or via albertistarum. Its adherents were labeled albertistae. For the most part, these terms appear in commentaries on Aristotle or in independent works dealing with issues related to the reading of Aristotle as this was practiced in the arts faculties of the various universities. Occasionally, references to the via alberti or to the albertistae can also be found in theological treatises.

Most characteristically, the Albertists defended a reading of Aristotle, which was drawn from the writings of Albert the Great and which they themselves distinguished from those of other late-medieval schools of thought, such as Thomism, Scotism, and Nominalism. This Albertist reading of Aristotle is documented in a great number of treatises written secundum viam alberti or secundum processum albertistarum, most of which were printed in Cologne in the 1480s and 1490s, but also in the writings of numerous other authors who refer to the views of the Albertists in their writings, such as the Parisian philosopher Johannes Versor and the theologian Denys the Carthusian.

Prior to the fifteenth century, thinkers also frequently referred to the writings of Albert the Great and used them as a starting point for their philosophical and theological reflections. A good example is Ulrich of Strasbourg, who in contemporary sources was referred to as discipulus alberti. The influence of Albert the Great is also visible in the works of other thirteenth- and fourteenth-century philosophers and theologians, such as Dietrich of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart, sometimes even very prominently, not least because contemporaries considered Albert to be one of the main expositores of Aristotle. However, in none of these cases is there mention of albertistae, in terms of members of a school of thought with a self-proclaimed identity nor in terms of a specific reading of Aristotle that was programmatically applied in all main parts of the arts curriculum, as was the case with Albertism in the fifteenth century.

Johannes De Nova Domo and Heymericus De Campo

The precise circumstances under which the via alberti came into existence and established itself are still obscure. In any case, the role of Johannes de Nova Domo, a master of arts, active at the University of Paris at the beginning of the fifteenth century, was crucial. He quoted Albert extensively in his works, calling him doctor meus, and compared Albert’s teachings with those of Thomas Aquinas. Most importantly, he considered Albert the most thorough and faithful interpreter of ancient Aristotelianism, that is, the philosophical movement represented according to him not only by Aristotle but also by Boethius, Avicenna, and Averroes. In fifteenth-century sources, as in the works of Johannes de Nova Domo himself, this movement was also called the “peripatetic tradition” and as such carefully distinguished from other ancient schools, like those of the Platonists, Stoics, and Epicureans. According to Johannes de Nova Domo, the sententia peripateticorum is best found in the works of Albert, much more so than in those of Thomas Aquinas, who in several places had not considered decisive issues as carefully as had his teacher.

Also of crucial significance was the relationship of Albertism to the Christian Faith. As Johannes de Nova Domo makes clear at the outset of his De esse et essentia, the Aristotelian tradition as documented in the writings of Albert was especially well suited to explaining and corroborating matters of Faith, much more so than any other philosophical tradition, even the Platonist, all of which encountered serious conflicts with Revelation. Remarkably, it is in Johannes de Nova Domo that one finds the notion of the harmony between Aristotle and Faith most strongly expressed, a feature which later in the century became the hallmark of Thomism.

Johannes de Nova Domo taught in Paris. It was however through the activities of his pupil Heymericus de Campo at Cologne that Albertism developed into a school of thought with an institutional framework that secured its survival for many years to come. For Heymericus, as for Johannes de Nova Domo, Albert the Great was the best reader of Aristotle. In his Tractatus problematicus, written in 1423 in Cologne, Heymericus demonstrated that on many occasions the interpretations of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas were different and sometimes even radically opposed. However, before he entered into a discussion of the views of what he considered to be the main representatives of philosophical thought in his time, the principales huius temporis philosophiae defensores, namely, the Albertists and Thomists, he first critically examined and then rejected the views of the Nominalists in the opening parts of his Tractatus problematicus, which, for that reason, he entitled Contra Modernos.

Criticism of Nominalism

Nominalism does not deserve to be reckoned as part of the Aristotelian tradition, Heymeric argued, because its defenders deny the existence of real universals outside the human mind. According to Aristotle, the objects of scientific knowledge are necessary and universal. Therefore, if universals had only a mental existence, then the sciences would not deal with reality but only with human thought, which would be absurd. For this reason, Heymeric concluded, Nominalists can only do logic, which is indeed concerned with human concepts, but none of the sciences dealing with things outside the human mind, such as physics and metaphysics. As the main representatives of Nominalism, he mentioned William of Ockham, John Buridan, and Marsilius of Inghen and considered the first to be the inaugurator of Nominalism, who out of jealousy had distorted Aristotelianism and invented an opposing school of his own.

This criticism of Nominalism, which in a less vigorous way was also present in the writings of Johannes de Nova Domo, had enormous impact. Both the argument that Nominalists are unable to engage in physics and metaphysics and the verdict that Nominalism does not belong to the Aristotelian tradition were repeated time and again until well into the sixteenth century. As a consequence, Nominalist authors were excluded from academic debates, which had an immediate practical effect. As a rule, in the commentaries on Aristotle written by Albertists, Nominalist authors were not mentioned and their positions not discussed. The most important conversants in their debates were the Thomists and, to a lesser extent, the Scotists. At Cologne, the Nominalists were also ignored by the Thomists, who, as far as this matter was concerned, shared the critical view of the Albertists.

From treatises produced within the faculties of theology, a more or less similar picture emerges. Here Albertists and Thomists also made a common stand against Nominalism. Exemplary is a disputation held at the Theological Faculty, at the University of Cologne in 1480. Here the Nominalist Johannes Rype de Alen was attacked by representatives of both schools but most powerfully by the Albertist Gerardus de Harderwijck, who accused him of not following the teachings of Aristotle when discussing the relations between the three divine persons. Johannes Rype de Alen identified these relations with the divine persons themselves, as had Ockham before him, and to whom he also openly referred. This caused Gerardus to object that Johannes denied any real distinction between the categories of substance and relation and that he thus ignored the principles of Aristotle. Significantly, for Albertists, the principles of Aristotelian philosophy also count when discussing the mysteries of Christian Faith, such as the Trinity and the Incarnation.

Not only in Cologne but also elsewhere the relationship between Aristotelian philosophy and Christian Faith was a matter of much debate. For many Albertists, Nominalism posed a serious danger to the adequate understanding of Christian Faith. They were supported in this perception by a large number of Thomists and Scotists. For this and other reasons, at the Universities of Heidelberg, Tübingen, Freiburg, and Ingolstadt, the arts faculties became divided into two different camps: that of the via moderna, defended by Nominalists, and that of the via antiqua, supported by Albertists, Thomists, and Scotists, each with their own reading of Aristotle and their own exams. In this way, the supporters of the via antiqua tried to avoid that students with a mistaken understanding of Aristotle would cause troubles in theology. As a result, Albertism, together with Thomism and Scotism, became one of the principal movements within the via antiqua.

The consequences of this development, which took place in the second half of the fifteenth century, cannot be underestimated. At one and the same university in the same year, the same texts of Aristotle were read by two different masters from two different perspectives, that of the via antiqua and that of the via moderna. In the case of the via antiqua, the works of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus were used and, in that of the via moderna, those of William of Ockham, John Buridan, and Marsilius of Inghen. Against the background of this institutional separation, it becomes clear why, in actual fact, the doctrinal profile of Albertism established itself largely through debates with Thomism and Scotism and not so much with Nominalism.

Albertism and Thomism

As Heymericus reports in a 1458 letter to the University of Cologne (the so-called Invectiva), when he first arrived in the city in 1422, he encountered the same philosophical schools he knew from Paris, including the Albertists and Thomists. When then asked to list the agreements and disagreements between these two schools in an academic dispute, the Thomist Gerardus de Monte reacted ferociously, claiming that it was impossible to find any agreement between Albertism and Thomism or to harmonize their methodologies in any coherent way. The Thomists obviously felt compelled to draw a clear line of demarcation between themselves and Albertism, although the reasons for this attitude remain uncertain. In all probability, however, they were dissatisfied with the way Albert the Great had proceeded in his commentaries on Aristotle. For, as Albert repeatedly stated, he tried to understand Aristotle solely on the basis of the natural principles of Aristotle himself without any reference to miracles or Faith, even if this would lead to conflicts with Revelation – an approach clearly differing from that of Thomas Aquinas. That Albertists, like Johannes de Nova Domo, claimed philosophy should be in harmony with the Christian Faith was for the Thomists in Cologne void and not in accord with the approach taken in Albert’s own commentaries. Heymericus was not taken aback by Gerardus de Monte, however, and in his account of the dispute (the Tractatus problematicus), he described not only the differences between the two schools but also those points where they were, to his mind, in agreement. Where he observed a disagreement, he added a so-called concordantia in which he tried to bring the two schools together, showing, for example, that a conceptual ambiguity was involved or that the texts of Aristotle were unclear. Obviously he viewed the opposition between the two schools from the perspective to which his training in Paris had accustomed him, one more moderate than that current in Cologne, as manifested by Gerardus de Monte’s uncompromising reaction. From this, an initial conclusion may be drawn – one of paramount importance for an adequate understanding of the early years of Albertism – namely, that its image as a movement fundamentally distinct from Thomism, and not merely on individual points but taken as a whole, had its origin in Cologne. It was a product of Thomism and imposed upon the followers of Albert the Great, who were themselves far less radical, even if they also observed a number of clear disagreements.

However, the situation changed toward 1456, when Gerardus, by then one of the most important Thomists at Cologne, in his Concordantiae dictorum Thomae Aquinatis et Alberti Magni once again attacked Heymericus but this time from entirely the opposite angle. Gerardus now claimed that, in the Tractatus problematicus, Heymericus had opposed the views of Albert and Thomas where in fact there is no conflict between their views at all. Gerardus came to this conclusion, according to his own account, after a renewed study of the writings of the two Dominicans. This rereading made it evident to him that both authors operated from exactly the same premises and that Heymericus had fundamentally misunderstood Albert’s and, above all, Thomas’ positions. Heymericus, at that time no longer active in Cologne but teaching in Leuven as professor of theology, reacted immediately and with great ire. He defended his original views, arguing that there are points of both agreement and disagreement in Albert’s and Thomas’ reading of Aristotle and that while some of these disagreements can be resolved, others definitively cannot. This clash marked the beginning of the second phase of Albertism, which is characterized by the fact that its representatives, much more clearly than before, present the image of a school of thought opposed to Thomism, to the extent that it was now the Albertists themselves who, against the conviction of the Thomists, stressed the opposition of Albert’s and Thomas’ interpretations of Aristotle. This is also the period in which the majority of commentaries secundum viam alberti were composed and in which new points of doctrinal difference were noted and discussed. Remarkably, the treatises secundum viam thomae much less frequently entered into debate with their Albertist antagonists.

The Institutional Factor

Throughout the century, Cologne was the main center of Albertism, with important representatives in Paris, Krakow, and Uppsala. The special position of Cologne was closely linked to an institutional peculiarity. As was the general trend at late-medieval universities, courses were held increasingly in the colleges and bursae, where students lived together with one or more masters. This meant that not only daily disputations and exercises but also the regular curricular courses were stamped with the personality of a specific group of masters, namely, those who had their home in the bursa. In Cologne, several bursae of this type existed, one of which bore a clear Albertist signature, namely, the Bursa Laurentiana, named after Laurentius Berungen de Groningen, who in 1439 or 1440 became its regent master, in the legacy of such famous Albertists as Heymericus de Campo and Johannes Hulshout of Mechelen. In its later years, the bursa housed masters like Gerardus de Harderwijck and Arnoldus Luyde de Tongeris, who were active in the writing of Albertist manuals and commentaries on Aristotle.

These manuals, some of which survived in manuscripts, others in printed editions, document the daily practice of reading Aristotle according to the processus albertistarum. The text was divided into small sections introduced by a division of the text and elucidation of its content. A number of short questions followed, in which specific problems linked to the text were discussed. It is especially in these questions that the doctrinal views of the Albertists came to the fore, and the arguments of Thomists and Scotists were refuted. The Thomists and Scotists employed largely the same arrangement in their own commentaries, the most important distinction being the sources they used in dividing and explaining the text of Aristotle. As a rule, in separating the different sections of the text, the Albertist used the commentaries of Albert the Great as a model, not those of Thomas Aquinas. Most of the distinctions introduced to clarify the meaning of Aristotle, as well as the solutions to the questions, also had their origin in the works of Albert.

The Question of Doctrinal Unity

It is hardly possible to construe from the writings secundum processum albertistarum a comprehensive doctrinal unity with a clear foundation in the works of Albert the Great. Although in general the same texts of Albert were employed, and the same texts of Aristotle commented upon, the focus of the various commentaries differed. In addition, sometimes works were attributed to Albert, which were as a matter of fact not his, but were considered to be so in the fifteenth century. A telling example is the reference to magister Albertus in libro De ortu et progressu scientiarum, which appeared in an Albertist commentary on the Isagoge of Porphyry. In actuality the work quoted was not by Albert, but by Robert Kilwardby. However, in Cologne, there existed a manuscript in which the treatise was attributed to Albert the Great, carrying the same title of Super ortu et scientiarum progressu, and which was used by some Albertists. This means that for the Albertists the most important factor was not doctrinal unity and coherence, but the fact that the sources used stemmed from their professed master. The same can also be observed among the Thomists. To be sure, with the Thomists, the matter was even more complicated, as in the fifteenth century it was an open secret that the works of Thomas Aquinas contained many apparently contradictory statements, which made the construction of a coherent theory shared by all Thomists almost impossible. This ambiguity in the works of Thomas was readily exploited by the Albertists, as proof that his commentaries were not a secure guide when reading Aristotle.

It is important to recognize precisely how the Albertists (as well as the Thomists) proceeded in their commentaries, as the impossibility of finding a single, comprehensive doctrinal system based upon the works of Albert the Great himself led some earlier researchers to question the existence of an Albertist school of thought. However, the sources show that the via alberti was characterized not by internal coherence and unity, but rather by the shared use of a number of distinct doctrines when explaining Aristotle, which were taken from works attributed to Albert the Great. These were highlighted in individual questions in which these beliefs were defended against the views of other schools, primarily against those of the Thomists. Other works were entirely devoted to this purpose, such as the Promptuarium argumentorum, a manual designed to help students of the one school to find arguments against the beliefs of the other.

A study of these doctrines reveals that the majority were concerned with difficult passages or items within the texts of Aristotle that had already been discussed by the Greek and Arabic commentators, and remained bones of contention within the Aristotelian tradition, such as the principle of individuation, or the question of whether humans can have direct knowledge of separate substances. As far as these points were concerned, all those authors representing the via alberti shared the same views. Conversely, on derivative and less crucial items, there were differences among the Albertists. These latter issues, however, were never labeled as being illustrative of the via alberti.

The main focus of those works labeled secundum processum albertistarum is always Aristotle and Albert the Great. Significant in this connection is that the independent works of Heymericus de Campo, such as the De sigillo aeternitatis and the Ars demonstrativa, which were clearly designed as coherent philosophical systems, were not labeled by him as Albertist. In the same way, contemporary historiography did not consider these works to be examples of the via alberti. Johannes Trithemius, for example, in his De scriptoribus ecclesiasticis, quoted these works without any references to the Albertist tradition. Moreover, he underlined their connection with Cusanus, an author who, like Heymericus in the abovementioned works, did not consider himself to be commenting on the works of Aristotle, even when Aristotle was occasionally discussed. Therefore, at least from a historical point of view, Albertism is to be regarded primarily as a movement within the Aristotelian tradition at late-medieval and early-modern universities.

Doctrinal Issues

Notwithstanding the fact that in his independent writings Heymericus does not present himself as an Albertist, it was he who in his Tractatus problematicus listed the doctrines of the via alberti and commented upon them for the first time. His treatise was crucial, as in the period to come most authors followed his views on the matter. A number of doctrines were added to the initial catalogue of 18 items, reaching a total of approximately 30 toward the end of the century, but it remained principally the same list, as the items he had mentioned were the most essential.

The following sections list a number of doctrinal points which were characteristic of Albertism and in which Albertism distinguished itself from other late-medieval schools of thought, such as Thomism, Scotism, and Nominalism. These points were argued for in commentaries secundum viam alberti and were also attributed to the Albertists in writings by members of the other schools of thought.


Against the conviction of a number of Thomists and Nominalists, the Albertist claimed that logic in itself is a purely theoretical science. The fact that logic directs the mind to argue correctly does not mean that it is in itself practical or even partially practical, as some Thomists and Nominalists had argued. Logic is solely an activity of the intellect and not of the will, being a science that has as its goal to produce true statements. To make their claim, Albertists referred to the distinction made by Aristotle between practical and theoretical sciences, whereby the former produce something outside the human mind and involve the activity of the will, while the latter remain within the mind. In this sense, logic is not practical. Only in a derivative sense can it possibly be labeled practical, namely, when logic is used as a tool in other sciences. But this does not concern the nature of logic per se. To distinguish between these two senses, Albertists discriminated between logica docens which is the theoretical science of logic in itself, as laid down, for example, in the Tractatus of Peter of Spain, and logica utens, which is the practical use of logic in physics, metaphysics, and any other science or art.


For the Albertists, matter is the sole cause of individuation. In this regard, Albertism was opposed to Scotism and Thomism, as both of these schools tried to found individuality in a formal principle: the Scotists in the so-called differentia individualis and the Thomists in matter as determined by quantity. The Albertists, however, argued that according to Aristotle, form is always universal. Principles that are based on the form of a thing can, therefore, never account for the individuality of the thing, as individuation means to be distinct from others. The only possible candidate is that which is opposed to the form, namely, matter. Being last in the order of being, matter is in itself undivided and incommunicable. Hence, it is both the root of numerical distinction from others and the root of incommunicability. Particularly against the Thomists, Albertists claimed that quantity by nature is communicable and therefore cannot be the primary source of individuation, even if directly linked to matter, since it is shared by different individuals. Matter therefore remains the single most important and complete source of individuation.

Human Knowledge

It was the firm belief of Albertists that humans can have direct knowledge of separate substances already in their earthly life. On this point, Albertism distinguished itself from Thomism and Nominalism. For representatives of both these schools argued that, according to Aristotle, all human knowledge begins with the senses. Therefore substances that are not perceived by the senses, such as separate substances, cannot be known directly but only indirectly through the sensible effects they produce. The Albertist, however, maintained that this reading of Aristotle is too narrow. When dealing with the knowledge and being of separate substances in his Metaphysics, Aristotle had remarked that separate substances know themselves and that human beings sometimes, for a very brief moment, possess the same knowledge as separate substances. For the Albertist, this passage clearly confirmed that Aristotle was of the opinion that humans sometimes know separate substances directly, as they do themselves, even if this is the exception rather than the rule. To further corroborate their reading of Aristotle, Albertists referred to the theory of the intellectus adeptus as put forward in the writings of Avicenna and Averroes. If humans have collected sufficient sense data, they are able to turn their intellect immediately to the source of the intelligibility of that sense data, namely, the agent intellect, which is itself either a separate substance or a direct emanation of a separate substance. In both cases, humans can know separate substances without first turning to the senses. It is in the immediate knowledge of separate substances that humans grasp the first principles of both theoretical and practical knowledge, such as the principle of non-contradiction or the rule that the good is to be striven for and the bad avoided.

Being and Essence

Albertists strongly opposed the claim of Thomists that there is a real distinction between being (ens or esse) and essence (essentia). As Denys the Carthusian reported in his commentary on the Sentences, it was the depth of the Albertist’s response to the Thomists on this issue which caused him to switch from the Thomistic to the Albertist side. According to the Albertists, it is fundamental to the sententia of Aristotle that the substantial form and nothing else conveys being to the thing determined by this form. This being is not attributed to the thing from the outside, but flows from the substantial form, which is itself a substantial part of the thing. The essence and the being of the thing are no more distinct than the significates of a respective noun and verb: the former highlighting the thing of the act and the latter the act of the thing, as, for example, the noun “walk” signifies a distance walked or to be walked and the verb “walk” the moving or traveling this distance. A similar point had already been made by Dietrich of Freiberg against Thomas Aquinas. According to the Albertists, it was Averroes who, against Avicenna, made clear that this was how Aristotle needed to be understood. That being is given by the substantial form does not mean that the form is a completely independent source of being. The substantial form is only the principle of the formal being. Besides this form, there is the agent, which acts from without as an efficient cause and produces the thing, thus bringing it from non-being into being. According to Aristotle, the agent is really distinct from the thing produced, as the efficient cause is not part of the thing in the way that the formal cause is. In this sense, and only in this sense, the Albertists maintained, can one speak of a real distinction between the thing and the being of the thing caused from without. If that is what the Thomists intend, then there is no real opposition between the two schools. If however the Thomists speak of being as something distinct from and added to the substantial form, then they truly depart from the Aristotelian tradition, according to the Albertists.

The Proper Object of Logic

Several items that in contemporary sources were labeled characteristic of the via alberti were not mentioned by Heymericus in his Tractatus problematicus but appear only later, in the second half of the fifteenth century. The most significant of these is the view that logic is primarily concerned with second-order rather than with first-order concepts. First-order concepts are concepts of things in reality, such as men and living beings. Second-order concepts, on the other hand, are concepts attributed to these first-order concepts, such as “species” and “genus,” in propositions like “man is a species” and “living being is a genus.” In maintaining that logic primarily deals with second-order concepts, the Albertist was in full agreement with the Scotist, against the Thomists and Nominalists. Although the debate concerned the genuine nature of logic according to Aristotle, its immediate source was a remark made by Avicenna in his Metaphysics, which stated that the subject of logic is second-order concepts added to first-order ones. Albertists thus saw themselves as the true followers of Avicenna’s reading of Aristotle on this point, a reading which, according to them, was imperative, because otherwise the distinction made in the Aristotelian tradition between logic on the one hand and physics and metaphysics on the other would collapse. Logic is a rational science, whereas physics and metaphysics are real ones. Although all these sciences can talk about man, logic is not interested in man as a real man, nor in the concept of man, but rather in the concepts that can be predicated of the concept used in the real sciences to refer to real men. Because, the Albertists argued, the concept of man is predicated of numerically distinct men in reality, this concept has the nature of a species, and thus the second-order term “species” can be predicated of it. The Albertists admitted that there is a certain relationship between first- and second-order concepts, inasmuch as the latter, say “species,” are attributed to the former, say “man,” dependent on the fact that the first-order concept “man” refers to different individuals in reality. However, and this is crucial, they did not consider second-order concepts to be a natural property of first-order concepts, as the Thomists claimed, nor to be a natural sign of them, as the Nominalists maintained. Logic, for the Albertists, was a science concerned with second-order concepts ontologically independent of first-order concepts. In short, logic is a true science in its own right.


As said above, the majority of texts secundum viam alberti were written in the second half of the fifteenth century. In the century to come, their number declined, and the Albertists gradually disappeared as significant contributors to philosophical and theological debates, as was the case with other medieval schools of thought. To be sure, this does not mean that the reading of Aristotle put forth in the writings of Albert the Great was no longer of interest. On the contrary, his works continued to be published and read. However, his reading was no longer supported by institutions especially devoted to this task, as had previously been the case, and became henceforth the matter of a few dedicated individuals. The institutional death of Albertism was largely the result of shifting doctrinal interests. Its opposition to Nominalism was critically regarded by Cartesians, and its proximity to Thomism, despite all controversies, made it difficult for Protestant authors to accept. That despite the same pressures Thomism was able to persist was largely due to the establishment of chairs devoted to the reading of Thomas and especially to the enormous efforts of both the Dominican and Jesuit orders – an institutional support system which was not granted to Albertism, consequently leaving the tradition to be divided and absorbed into the various Thomistic and Scotistic schools of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.



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© Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Departement Künste, Medien, PhilosophieUniversität BaselBaselSwitzerland