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Sovereign Debt

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Abstract

Sovereign debt is one of the most enduring puzzles in economics. Why would anyone lend to an entity not subject to external enforcement? This chapter examines the emergence of sovereign loans, their transformation from personal to transpersonal debt, and their evolution through time. The different models that have been proposed to explain the rationale and sustainability of sovereign lending are discussed and evaluated in light of the historical record, together with a brief discussion of data sources and the political economy of debt.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. The University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada

    Mauricio Drelichman

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  1. Mauricio Drelichman
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Correspondence to Mauricio Drelichman .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. BETA/CNRS (UMR 7522), University of Strasbourg Institute for Advanced Study, Strasbourg Cedex, France

    Claude Diebolt

  2. University of Wisconsin Department of Economics, La Crosse, WI, USA

    Michael Haupert

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Drelichman, M. (2019). Sovereign Debt. In: Diebolt, C., Haupert, M. (eds) Handbook of Cliometrics. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_37-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-40458-0_37-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-40458-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-40458-0

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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