Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Living Edition
| Editors: Robert A. Meyers

Cooperative Games

  • Roberto Serrano
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_98-2


Characteristic or coalitional function

The most usual way to represent a cooperative game.

Cooperative game

Strategic situation involving coalitions, whose formation assumes the existence of binding agreements among players.


Solution concept that assigns the set of payoffs that cannot be improved upon by any coalition.

Game theory

Discipline that studies strategic situations.

Shapley value

Solution concept that assigns the average of marginal contributions to coalitions.

Solution concept

Mapping that assigns predictions to each game.

Definition of the Subject


It is one of the two counterparts of game theory. It studies the interactions among coalitions of game theory players. Its main question is this: Given the sets of feasible payoffs for each coalition, what payoff will be awarded to each player? One can take a positive or normative approach to answering this question, and different solution concepts in the theory lean towards one or the other.


It is a...


Cooperative Game Solution Concept Competitive Equilibrium Marginal Contribution Grand Coalition 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsBrown UniversityProvidenceUSA