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Synonyms

Objective/subjective distinction

Definition

In general, evaluative facts (e.g., the fact that knowledge is good, the fact that stealing is wrong) are called objective if they obtain independently of the beliefs and other attitudes (e.g., desires, approvals, hopes, wishes, fears, likings) of subjects. By contrast, evaluative facts are subjective if they depend for their existence on the beliefs or attitudes of subjects.

Description

The objective/subjective distinction is deployed in several related ways within the philosophical and psychological literature on welfare, well-being, happiness, prudential value, and quality of life(hereafter, “welfare”). There is controversy about whether the welfare of human beings and other sentient creatures is itself objectively or subjectively good. More prominently, there is a debate about whether the true theory of welfare treats welfare as objective or subjective. There is also considerable controversy concerning what makes theories...

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Correspondence to Jason Raibley .

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Raibley, J. (2014). Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values. In: Michalos, A.C. (eds) Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_1988

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-0753-5_1988

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