Definitions
Differential fault analysis is an active attack against cryptographic implementations. The goal is to induce faults during a cryptographic operation to infer private information (e.g., a decryption key).
Background
Cryptographic systems should not only be resistant to cryptanalysis, but they should also be resistant to implementation attacks, including side-channel and fault attacks. Differential fault analysis was developed by Boneh et al. (2001) and extended to the symmetric-key setting by Biham and Shamir (1997). The principle idea behind fault attacks consists in modifying the normal behavior of a cryptographic implementation in order to get a faulty output. Then from one or more faulty outputs, the attacker tries to infer some information about the secret key. Examples of practical fault injection are described in Skorobogatov and Anderson (2002) and Bar-El et al. (2006). When...
References
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Joye, M., Tunstall, M. (2023). Differential Fault Analysis. In: Jajodia, S., Samarati, P., Yung, M. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography, Security and Privacy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27739-9_1707-1
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