Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks

Living Edition
| Editors: Xuemin (Sherman) Shen, Xiaodong Lin, Kuan Zhang

Collusion

  • Fan Wu
  • Dan Peng
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32903-1_32-1

Synonyms

Definitions

In markets where game theory and mechanism design are used for resource allocation or cost sharing, agents are independent and rational, i.e., each agent aims to get higher individual utility for itself. Collusion takes place when a subset of agents deviates from the strategy of truthfully reporting their private information to manipulate the game outcomes.

Historical Background

Collusion is a pervasive problem in markets. Agents have the incentive to collude and cheat, when collusion is profitable, e.g., they can gain more group utility as well as individual utilities.

Many case studies in practice show that traditional auctions are vulnerable to collusive behaviors. For example, in previous FCC spectrum auctions (Cramton and Schwartz, 2000), where the bids for spectrum licenses were large in hundreds of millions and there were no constraints on the submitted bids, bidders signaled with...

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringShanghai Jiao Tong UniversityShanghaiChina

Section editors and affiliations

  • Jianwei Huang
    • 1
  • Yuan Luo
  1. 1.Department of Information EngineeringThe Chinese University of Hong Kong, StainHong KongChina