Weaponization of Neuroscience

Abstract

This introductory chapter to the section on the “Weaponization of Neuroscience” provides a short overview of the developments in biological disarmament since the beginning of the twentieth century. It starts with an account of the problems at the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention to establish a verification regime and how the Convention subsequently shifted its focus from state to non-state actors in terms of preventing the development of biological weapons. As part of this reorientation, the issue of the potential misuse of benign scientific research was raised, which was coined “dual-use biosecurity” or the “dual-use dilemma” in the following debates. While the international security community was initially only worried about the misuse of neuroscience by malign non-state actors, the disarmament community has expanded the topic to include the use of scientific research by state military as well.

The five chapters in this section discuss the following: Is neuroscience research of interest to the military? Does international law regulate neuroscience? What is the level of awareness and education of neuroscientists on the topic of dual use? How can the neuroscience community work towards protecting their research from misuse? What can neuroethics do?