Abstract
Deliberation involves the interpersonal exchange and evaluation of reasons and counter-reasons, in which each party attempts to rationally persuade the others, rather than manipulating or bargaining with them. This group deliberation is crucial for the generation of epistemic goods, such as knowledge and reasonable beliefs, given that it helps us eradicate possible errors. But it is a familiar fact that groups often perform suboptimally and indeed only under particular conditions deliberative groups can tap this epistemic potential and in turn avoid deliberative distortions, such as polarization and domination. This entry then focuses on certain positive epistemic possibilities that group deliberation can foster and on certain structural and personal conditions that enable such potential. Regarding the structural conditions, the deliberative group needs to instantiate some cognitive diversity concerning opinions, knowledge, and skills. Regarding the personal conditions, the individual deliberators need to possess an intellectually humble and autonomous character.
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I would like to thank the support of Fondecyt 1210724.
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De Brasi, L. (2021). Deliberation. In: The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98390-5_198-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98390-5_198-1
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