Introduction
We have a remarkable, perhaps unique (Tomasello and Racokzy 2003), ability to act together with others purposefully. Many of the things we do would be harder, if not impossible, to achieve were it not for this ability. It is much easier, and perhaps less dangerous, to lift a couch together, and under no circumstances can anyone dance a tango alone. At times, we find uniting with others as part of a common pursuit a fulfilling experience in itself, worth pursuing for its own sake. Much of our lives are framed by the collective actions of which we are a part: games, plays, performances, research, rites, political action, and family trips. Moreover, social and legal structures are often instituted and preserved but also reshaped and overthrown by collective action.
So, what do collective actions involve? How do we get to act together with others? To answer these questions, it is natural, as many philosophers have done, to enlist the notion of collective intention...
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Rachar, M., Salomone-Sehr, J. (2023). Intentions, Collective. In: Sellers, M., Kirste, S. (eds) Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-6730-0_1078-1
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