Encyclopedia of Wireless Networks

Living Edition
| Editors: Xuemin (Sherman) Shen, Xiaodong Lin, Kuan Zhang

Auction

Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32903-1_27-1

Synonyms

Definitions

Auction is a concept from microeconomics, referring to the practice of buying and selling goods through the process of bidding. Auction participants include buyers, sellers, and the auctioneer, and the role of the auctioneer may be assumed by the seller, especially if there is a single seller. An auction mechanism is a series of rules specifying how an auction is conducted. The three most important components of an auction mechanism are the determination of the winners, the allocation of items, and the payment.

Historical Background

Auction is deemed as an effective way to assign items to buyers who value them the most. According to different numbers of participants, auctions can be categorized into three settings.
  • Forward auction. One seller, who also acts as the auctioneer, and multiple buyers.

  • Reverse auction. One buyer, who also acts as the auctioneer, and multiple sellers.

  • Double auction. Multiple buyers, multiple sellers, and a...

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceWuhan UniversityWuhanPeople’s Republic of China
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringHong Kong University of Science and TechnologyHong KongPeople’s Republic of China

Section editors and affiliations

  • Jianwei Huang
    • 1
  • Yuan Luo
  1. 1.Department of Information EngineeringThe Chinese University of Hong Kong, StainHong KongChina