Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce – Payment Schemes
General Terms
Algorithmic Game Theory, Mechanism Design
Introduction
Fueled by the growth of Internet and advancements in online advertising techniques, today more and more online firms rely on advertising revenue for their business. Some of these firms include news agencies, media outlets, search engines, social and professional networks, etc. Much of this online advertising business is moving to what’s called programmatic buying where an advertiser bids for each single impression, sometimes in real time, depending on how he values the ad opportunity. This work is motivated by the need of a desired property in the auction mechanisms that are used in these bid-based advertising systems.
A standard mechanism for most auction scenarios is the famous Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. VCG is incentive compatible (IC) and maximizes social welfare. Incentive compatibility...
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Notes
- 1.
This work was done while the second author was an intern at Google, New York, and student at University of Maryland, College park where supported in part by NSF CAREER award 1053605, NSF grant CCF-1161626, ONR YIP award N000141110662, DARPA/AFOSR grant FA9550-12-1-0423.
Recommended Reading
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Acknowledgements
The first author would like to thank Vasilis Gkatzelis for some initial fruitful discussions on this topic.
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Goel, G., Khani, M. (2015). Revenue Monotone Auctions. In: Kao, MY. (eds) Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_758-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_758-1
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