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Recognition and Feminist Thought

  • Christine Bratu
  • Kristina Lepold
Living reference work entry
Part of the Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften book series (SPREFGEIST)

Abstract

In this article, we give an overview over both past and present as well as possible future debates around recognition in and in connection with feminist thought. In principle, recognition can involve persons, collectives, and institutions, but here we are primarily concerned with the recognition of persons by other persons. In the first section, we start with a discussion of care as a form of recognition and the recognition of care work. In the second section, we turn to critiques of recognition in feminist thought. In the third section, we outline a new field of research that should be of interest to both feminist and recognition theorists, namely our credibility economy. Since there is a separate article on Judith Butler and queer feminism in this handbook, we exclude their contributions from our discussion here.

Keywords

Recognition Feminism Care Redistribution Epistemic injustice 

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Copyright information

© Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, ein Teil von Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and the Study of ReligionLudwig-Maximilians-Universität MünchenMunichGermany
  2. 2.Department of Philosophy and HistoryGoethe-Universität Frankfurt am MainFrankfurt am MainGermany

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