Encyclopedia of Complexity and Systems Science

Living Edition
| Editors: Robert A. Meyers

Correlated Equilibria and Communication in Games

  • Françoise Forges
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27737-5_103-3

Definition of the Subject

The correlated equilibrium is a game theoretic solution concept. It was proposed by Aumann (1974, 1987) in order to capture the strategic correlation opportunities that the players face when they take into account the extraneous environment in which they interact. The notion is illustrated in section “Introduction.” A formal definition is given in section “Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Basic Properties.” The correlated equilibrium also appears as the appropriate solution concept if preplay communication is allowed between the players. As shown in section “Correlated Equilibrium and Communication,” this property can be given several precise statements according to the constraints imposed on the players’ communication, which can go from plain conversation to exchange of messages through noisy channels. Originally designed for static games with complete information, the correlated equilibrium applies to any strategic form game. It is geometrically and...

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Solution Concept Cheap Talk Correlate Equilibrium Sequential Equilibrium 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.CeremadeUniversité Paris-DauphineParisFrance