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Complexity of Bimatrix Nash Equilibria

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Encyclopedia of Algorithms
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Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

2006; Chen, Deng

Problem Definition

In the middle of the last century, Nash [8] studied general noncooperative games and proved that there exists a set of mixed strategies, now commonly referred to as a Nash equilibrium, one for each player, such that no player can benefit if he/she changes his/her own strategy unilaterally. Since the development of Nash’s theorem, researchers have worked on how to compute Nash equilibria efficiently. Despite much effort in the last half century, no significant progress has been made on characterizing its algorithmic complexity, though both hardness results and algorithms have been developed for various modified versions.

An exciting breakthrough, which shows that computing Nash equilibria is possibly hard, was made by Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou [5], for games among four players or more. The problem was proven to be complete in PPAD(polynomial parity argument, directed version), a complexity...

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Recommended Reading

  1. Chen X, Deng X (2005) 3-Nash is ppad-complete. ECCC, TR05-134

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  2. Chen X, Deng X (2006) Settling the complexity of two-player Nash-equilibrium. In: Proceedings of the 47th annual IEEE symposium on foundations of computer science (FOCS’06), Berkeley, pp 261–272

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  3. Chen X, Deng X, Teng SH (2006) Computing Nash equilibria: approximation and smoothed complexity. In: Proceedings of the 47th annual IEEE symposium on foundations of computer science (FOCS’06), Berkeley, pp 603–612

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  4. Daskalakis C, Papadimitriou CH (2005) Three-player games are hard. ECCC, TR05-139

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  5. Daskalakis C, Goldberg PW, Papadimitriou CH (2006) The complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium. In: Proceedings of the 38th ACM symposium on theory of computing (STOC’06), Seattle, pp 71–78

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  6. Goldberg PW, Papadimitriou CH (2006) Reducibility among equilibrium problems. In: Proceedings of the 38th ACM symposium on theory of computing (STOC’06), Seattle, pp 61–70

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  7. Megiddo N, Papadimitriou CH (1991) On total functions, existence theorems and computational complexity. Theor Comput Sci 81:317–324

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  8. Nash JF (1950) Equilibrium point in n-person games. Proc Natl Acad USA 36(1):48–49

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  9. Papadimitriou CH (1994) On the complexity of the parity argument and other inefficient proofs of existence. J Comput Syst Sci 48:498–532

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Correspondence to Xi Chen .

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Chen, X. (2015). Complexity of Bimatrix Nash Equilibria. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_79-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_79-3

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  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-27848-8

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Complexity of Bimatrix Nash Equilibria
    Published:
    30 May 2015

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_79-3

  2. Original

    Complexity of Bimatrix Nash Equilibria
    Published:
    25 November 2014

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_79-2