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Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks pp 1–4Cite as

Collusion

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Synonyms

Bid rigging; Cartel; Collaborative cheating; Price agreement; Tacit collusion

Definitions

In markets where game theory and mechanism design are used for resource allocation or cost sharing, agents are independent and rational, i.e., each agent aims to get higher individual utility for itself. Collusion takes place when a subset of agents deviates from the strategy of truthfully reporting their private information to manipulate the game outcomes.

Historical Background

Collusion is a pervasive problem in markets. Agents have the incentive to collude and cheat, when collusion is profitable, e.g., they can gain more group utility as well as individual utilities.

Many case studies in practice show that traditional auctions are vulnerable to collusive behaviors. For example, in previous FCC spectrum auctions (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000), where the bids for spectrum licenses were large in hundreds of millions and there were no constraints on the submitted bids, bidders signaled with...

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, China

    Fan Wu & Dan Peng

Authors
  1. Fan Wu
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  2. Dan Peng
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Fan Wu .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo , Waterloo, Ontario, Canada

    Xuemin (Sherman) Shen

  2. Faculty of Business and Information Technology, University of Ontario Institute of Technology, Oshawa, Ontario, Canada

    Xiaodong Lin

  3. Dpt.of Electrical & Computer Engineering, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, Omaha, Nebraska, USA

    Kuan Zhang

Section Editor information

  1. No affiliation provided

    Jianwei Huang

  2. No affiliation provided

    Yuan Luo

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Cite this entry

Wu, F., Peng, D. (2018). Collusion. In: Shen, X., Lin, X., Zhang, K. (eds) Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32903-1_32-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32903-1_32-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-32903-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-32903-1

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Computer SciencesReference Module Computer Science and Engineering

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