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Antisocial Behavior in the Workplace

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Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics

Abstract

Antisocial behavior within the workplace can have adverse consequences on worker and firm productivity. Despite their potentially large costs, antisocial activities are rarely directly observable or recorded, making field studies on this topic relatively uncommon. This chapter presents the commonly used experimental methods to investigate workplace relevant antisocial behavior, the costs of such behavior, and possible explanations for its existence. Section “Sabotage” reviews the laboratory experimental methods that have been employed to measure sabotage; it also discusses the key results and possible explanations for this behavior. Section “Asset Destroying Actions” provides an overview of the asset destroying literature, where subjects are willing to pay to reduce others’ earnings. The final section “Dishonesty in the Workplace” focuses on the experimental literature on dishonesty, including corruption. This section also discusses potential motivations for dishonest behavior. The literature documents the existence of antisocial behavior. In particular, there is substantial evidence of sabotage, asset destroying actions, and dishonesty. The review identifies several motivations underlying these behaviors, such as envy, spite, reference dependence, inequality aversion, aversion to lying, maintenance of public and self-image, and social norms.

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Acknowledgement

The authors gratefully acknowledge research assistance provided by Evelina Onopriyenko as well as funding from the Australian Research Council (Discovery Project DP1411151). We also appreciate the excellent comments provided by the Editor, Maire Claire Villeval.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Economics, Monash University, Clayton, Australia

    Lata Gangadharan & Philip J. Grossman

  2. Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden

    Joe Vecci

Authors
  1. Lata Gangadharan
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  2. Philip J. Grossman
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  3. Joe Vecci
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Correspondence to Lata Gangadharan .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. UNU-MERIT & Princeton University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Klaus F. Zimmermann

Section Editor information

  1. GATE, CNRS – University of Lyon, Ecully, France

    Marie Claire Villeval

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Gangadharan, L., Grossman, P.J., Vecci, J. (2020). Antisocial Behavior in the Workplace. In: Zimmermann, K. (eds) Handbook of Labor, Human Resources and Population Economics. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_139-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-57365-6_139-1

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