Abstract
The first section surveys Australian philosophy of religion, putting greater emphasis on the more distinctively Australian contributions, without any implication that it is good for there to be distinctively Australian contributions. It also exhibits connections between the philosophy of religion and Australian contributions to other areas of philosophy. The second section surveys philosophy of religion in New Zealand.
Peter Forrest is the author of the section ‘Philosophy of Religion in Australia’ and John Bishop and Ken Perszyk are the authors of the section ‘Philosophy of Religion in New Zealand’.
Many thanks to Nick Trakakis for his helpful editorial comments.
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Notes
- 1.
For an alternative account of Australian philosophy of religion before about 1980, see Grave (1984).
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
For some further remarks on Platonist and other interpretations of the Dreaming, see Charlesworth’s introduction to Charlesworth et al. (2005).
- 5.
‘Concupiscence’ is the tendency to satisfy your appetites even when it is contrary to reason to do so, as it might be to eat the whole cake. ‘Concupittance’, coined in honour of the theologian Don Cupitt, is the desire, contrary to reason, to eat the whole cake and still have a slice or two.
- 6.
See, however, Duff-Forbes (1961) for some criticisms of various defences of religious language from the charge of unfalsifiability.
- 7.
Evils X and Y are incommensurable if it is neither the case that X is worse than Y nor that Y is worse than X nor that X and Y are equal. While equality is transitive, incommensurability is not. Here is an example of incommensurable evils adapted from Bernard Williams’ story of Jim and the Indians. The police chief first offers Jim a choice between killing two Indians or himself shooting all ten. When Jim hesitates, the police chief ‘generously’ offers him the choice between killing just one Indian or himself shooting all ten. When Jim still hesitates, the police chief berates him for irrationality on the grounds that if his dislike of killing two Indians is roughly equal to his dislike of allowing ten to be killed, then, surely, his dislike of killing just one must be significantly less than his dislike of allowing ten to be killed. I judge, and invite readers to judge, that Jim is not irrational and that this is an example of incommensurable evils.
- 8.
Types of act should be characterised in a language without proper names, and a type of act performed by an agent x should have x and only x as a free variable.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11.
Although a defender of pantheism, Levine resists the thesis that standard theism collapses into pantheism (Levine 1984).
- 12.
Worth noting is the Intelligent Design conference, held at the Australian Catholic University in 2006.
- 13.
A further contribution: Nagasawa (2007a) has defended the ontological argument against Millikan’s criticism that existence is not a perfection.
- 14.
- 15.
These conferences arose out of an occasional series that dates back to a ‘Christianity and Platonism’ conference in Melbourne in 1977.
- 16.
Andrew Dole and Andrew Chignell have recently identified Flew and MacIntyre’s edited collection (1955) as a ‘transitional document’ beginning a movement towards ‘lines of inquiry that had been blocked by the positivists’ (2005: 7–8). For an account of why the resurgence of interest in philosophy of religion in recent decades occurred within the analytical—and not Continental—tradition, see Wolterstorff (2009).
- 17.
For the explanation of their choice of the term ‘Philosophical Theology’, see Flew and MacIntyre’s (1955) preface, viii.
- 18.
For an influential defence of the right of Christian philosophers to philosophise from Christian presuppositions, see Alvin Plantinga’s 1983 inaugural lecture ‘Advice to Christian Philosophers’ in Plantinga (1984).
- 19.
Mary Prior reports (personal communication to Max Cresswell) that the problem of free will and divine omniscience was ‘in the air’ in their discussions, and it may be that Prior’s initial interest in the logic of time was motivated by an interest in formalising theological arguments on this topic. That Prior had deep theological interests is, anyway, clear from his earlier published writings. Mike Grimshaw remarks that ‘if Prior the man is to be understood, then we need to look at his early published work which locates him as potentially one of New Zealand’s greatest theologians – if he had chosen that route of study’ (2002: 480).
- 20.
Findlay’s paper was originally published after he went to King’s College, London; Hughes’ reply was originally published before he arrived in Wellington.
- 21.
- 22.
For an account of Geering’s work and career, see Paul Morris’ introduction to The Lloyd Geering Reader (2008).
- 23.
Note, however, John Owens’ (2004) critique of a common interpretation of the Wittgensteinianism of D. Z. Phillips.
- 24.
- 25.
Perszyk’s (2011) edited collection on Molinism grew out of this workshop.
- 26.
In Bradley’s own words: ‘God himself drowned the whole human race except Noah and his family [Gen. 7:23]; he punished King David for carrying out a census that he himself had ordered and then complied with David’s request that others be punished instead of him by sending a plague to kill 70,000 people [II Sam. 24:1–15]; and he commanded Joshua to kill old and young, little children, maidens and women (the inhabitants of some 31 kingdoms) while pursuing his genocidal practices of ethnic cleansing in the lands that orthodox Jews still regard as part of Greater Israel [see Josh., chapter 10 in particular]’. See also Michael Tooley’s remarks on revealed religions and the argument from evil (in Plantinga and Tooley 2008: 73–76) and Lewis (2007).
- 27.
Describing itself as ‘an association of people who have a common interest in exploring religious thought and expression from a non-dogmatic and human-oriented standpoint’, the Sea of Faith Network was founded in the wake of Don Cupitt’s 1984 BBC television documentary series and book with that title, taken from Matthew Arnold’s poem ‘Dover Beach’.
- 28.
The Open Society 78.1 (2005).
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Forrest, P., Bishop, J., Perszyk, K. (2014). Philosophy of Religion in Australasia. In: Oppy, G., Trakakis, N. (eds) History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_16
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