Hinduism and Tribal Religions

Living Edition
| Editors: Pankaj Jain, Rita Sherma, Madhu Khanna


  • Anupam Jash
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-024-1036-5_536-1



The term pramāṇa is mainly used in Indian philosophy to designate the instrumental cause of a true or valid cognition. It is also used by some Indian schools to mean a true cognition itself.


The concept of pramāṇa plays a very crucial role in Indian epistemology ([1], p. 126). Pramāṇa is predominantly understood in Indian philosophy as the instrument of true or valid cognition. The Sanskrit word jñāna, used in Indian philosophy, does not translate into the English word “knowledge” in the sense of justified true belief as used by Western philosophers. In what follows, we shall use the word “knowledge” in the sense of denoting a “true cognition.” The word jñāna in Indian philosophy usually stands for a cognition which is either true or false ([2], p. 17) and denotes a mental episode which occurs at a certain moment of time. This concept of jñāna prompts most Indian philosopher to take a causal view of cognition ([3], p. 155)....

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyBankura Christian CollegeBankuraIndia