Human Rights and Justice
- 5 Mentions
- 31 Downloads
Introduction
This entry explores the relationship of human rights to the classical understanding of justice as the constant and perpetual determination to give to others their due (see Aquinas 2002, II–II, q. 58, a. 1; Justinian 1904, I.I.10). Thus understood, justice is a virtue of human actions and not primarily of social institutions or structures (cf. Rawls 1971, 3). This situates rights as entailments of relationships of justice, such that what one person is due to give to another is what the other has a right to. Human rights correspond both to natural duties of justice owed to all persons and to duties of justice specified for common good owed to others in one’s community. The willingness of modern human rights law to recognize rights to commit injustices is criticized as abandoning the deep conceptual relationship between human rights and justice.
What Is Due to Each and All
Our actions make manifest the source of those actions, the responsible person who intends and is the...
References
- Aquinas T (2002) Summa theologiae. In: Dyson RW (ed) Aquinas: political writings. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Aristotle (1996) Politics. In: Everson S (ed) Aristotle: the politics and the constitution of Athens. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKGoogle Scholar
- Aristotle (2000) Nicomachean ethics. In: Crisp R (ed) Aristotle: Nicomachean ethics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Barak A (2012) Proportionality: human rights and their limitations. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Feinberg J (1970) The nature and value of rights. J Value Inq 4:243–257CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Finnis J (1998) Aquinas: moral, political, and legal theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKGoogle Scholar
- Finnis J (2002) Aquinas on ius and Hart on rights. Rev Polit 64:407–410CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Finnis J (2011a) Natural law and natural rights, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKGoogle Scholar
- Finnis J (2011b) Human rights & common good: collected essays, vol III. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Gardner J (2012) Law as a leap of faith. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Gardner J (2013) Finnis on justice. In: Keown J, George RP (eds) Reason, morality, and law: the philosophy of John Finnis. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKGoogle Scholar
- Justinian (1904) The digest of Justinian, vol I (trans: Monro CH). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKGoogle Scholar
- Köpcke M (2018) Why it takes law to realise human rights. In: Webber G et al Legislated rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKGoogle Scholar
- Köpcke M (2019) Legal validity. Hart Publishing, Oxford, UK/PortlandCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Miller BW (2008) Justification and rights limitation. In: Huscroft G (ed) Expounding the constitution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKGoogle Scholar
- Möller K (2014) Proportionality and rights inflation. In: Huscroft G, Miller BW, Webber G (eds) Proportionality and the rule of law. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Nicholas B (1975) An introduction to Roman law. Clarendon Press, Oxford, UKGoogle Scholar
- O’Neill O (2016) Justice across boundaries: whose obligations? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Oberdiek J (2008) Specifying rights out of necessity. Oxf J Leg Stud 28:127–146CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- R v Sharpe [2001] 1 SCR 45 (Supreme Court of Canada)Google Scholar
- Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Belknap Press, Cambridge, MAGoogle Scholar
- Simmonds NE (2020) The puzzle of rights. Am J Jurisprud 65:181–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Simon YR (1973) A general theory of authority. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre DameGoogle Scholar
- Tasioulas J (2012) Towards a philosophy of human rights. Curr Leg Probl 65:1–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Tasioulas J (2013) Justice, equality, and rights. In: Crisp R (ed) The Oxford handbook of the history of ethics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKGoogle Scholar
- Tasioulas J (2015) On the foundations of human rights. In: Cruft R, Liao SM, Renzo M (eds) Philosophical foundations of human rights. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKGoogle Scholar
- Thomas J (2015) Public rights, private relations. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Thompson M (2006) What it is to wrong someone? A puzzle about justice. In: Wallace RJ et al (eds) Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UKGoogle Scholar
- Tuck R (1979) Natural rights theories. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Urbina F (2017) A critique of proportionality and balancing. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Webber G (2009) The negotiable constitution. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKCrossRefGoogle Scholar
- Webber G (2018) Rights and persons. In: Webber G et al Legislated rights: securing human rights through legislation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKGoogle Scholar
- Webber G, Yowell P (2018) Securing rights through legislation. In: Webber G et al Legislated rights: securing human rights through legislation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UKGoogle Scholar