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Kant and Hegel on Property

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Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics

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Abstract

Kant’s and Hegel’s theories of property formulate the fundamentals of two typical ways of interpreting the right of property. This chapter reconstructs their conceptions as opposite but still equally valid answers to an important problem of today’s theory of justice (as long as they are limited to their fundamentals). While Kant’s conception tries to give a pure justification of property, without considering the historical and social circumstances and their possible consequences, Hegel’s concept of property is embedded in a theory connecting the moral and the juridical perspective – and even offering a special theory of civil society as the concept of property’s background. This chapter focuses on the characteristics of both their approaches to legitimate property. As regards Kant, this means the notion that property does not necessarily contradict the requirement of compatibility with the freedom of all and must therefore be permitted – as long as this condition is met and the idea of a common will deciding on the legitimacy of property is taken into account. As regards Hegel, it means the notion that the formal or abstract right is not adequate to legitimate property. On the contrary, reference to it alone leads to unreasonableness or injustice, while a reasonable justification of property depends on the dialectical determination of the relation of idea and reality, meaning that the real relations of the civil society must be taken into consideration and that they must be understood as dispositions of reason ruling over the real constitution of the state and thus compensating for the disintegration of civil society.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See, for instance, Articles 28, 30, 31, 39, and 41 of the English translation of the [25] Magna Carta, edited by the British Library (the original Magna Carta in Latin has a continuous text, the clauses are not numbered): http://www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/translation/mc_trans.html. For the phrase cf. [22].

  2. 2.

    The phrasing goes back to Jefferson, and it is debated whether Jefferson wanted to show by this the distance to Locke’s thoughts of “life, liberty, and estate” [30].

  3. 3.

    [30], p. 530. Confer the brochure “The Rights of the British Colonies Asserted and Proved” written by J. Otis which is concentrated in the phrase: “no taxation without representation” (cf. [5], p. 537, n. 4).

  4. 4.

    The Virginia Bill of Rights frankly states this right of property (“Section 1. That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely the enjoyment of life and liberty, which the means of acquiring and possessing property and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” In: ([4], p. 70), whereas the Constitution of 1787 renounces to name the different human rights at all, that means renounces to name especially the right of property (cf. [31], pp 512–515). The amendments of the Constitution already corrected this in 1791. Regarding the right of property, see amendments no. IV and V (cf. [5], p. 528). The opinion of the Authors of the Constitution must be regarded to be close to Locke’s opinion of property (cf. [24]). See the interpretation of one of the English editors of the Federalist Papers (especially art. 10), ([1], p. XLIX), and the interpretation of the German editor ([32], p. 27, 35, 37, 43, 543 (n. 62)).

  5. 5.

    Art. II of “Constitution Française,” 1791 Septembre 3, in: [4], p. 74.

  6. 6.

    Art. XVII of “Constitution Française,” 1791 Septembre 3, in: [4], p. 76. For the rules of compensation, see also amendment no. V of the Constitution of the United States ([5], p. 528).

  7. 7.

    Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 17, in: [4], p. 142.

  8. 8.

    [19] (Reference to certain pages will be given by reference to the edition of the “Akademie-Ausgabe” written in the margin of the English edition). The German text is found in [14].

  9. 9.

    For the history of Kant’s conception of property cf. [3], p. 167–201, 167, 185ff, and [2], pp. 272–275.

  10. 10.

    Cf. [2], p. 268; [20], pp. 50–87.

  11. 11.

    Cf. the introduction of Bernd Ludwig to his edition of [23] Kant, Immanuel, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre,” 2. verb. Auflage, Hamburg 1998, which is the first part of Kant’s “Metaphysik der Sitten”. For the difficulties cf. Brandt, Eigentumstheorien, 185f.

  12. 12.

    Cf. [17], j, p. 4, note.

  13. 13.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 205.

  14. 14.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 214.

  15. 15.

    Kant uses the word “will” for the capacity of choice which is determined by reason, knowing well that the human capacity of choice is often determined by other forces than reason.

  16. 16.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 220. Kant’s argument for the necessity (and therefore legality) of this external constraint refers to a theory of opposite forces: if my action is compliant with the universal law, i.e., with the freedom of others, every force or opposition against this action must be contradictory to the universal law, and therefore every force or opposition against this oppositional force, i.e., the external constraint, must be compliant in turn, cf. [14, 19], p. 230f. This theory of oppositional forces goes back to the fundamental insights Kant published in the essay of 1763 “Versuch den Begriff der negativen Größen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen.” The concept of “Realrepugnanz” gave Kant the key to reverse the rationalistic ontology of Christian Wolff and later on build his own transcendental Logic, Ethics and Aesthetics.

  17. 17.

    ([18], pp. B 294–315). This distinction is an old idealistic legacy as the Greek expressions indicate; cf. [27], pp. 507b–509a; [26] 28 B 7, u. 8,34f u. 50ff.

  18. 18.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 247f.

  19. 19.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 247f.

  20. 20.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 247f.

  21. 21.

    Kersting cannot see this, either (cf. [20], p. 320f), although he is willing and able to give an affirmative modern interpretation of the applicability of the first two kinds of objects (cf. [20], p. 265ff, 293–308).

  22. 22.

    Cf. [14, 19], pp 276–284.

  23. 23.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 247.

  24. 24.

    Cf. [2], p. 260.

  25. 25.

    Cf. [18], p. B 661f; Kant’s use of the word “postulate” is analogous to its use in the field of mathematics, cf. [18], p. B 286f.

  26. 26.

    Cf. [2], p. 260.

  27. 27.

    Cf. [18], p. B 191.

  28. 28.

    Cf. [18], p. B 193f.

  29. 29.

    Cf. [18], pp. B 817–822.

  30. 30.

    Cf. [18], p. B 821. Cf. [8].

  31. 31.

    Kant’s Universal Law of Right features the same difference of “freedom of choice” and “everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law” ([14, 19], p. 231). It requires that the first “can coexist” with the second, and says that in case it cannot coexist, the special freedom of choice in question is not right. Thus, the Universal Law of Right requires that the conformity or correspondence has to be demonstrated. The ostensible “demonstration” of the “lex permissiva,” however, not only postulates that the first freedom can coexist with the second, but is right from the beginning, based on the identity of both (“freedom would be depriving itself,” [14, 19], p. 246).

  32. 32.

    These objections are directed at Kant’s proof deliberation for the possibility of an “intelligible possession” on principle, and, as far as Kant’s conception of property is based on this possibility, they are directed at this conception, too. Thus, the difference of “intelligible possession” and “property” that has recently been stressed by Rühl, Ulli F. [29], pp. 68–85, does not make these objections irrelevant.

  33. 33.

    Cf. [18], p. B 106, cf. as regards the distinction of judgments: [18], p. B 95. Cf. [2], pp 241–244, 255–258.

  34. 34.

    Kant’s anthropological considerations come down to the diagnosis that we have to expect and as regards the “formation of the state” account for a “race of devils” (“Volk von Teufeln,” Kant, Perpetual Peace resp. Zum ewigen Frieden, B 61).

  35. 35.

    Cf. [14, 19], pp. 255f, 264ff.

  36. 36.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 263.

  37. 37.

    Cf. [20], p. 270f.

  38. 38.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 262f.

  39. 39.

    Cf. [14, 19], pp. 260–263.

  40. 40.

    Cf. [20], pp. 326–332, 341ff.

  41. 41.

    Cf. [20], p. 276.

  42. 42.

    Cf. [14, 19], p. 325f.

  43. 43.

    Cf. [3], pp. 193, 200f; [20], pp. 62–67, 338–343, 375–381.

  44. 44.

    [10], resp. in German: [12]. My interpretation is based on the article “Der Begriff des ‘Eigentums’ in der Rechtsphilosophie Hegels,” in: [6], pp. 161–175.

  45. 45.

    This critique was based on the conviction to know the means for getting over the contradictions of the disintegrated Civil Society. Hegel even believed to see these means in his mind’s eye: the constitutional monarchy of the Prussian state during its conservative period (“Restaurationszeit”) should make this reconciliation possible; yes, it should even have made the reconciliation real. That is why there is no use in having a discussion about the last suggestions Hegel hit upon for the solutions of the social conflicts. In most of the cases, they obviously and immediately turn out to be untenable, even dangerous – of course in particular when the powerful state is propagated (cf. [21]).

  46. 46.

    Cf. [10, p. 60, [12], p. 106].

  47. 47.

    Cf. [11], p. 572f.

  48. 48.

    For critique cf. the author’s article [7].

  49. 49.

    Cf. [9], p. 301f.

  50. 50.

    Cf. [10], p. 53f, 63f, [12], p. 93f, 113.

  51. 51.

    Cf. [10], p. 55, 197f, [12], p. 95, 360f.

  52. 52.

    Cf. [9], p. 287.

  53. 53.

    Cf. [28].

  54. 54.

    Cf. [10], p. 55, [12], p. 96f.

  55. 55.

    Cf. [10], p. 60f, [12], p. 107.

  56. 56.

    Cf. [10], 86, [12], p. 159f.

  57. 57.

    Cf. [10], p. 197–201, [12], p. 360–363.

  58. 58.

    Cf. [10], p. 182f, 190, 220f, [12], p. 341f, 350f, 389.

  59. 59.

    Cf. [10], p. 181–191, [12], p. 340–353.

  60. 60.

    In his interpretation of Hegel’s “Philosophy of Right,” Axel Honneth leaves Hegel’s reference to the “Science of Logic” aside ([13], p. 13). The dialectical basis does not fit the plan to bring the “Philosophy of Right” up to date. To be consistent, Honneth has to find another reason to take the disintegrated civil society into account. The negative moment Hegel assigns to it because of the dialectical development is turned into a positive moment. Honneth explains Hegel’s “System of Needs” to be a system of justified interests ([13], p. 117). In the peculiar area of the civil society, the isolated individuals are supposed to be able to realize their interests and needs, recognizing every other individual as in the same sense interested in the satisfaction of their needs. While this ignorance of Hegel’s speculative basis seems very reasonable to me, the consequence that the critique of the disintegrated civil society becomes weak cannot be very welcome. The status quo of our actual civil society becomes more legitimated, although it requires more critique as it has been “in unimpeded activity” for a long time since Hegel diagnosed its depravation.

  61. 61.

    Cf. [10], p. 189, 206, [12], p. 349f, 370f.

  62. 62.

    Cf. [10], p. 184f, 221f, [12], p. 343ff, 390.

  63. 63.

    Cf. [10], p. 192, 196f, 224f, [12], p. 354, 359f, 394.

  64. 64.

    Cf. [10], p. 193f, [12], p. 355f.

  65. 65.

    Cf. [10], 220ff, [12], p. 389ff.

  66. 66.

    Cf. [10], p. 208f, [12], p. 373f.

  67. 67.

    Cf. [10], p. 215f, [12], p. 383.

  68. 68.

    Cf. [10], p. 154f, 216f, 234, 265ff, 278f, 285f, 289f, 293f, [12], p. 294, 384f, 404, 442ff, 458f, 466f, 471f, 476ff.

  69. 69.

    Cf. [10], p. 82f, 102f, 264–272, 280–283, 304–308, [12], p. 151, 190f, 442–450, 461ff, 491–494.

  70. 70.

    According to Hegel, the laws of the state basically are the laws which have been legislated by the Civil Society, except that they are now also known as reasonable. That is why the power of legislation in this state, formed after the model of an organism, is restricted to “fresh and extended determination” (“Fortbestimmung”) of the same laws – cf. [10], p. 284f, [12], p. 465ff. The lack of laws able to limit the force of the power of the state against the individuals must attract attention, particularly when one deals with an author who uncompromisingly calls for legislation of reasonable ends – cf. [10], p. 265f, 231ff (footnote) [12], p. 442f, 402–406 (footnote). The efficiency of the “private estate” (“Privatstand”) effecting on the power of legislation by means of the “Estates, as an element in the legislative power” (cf. [10], p. 291 [12], p. 473), is all Hegel intends for this business. But one cannot compare this at all to the concession of fundamental laws. Concerning the right of property, Hegel has neither a rule for compensation in case of dispossession of the individual by the state nor a right of nationalization of possession.

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Acknowledgement

I am grateful to Jan T. Schönherr for correcting my English in this article.

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  1. Institut für Philosophie, Goethe-Universität, Grüneburgplatz 1, 60629, Frankfurt Main, Germany

    Prof. Andreas Eckl

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  1. Peter Löscher-Stiftungslehrstuhl für Wirtschaftsethik, Technische Universität München, München, Germany

    Christoph Luetge

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Eckl, A. (2013). Kant and Hegel on Property. In: Luetge, C. (eds) Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-1494-6_34

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