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Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics pp 1503–1521Cite as

Value Ladenness and the Value-Free Ideal in Scientific Research

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Abstract

Regarding scientific research, value ladenness and the value-free ideal represent two poles. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the influential view was science as “value-free” (Wertfrei), whereas in the first decade of the twenty-first century the dominant perspective is science as “value-laden.” After considering the historical setting on values in science, the analysis here deals with the characteristics and relations between axiology of research and ethics of science. This involves taking into account the option in favor of holism of values and the alternative in terms of fractional orientations, either in “internal” terms or in “external” ones. Thus, the presence of values in basic science and in applied science is considered. After that, economics as a relevant case study is addressed through the distinction between positive economics and normative economics. There is also a coda with final remarks on the topics analyzed.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    This has been pointed out emphatically: [18]. See also [38]. Additional aspects can be found in [4, 16, 48, 53] and [57].

  2. 2.

    In addition to values in science, there is the issue of the value of science itself, cf. [42]. See also [55].

  3. 3.

    The designs in the sciences of the artificial take into account values, as can be seen in the case of the evaluative rationality regarding the ends of the designs, cf. [30].

  4. 4.

    Cf. [72]. See also [70].

  5. 5.

    The characteristics of Historismus can be found in W. Dilthey, cf. [20] pp. 109–137; especially, pp. 110–112 and 115–117.

  6. 6.

    “The idea of truth as the fundamental regulative principle – the principle that guides our search – can be regarded as an ethical principle. The search for truth and the idea of approximation to the truth are also ethical principles; as are the ideas of intellectual integrity and of fallibility, which lead us to a self-critical attitude and to toleration” [67, p. 199]. On the truth as epistemic value and ethical value in Popper, see [59], pp. 282–293.

  7. 7.

    [45]. On the intellectual precedents of Kuhn’s views, cf. [27] pp. 15–103; especially, pp. 23–27.

  8. 8.

    [60]. Before this Presidential address in the PSA, there is a paper on the same topic: [71].

  9. 9.

    On the status of “values” in general, see [75] and [76].

  10. 10.

    This discussion on this issue is in [65].

  11. 11.

    The objectivity of values is explicitly discussed in connection with human needs in [72], Chap. 3, pp. 73–96. See also [67].

  12. 12.

    However, following a pragmatic approach (sites, products, etc.), he does not see a clear distinction between “science” and “technology” (including “basic research” and technology), cf. [41] pp. 85–91, especially, p. 86.

  13. 13.

    This can be seen in the case of scientific prediction: “Probably the most deeply held values concern predictions: they should be accurate; quantitative predictions are preferable to qualitative ones; whatever the margin of permissible error, it should be consistently satisfied in a given field; and so on” [46], p. 185.

  14. 14.

    On the distinction between “applied science” and “application of science,” see [62], p. 9.

  15. 15.

    According to Imre Lakatos, “Scientists, as citizens, have responsibility, like other citizens, to see that science is applied to the right social and political ends,” in [50], p. 258.

  16. 16.

    Cf. [24], pp. 11–44; especially, pp. 22–26.

  17. 17.

    This is also the case in the sciences of the artificial, where there are certainly ethical concerns, for example, in the field of computer sciences. Cf. [17] and [36].

  18. 18.

    On this notion, see [73].

  19. 19.

    This thematic realm is receiving an increasing attention. Cf. [8].

  20. 20.

    The social consequences in this field are visible. See, for example, [40].

  21. 21.

    Cf. Rescher, N, Personal Communication, 27 Aug 1998. His conception is developed in [74]. On his philosophical approach, see [87]. On holism about values see [10] and [61].

  22. 22.

    Cf. Rescher, N, Personal Communication, 27 Aug 1998. Cf. [24], p. 22.

  23. 23.

    For Laudan, “epistemic values” (truth, falsity, …) can be distinguished from “cognitive values” (scope, generality, coherence, consilience, explanatory, …), cf. [52], p. 20.

  24. 24.

    Rescher, N, Personal Communication, 27 Aug 1998.

  25. 25.

    Cf. [51], pp. xi–xii, n. 2. The subtitle of his book is very clear: The Aims of Science and their Role in Scientific Debate. In his reticular model of scientific rationality, Laudan emphasizes that those values are good enough for the task: “Doubtless a wide range of cognitive goals or values can satisfy the demands laid down here” [51], p. 63.

  26. 26.

    See, for example, [34] and [85].

  27. 27.

    There is usually a tension in the scientist between the defense of his or her autonomy and the need for responsibility, cf. [14].

  28. 28.

    The constitutive elements of science are presented in [28], pp. 3–49; especially, pp. 10–11.

  29. 29.

    On this distinction, cf. [62] and [80].

  30. 30.

    The existence of differences between basic science and applied science can be seen on analyzing the latter, cf. [63] and [64].

  31. 31.

    This means that scientific progress is commonly modulated by an “economics of research.”

  32. 32.

    Cf. [72], Chaps. 7, 8, and 9, pp. 151–203.

  33. 33.

    The repercussion is even more noticeable when technology is involved, cf. [2] and [3].

  34. 34.

    The concept of “neutrality” in science has been analyzed in [1], Chap. III.

  35. 35.

    Rescher, N, Personal Communication, 27 Aug 1998.

  36. 36.

    This kind of approach affects the issue of “intrinsic” versus “extrinsic” values. On intrinsic and relational properties, see [37]. See also [9].

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  1. Faculty of Humanities, University of A Coruña, Dr. Vazquez Cabrera street, w/n, 15403-Ferrol, Ferrol, Spain

    Dr. Wenceslao J. Gonzalez

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    Christoph Luetge

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Gonzalez, W.J. (2013). Value Ladenness and the Value-Free Ideal in Scientific Research. In: Luetge, C. (eds) Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_78

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