Philosophy of Language

Frederick Kroon; Denis Robinson

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6958-8_15

History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand pp 413-443 | Cite as

Philosophy of Language

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Frederick KroonEmail author
Denis Robinson

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First Online: 25 June 2014

Abstract

Philosophy of language is a ‘philosophy of’ discipline, concerned with conceptual issues centring on the nature, origin and purpose of language, in all its multifarious uses. As such, it is a relatively new part of philosophy, unlike, say, metaphysics or ethics. The present chapter focuses on philosophy of language in Australasia, but because philosophy of language is a field with an impressive prehistory/early history, we begin our discussion by looking at central features of that early history. Later sections cover major themes in philosophy of language as it has developed in Australasia.

Keywords

Conceptual Analysis Propositional Attitude Ordinary Language Impossible World Natural Kind Term

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Appendix: The University of Melbourne, Philosophy of Language and the Oxford Connection

Melbourne

Although the University of Melbourne is sometimes portrayed as a hotbed of Wittgensteinianism in the 1950s and 1960s, not unnaturally given the presence of Wittgenstein’s students A. C. Jackson and D. A. T. Gasking, in the course of the 1960s this became progressively more of an oversimplification. (What remained true, however, was that Melbourne maintained a tradition of sending graduate students to Oxbridge, primarily to Oxford, rather than to North America—though this tradition faded out around 1980 when Mark Johnston (now at Princeton) and Neil Lewis (now at Georgetown) went from Melbourne to Princeton and Pittsburgh, respectively).

In the mid-1960s a lot of philosophy of language was being taught at Melbourne, and much of it was non-Wittgensteinian. Keith Campbell arrived around 1964, after studying at Oxford, and gave honours seminars on topics in semantics, beginning with Peirce, Frege and Carnap. Len O’Neill had gone from Melbourne to study at Cambridge, where he worked with Jonathan Bennett on the analytic/synthetic distinction, after which he returned in the mid-1960s to a lectureship at Melbourne (Keith Campbell having moved on to Sydney). Douglas Gasking, despite his Wittgensteinian background and tendencies, was very interested in Quine’s work and published a useful paper on the analytic/synthetic controversy. (Gasking and, in his footsteps, O’Neill were also big fans of Peirce.) BA(Hons) students were encouraged to study Word and Object (Quine 1960): The focus was often on Quine’s linguistic behaviourism and the indeterminacy of translation, but Word and Object’s exploration of the theory of reference in relation to a range of different grammatical categories of ordinary language was also noted. Gasking’s interests were wide-ranging, but in philosophy of language he was also particularly interested in Wittgenstein’s notion of ‘criterion’ and in the analysis of propositional attitude ascriptions.

In 1968 Donald Davidson gave the Gavin David Young Lecture at Adelaide University, on ‘Agency and Causality’. (Among his predecessors was Quine, who in 1959 spoke on ‘Terms and Objects’.) Davidson visited Melbourne on that trip and gave various talks. At one of these talks (possibly ‘On Saying That’, but my memory is uncertain), at La Trobe University, he began by outlining the ‘Davidson program’ for adapting Tarski’s semantic methods to giving recursive truth-definitions for natural languages. Interjections from the audience, some asserting that Tarski’s theory of truth ‘just relies on a trick’, led to Davidson giving a heated impromptu lecture on Tarskian semantics. The debate prefigured issues which were later to be much discussed in the literature, over whether substitutional quantification using propositional variables could provide a very quick way of deducing instances of Tarski’s T-schema, whether if so the result should be counted as a way of meeting Davidson’s demands for a recursive truth-theory for natural language, and whether if so this should be taken as a reductio of Davidson’s proposal. Vociferous irreverent participants in this debate included Brian Ellis and John F. Fox—the latter was, some years later, to write the seminal article ‘Truthmaker’ (Fox 1987).

One of those present was Barry Taylor, who became an enthusiast for the Davidson program. Taylor had around the same time heard Richard Routley, as he then was, discussing the problem of giving a semantical treatment (in terms of ‘setups’) for relevant disjunction, and had found the talk interesting, though opaque. Taylor had already, after only one year of university study, worked through the entirety of Carnap’s Logical Syntax of Language (1937), and by the time he encountered Davidson, he had also made a close study of Word and Object. Building on these foundations, Taylor decided to write his MA thesis on Quine’s views on ontological commitment: The rather formal treatment, in a Davidsonian spirit, brought Tarskian tools to bear on the topic. Taylor was thus exceptionally well prepared for the intellectual milieu he was to encounter in Oxford. Some others who went to Oxford had picked up some elements of the same influences.

Oxford

In the early 1970s Oxford saw an increasing ferment of interest in the philosophy of language. Davidson had given the 1969/1970 Locke Lectures (‘The Structure and Content of Truth’), and his influence grew steadily in the ensuing years. But the familiar joke about the ‘Davidsonic boom’ greatly oversimplifies things. In 1970 Kripke gave his ‘Naming and Necessity’ lectures, soon to be published in the same Synthese volume as Lewis’ ‘General Semantics’, and papers by Montague, Geach and Harman. All of these drew significant attention in Oxford, so that much discussion there in the early 1970s touched on such topics as categorical grammars, the notion of logical form, intensional versus extensional truth-theoretic semantics, the theory of reference and other central topics in philosophy of language. Strawson and Ayer were among those whose graduate seminars touched on Truth and Meaning (topic and article both). Dummett, though he had published little of what was to come, had been very influential in the years leading up to the 1973 publication of Frege: Philosophy of Language (Dummett 1973), and his influence grew further after that publication. Lewis made visits to Oxford in this period; he was ensconced in St. Catherine’s College during some of the time he was writing Counterfactuals (Lewis 1973), and photocopies of his handwritten chapter drafts were in circulation (Mackie was lecturing on counterfactuals at this time and metalinguistic accounts were not yet regarded as beyond salvation). He also presented his paper ‘Language and Languages’ at Oxford during this period.

Quine visited at least twice between 1971 and 1974. On one visit he gave a named lecture, with much ritual formality, on ‘Semi-Substitutional Quantification’. Early in 1974 he gave one of the Wolfson College Lectures, other lecturers including Davidson, Dummett and Geach. Kripke was the 1973/1974 Locke Lecturer (‘Reference and Existence’). Participants at a memorable conference at Great Windsor Park around that time included Quine, Davidson, Kripke, Dummett, Evans, McDowell, Geach and Anscombe. Much of the material from this conference and lecture series wound up either in Guttenplan (1975) or Evans and McDowell (1976). (The title of the latter collection, Truth and Meaning, reflects the ‘Davidsonic boom’, but Dummett’s influence in that context is evidenced by, for instance, his inclusion in both collections, not to mention McDowell’s paper title in the latter: ‘Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verificationism’.) In the following semester Davidson and Dummett ran a joint seminar. Also involved in philosophy of language in this era were Dana Scott (who participated in discussion groups on Dummett’s Frege: Philosophy of Language), David Wiggins (who particularly explored connections between Frege’s work and Davidson’s project), and Crispin Wright, though from the point of view of a graduate student he was more of a reclusive eminence grise than a visibly influential figure like Evans. Chris Peacocke entered the BPhil in 1972 and was already recognised as frighteningly intelligent, learned and precocious.

Evans had spent the 1969/1970 academic year in America, attending lectures by Kripke and Quine among others while there, and returned in 1970 with a strong interest in the indeterminacy of translation, theories of reference and the Kripkean thoughts which saw publication as ‘Naming and Necessity’—topics on which he was soon lecturing in his joint graduate seminar with John McDowell. (McDowell had, around the time of Davidson’s Locke Lectures, begun an intellectual journey, by way of logical atomism, from ancient philosophy to Davidson, philosophy of language, and, subsequently, beyond).

Intellectual Traffic

There was a to-and-fro traffic between the city of Melbourne and Oxford in the 1970s. A number of philosophers of language who wound up teaching in Australian universities covered one or both parts of this journey. The direction of intellectual influence was predominantly from Oxford to Melbourne, but perhaps not wholly so.

Taylor’s arrival in Oxford in 1970, armed with a good foundational knowledge of the niceties of writing Tarskian truth-theories, was (fortuitously) perfectly timed to coincide with Evans’ and McDowell’s developing interest in the Davidson program. He became a close intellectual confidant of the two of them and (an unusual compliment to a graduate student) was at least once a guest lecturer in their joint semantics seminar, the must-attend seminar for many graduate students in early-1970s Oxford. Excellent graduate students with an interest in philosophy of language were not lacking at Oxford in those days, and they all attended the Evans/McDowell seminar. As well as Christopher Peacocke they included Lloyd Humberstone, who was to make his career at Monash University, and Martin Davies, who arrived at Oxford from Monash in 1973 and was for a time later, between Oxford appointments, at the ANU.

Others who came from Melbourne during this time of philosophy of language ferment at Oxford included Lynda Burns, who arrived in 1970 to write a BPhil thesis with John Mackie on counterfactuals, and a year later Denis Robinson, who worked with John McDowell and wrote a BPhil thesis on semantics, logical form and the Davidson program. Taylor took up a lectureship in Melbourne in 1974 (revisiting Oxford in the late 1970s), and Robinson and Burns taught there throughout the remainder of the 1970s and into the early 1980s. Davies visited Melbourne for about a semester around the end of the 1970s, close to the time of his publication with Humberstone of ‘Two Notions of Necessity’, and discussed associated formal and semantic issues with Leonard Goddard, co-author with Routley of The Logic of Significance and Context (1973). Karen Green wrote a Monash honours thesis on ‘The Relation of Truth to Meaning’ in 1973 and took the Oxford BPhil with a thesis on ‘Truth and Substitutional Quantification’ in 1977, before completing a Sydney PhD (with Michael Devitt as unlikely supervisor) on ‘Sense and Psychologism: Frege to Dummett’. She then taught at Melbourne and Hobart before winding up back at Monash. John A. Burgess wrote a Davidson-program-influenced MA in the mid-1970s, supervised by Taylor, before going to Oxford to be supervised in his DPhil by Evans, until the latter’s sadly premature death in 1980.

The ‘Melbourne Semantics Group’

One or two mid-1980s publications refer to the ‘Melbourne Semantics Group’. The name was applied, mainly retrospectively, to an extremely informal discussion group, of varying composition, which met once every week or two in term time, in the evenings, at the University of Melbourne, starting late in the 1970s and running for at least several years into the 1980s. The group was partly coextensive with a group formed to discuss Dummett’s 1976 William James Lectures, circulated in a typescript photocopied from a copy available in the Harvard Departmental Library. Most people arrived carrying a bottle of wine, meetings began at 7pm, and ended at an indeterminate time around 10:30 or 11, when it was deemed that serious philosophical discussion had more or less come to a halt for the evening. The general agenda was mostly to read recent or important journal articles on semantics, construed in a broad and wide-ranging way, but including some fairly technical articles. Someone was always assigned to introduce the discussion with comments on the night’s reading: this might take as little as 20 min or as long as an hour. Allen Hazen once presented a brilliantly clear and knowledgeable 2-hour summary, without notes, of the history of post-Tarskian antecedents to and rivals of Kripke’s theory of truth. Energetic debate usually followed the initial presentation. For variation, occasionally people read draft papers of their own. (On a memorable evening, Frank Jackson read a draft of what later became a chapter of his Conditionals, on the Paradox of the Surprise Examination. David Lewis laconically remarked afterwards, ‘I think Frank seriously underestimates what he has accomplished’.) Regular members of the group in that era included Taylor, Robinson, Hazen (after his arrival in 1983), Monash’s Humberstone, and La Trobe’s John Bigelow and Robert Farrell. When they were in town (which might be only occasionally), participants also included Mark Johnston, Neil Lewis, John A. Burgess, Errol Martin, Frank Jackson, David Lewis, Martin Davies and Michael Smith. Melbourne graduate students usually helped to swell the numbers somewhat. Evenings often began—or ended—with a toast ‘to semantics’. In the early 1980s, however, the commitment of some participants to the linguistic turn waned somewhat, and some meetings of the same people became meetings of what we might in retrospect dub the Melbourne Metaphysics Group; on such occasions the toast would be ‘to metaphysics’. People’s level of discomfort with this development seemed roughly proportional to their sympathy with Putnam’s ‘just more theory’ defence of his anti-realist model-theoretic argument, against objections based on causal theories of reference. One of those who came to think the linguistic turn less than mandatory was Robinson, who applied semantic descent to his Davidsonian PhD topic ‘The Semantics of Mass Terms’, yielding the substitute topic ‘The Metaphysics of Material Constitution’.

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Frederick Kroon
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Denis Robinson
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1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

Philosophy of Language

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