Living Reference Work Entry

Encyclopedia of Algorithms

pp 1-9

Date: Latest Version

Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design

  • Yang CaiAffiliated withComputer Science, McGill University Email author 
  • , Constantinos DaskalakisAffiliated withEECS, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • , Matthew WeinbergAffiliated withComputer Science, Princeton University


Mechanism design Job scheduling Fair allocation Revenue maximization Equivalence of separation and optimization

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

  • STOC2012; Cai, Daskalakis, Weinberg

  • FOCS2012; Cai, Daskalakis, Weinberg

  • SODA2013; Cai, Daskalakis, Weinberg

  • FOCS2013; Cai, Daskalakis, Weinberg

  • SODA2015; Daskalakis, Weinberg

Problem Definition

The goal is to design algorithms that succeed in models where input is reported by strategic agents (henceforth referred to as strategic input), as opposed to standard models where the input is directly given (henceforth referred to as honest input). For example, consider a resource allocation problem where a single user has m jobs to process on n self-interested machines. Each machine i can process job j in time ti j, and this is privately known only to the machine. Each machine reports some processing times ...

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