Philosophy of Language

  • Frederick Kroon
  • Denis Robinson
Reference work entry


Philosophy of language is a ‘philosophy of’ discipline, concerned with conceptual issues centring on the nature, origin and purpose of language, in all its multifarious uses. As such, it is a relatively new part of philosophy, unlike, say, metaphysics or ethics. The present chapter focuses on philosophy of language in Australasia, but because philosophy of language is a field with an impressive prehistory/early history, we begin our discussion by looking at central features of that early history. Later sections cover major themes in philosophy of language as it has developed in Australasia.


Conceptual Analysis Propositional Attitude Ordinary Language Impossible World Natural Kind Term 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of AucklandAucklandNew Zealand

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