Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Living Edition
| Editors: Robert A. Meyers

Repeated Games with Complete Information

Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_451-3

Definition of the Subject

Repeated interactions arise in several domains such as Economics, Computer Science, and Biology.

The theory of repeated games models situations in which a group of agents engage in a strategic interaction over and over. The data of the strategic interaction is fixed over time and is known by all the players. This is in contrast with stochastic games, for which the data of the strategic interaction is controlled by player’s choices, and repeated games with incomplete information, where the stage game is not common knowledge among players (the reader is referred to the corresponding entries of this encyclopedia). Early studies of repeated games include Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Aumann (1960). In the context of production games, Friedman (1971) shows that, while the competitive outcome is the only one compatible with individual profit maximization under a static interaction, collusion is sustainable at an equilibrium when the interaction is repeated.

Generally,...

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Repeated Game Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Strategy Profile Payoff Vector 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Notes

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful to Johannes Hörner for insightful comments.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.PSE, UMR CNRS-EHESS-ENPC-ENS 8545Northwestern UniversityParisFrance
  2. 2.Economics and Finance DepartmentHEC ParisParisFrance