Encyclopedia of Algorithms

Living Edition
| Editors: Ming-Yang Kao

Mechanism Design and Differential Privacy

  • Kobbi Nisim
  • David Xiao
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27848-8_548-1

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

2007; Frank McSherry and Kunal Talwar2011; Arpita Ghosh and Aaron Roth2012; Kobbi Nissim, Claudio Orlandi, and Rann Smorodinsky2012; Lisa Fleischer and Yu-Han Lyu2012; Katrina Ligett and Aaron Roth2013; Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, and Salil P. Vadhan2014; Kobbi Nissim, Salil P. Vadhan, and David Xiao

Problem Definition

Mechanism design and private data analysis both study the question of performing computations over data collected from individual agents while satisfying additional restrictions. The focus in mechanism design is on performing computations that are compatible with the incentives of the individual agents, and the additional restrictions are toward motivating agents to participate in the computation (individual rationality) and toward having them report their true data (incentive compatibility). The focus in private data analysis is on performing computations that limit the information leaked by the...


Differential privacy Mechanism design Privacy-aware mechanism design Purchasing privacy 
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Recommended Reading

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    Alpert CJ, Chan T, Kahng AB, Markov IL, Mulet P (1998) Faster minimization of linear wirelength for global placement. IEEE Trans CAD 17(1):3–13CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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    Dwork C, McSherry F, Nissim K, Smith A (2006) Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. In: TCC 2006, New York, pp 265–284Google Scholar
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    Fleischer L, Lyu Y-H (2012) Approximately optimal auctions for selling privacy when costs are correlated with data. In: EC 2012, Valencia, pp 568–585Google Scholar
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    Ghosh A, Roth A (2011) Selling privacy at auction. In: EC 2011, San Jose, pp 199–208Google Scholar
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    McSherry F, Talwar K (2007) Mechanism design via differential privacy. In: FOCS 2007, Providence, pp 94–103Google Scholar
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    Nissim K, Orlandi C, Smorodinsky R (2012) Privacy-aware mechanism design. In: EC 2012, Valencia, pp 774–789Google Scholar
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    Nissim K, Smorodinsky R, Tennenholtz M (2012) Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy. In: ITCS 2012, Boston, pp 203–213Google Scholar
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    Nissim K, Vadhan SP, Xiao D (2014) Redrawing the boundaries on purchasing data from privacy-sensitive individuals. In: ITCS 2014, Princeton, pp 411–422Google Scholar
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    Xiao D (2013) Is privacy compatible with truthfulness? In: ITCS 2013, Berkeley, pp 67–86Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  • Kobbi Nisim
    • 1
  • David Xiao
  1. 1.CNRSUniversité Paris 7ParisFrance