Introduction
The importance of Hume and Kant in the history of the discussion about relations between the sphere of facts (“Is”) and the sphere of duties (“Ought”) cannot be overestimated. In point of fact, it can be said that they initiated this discussion by formulating the problem explicitly. They also provided two “paradigmatic” answers to the question of the relations between “Is” and “Ought”, which determined the course of further discussions: generally speaking, both Hume and Kant agreed that there is no legitimate logical transition between “Is” an “Ought,” but while Hume (on one interpretation) believed that “Ought” can be reduced to “Is,” Kant strongly objected to this kind of reduction, stressing the autonomy and irreducibility of the sphere of “Ought.” But this general account of their views simplifies a lot. We shall try to highlight the complexity of their investigations in the following sections.
Hume
The issue of the mutual relation of “Is” and “Ought” is tackled by...
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Osmola, S., Załuski, W. (2017). “Is” and “Ought” in Hume’s and Kant’s Philosophy. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_225-1
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