Philosophy of Language
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Abstract
Philosophy of language is a ‘philosophy of’ discipline, concerned with conceptual issues centring on the nature, origin and purpose of language, in all its multifarious uses. As such, it is a relatively new part of philosophy, unlike, say, metaphysics or ethics. The present chapter focuses on philosophy of language in Australasia, but because philosophy of language is a field with an impressive prehistory/early history, we begin our discussion by looking at central features of that early history. Later sections cover major themes in philosophy of language as it has developed in Australasia.
Keywords
Conceptual Analysis Propositional Attitude Ordinary Language Impossible World Natural Kind Term
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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