Abstract
This entry examines the claim that social philosophies centered on recognition are at odds with those centered on negative liberty. Several versions of the negative conception of freedom are articulated, together with corresponding tensions with the promotion of relations of recognition. This initial opposition is then shown to miss several senses in which recognition and negative freedom are actually entwined. Several deep tensions remain, however, which are distinguished in terms of different traditions of conceptualizing recognition.
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Anderson, J. (2020). Recognition Versus Negative Liberty. In: Siep, L., Ikäheimo, H., Quante, M. (eds) Handbuch Anerkennung. Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-19561-8_16-1
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