Skip to main content

Relational Autonomy: A Feminist Perspective on the Concept of Autonomy

  • Living reference work entry
  • First Online:
Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
  • 301 Accesses

Introduction

Personal autonomy emerges as a concept frequently used in political, social, and legal debates. It is constantly evolving in scope since its definition is the subject of an ongoing discussion. Feminist scholars have also contributed to this discussion with their reinterpretation of the meaning of autonomy and its importance in individuals’ lives.

The concept of autonomy itself is crucial for the feminist movement. It relates to the core issues of feminism that are emancipation and oppression. As emancipation means living according to one’s own will, autonomy is one of the significant values in feminist philosophy (Veltman and Piper 2014, 1). Therefore rather than a total rejection of the concept, feminists have suggested redefining it. Their reformulation is based on the critiques of the liberal understanding of the concept.

Feminist scholars have claimed that liberal understanding of autonomy was rooted in values such as self-sufficiency, self-reliance, independence, and...

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Institutional subscriptions

References

  • Benson P (2014) Feminist commitments and relational autonomy. In: Veltman A, Piper M (eds) Autonomy, oppression and gender. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 87–114

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Christman J (2004) Relational autonomy, liberal individualism, and the social constitution of selves. Philos Stud 117(1–2):143–164

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clement G (1996) Care, autonomy and justice. Westview Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman M (2003) Autonomy, gender, politics. Oxford University Press, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gilligan C (1982) In a different voice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilligan C (1993) Reply to critics. In: Larrabee MJ (ed) An ethic of care: feminist and interdisciplinary perspectives. Routledge, New York, pp 207–214

    Google Scholar 

  • Held V (2006) The ethics of care. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackenzie C, Stoljar N (2000) Relational autonomy, feminist perspectives on autonomy, agency and the social self. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Nedelsky J (1989) Reconceiving autonomy: sources, thoughts and possibilities. Yale J Law Fem 1(1):7–36

    Google Scholar 

  • Nedelsky J (2011) Law’s relations: a relational theory of self, autonomy, and law. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Oshana M (2006) Personal autonomy in society. Ashgate, Hampshire

    Google Scholar 

  • Schluter M (2004) What is relational justice? In: Burnside J, Baker N (eds) Relational justice: repairing the breach. Waterside Press, Winchester, pp 17–27

    Google Scholar 

  • Veltman A, Piper M (2014) Introduction. In: Veltman A, Piper M (eds) Autonomy, oppression and gender. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 1–11

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Wallbank J, Choudhry S, Herring J (2010) Welfare, rights, care and gender in family law. In: Wallbank J, Choudhry S, Herring J (eds) Rights, gender and family law. Routledge, Oxon

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nadire Ă–zdemir .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Section Editor information

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2020 Springer Nature B.V.

About this entry

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this entry

Ă–zdemir, N. (2020). Relational Autonomy: A Feminist Perspective on the Concept of Autonomy. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_703-1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_703-1

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-007-6730-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-007-6730-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Law and CriminologyReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

Publish with us

Policies and ethics