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Legal Science: Analytical Conceptions

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Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy
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Introduction: The Province of Analytical Legal Science Determined

The notion of “legal science” overlaps, at least in part, with those of “legal dogmatics,” “legal knowledge,” “legal theory,” “legal methodology,” and “jurisprudence.” Furthermore, the expression “legal science” itself suffers from ambiguities (Peczenick 2005, 1–3; Chiassoni 2013, 152–153).

First, “legal science” is affected by the process/product ambiguity. It may denote, on the one hand, the propositions which lawyers derive from certain strings of symbols (the texts) – in this sense, it denotes legal propositions, or, simply, “the law” – and, on the other hand, the processes of the derivation of these propositions, the processes whereby the propositions are obtained; in other words, it “can be used both to refer to the set of activities performed by the person who studies the law and to the result of such activities” (Núñez Vaquero 2013, 56). This ambiguity is further complicated by the fact that, since it is hard to...

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to legal realism “valid” coincides with “binding” and “efficacious.” Instead, according to other conceptions “valid” means “belonging to the system” (normativism), or “according to justice” (natural law theories).

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Schiavello, A. (2023). Legal Science: Analytical Conceptions. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_358-1

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