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Contractual Misincentives in the Outsourcing of Information Technology: A Principal-Agent Approach

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Synonyms

Contract theory; Game theory; Information technology outsourcing; Misincentives; Principal-Agent

Definition

The counter-effects of imposing penalty clauses in information technology outsourcing agreements.

Introduction

Outsourcing the technological infrastructure has become a common practice for public administrations worldwide aiming at dedicating efforts and resources on their core activities. Outsourcing agreements have been conceptualized through the lens of agency theory by many governance applications of Principal-Agent models, some of which includes government contracting, asset and fund management, supply chain, cross-country offshoring, informal contracting, and information technology products and services (Coats 2002; de Almeida 2007; Dluhosch and Hens 2016; Dey et al. 2010).

The distinctions and influences of extrinsic incentives from contractual sanctions and rewards have been widely discussed in the economics, governance, and information systems management studies...

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Correspondence to Thyago Celso C. Nepomuceno .

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Nepomuceno, T.C.C., Nepomuceno, K.T.C., Costa, A.P.C.S. (2020). Contractual Misincentives in the Outsourcing of Information Technology: A Principal-Agent Approach. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3928-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3928-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-31816-5

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