Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Living Edition
| Editors: Robert A. Meyers

Reputation Effects

  • George J. Mailath
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_453-2


Action type

A type of player who is committed to playing a particular action, also called a commitment type or behavioral type.

Complete information

Characteristics of all players are common knowledge.

Flow payoff

Stage game payoff.

Imperfect monitoring

Past actions of all players are not public information.

Incomplete information

Characteristics of some player are not common knowledge.

Long-lived player

Player subject to intertemporal incentives, typically has the same horizon as length of the game.

Myopic optimum

An action maximizing stage game payoffs.

Nash equilibrium

A strategy profile from which no player has a profitable unilateral deviation (i. e., it is self-enforcing).

Nash reversion

In a repeated game, permanent play of a stage game Nash equilibrium.

Normalized discounted value

The discounted sum of an infinite sequence {at}t ≥ 0, calculated as (1 − δ) ∑t ≥ 0δtat, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount value.

Perfect monitoring

Past actions of all players are public...

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© Springer Science+Business Media LLC 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of PennsylvaniaPhiladelphiaUSA