Synonyms

Betterment; Improvement; Reorganization; Reorientation; Transformation

Definitions

In a generic sense, reform is an effort to improve institutions or processes. Administrative reform is a purposeful transformatory process whose overachieving aim is to have a public sector that conforms to the three 3Es of management: efficiency, effectiveness, and economy.

Introduction

In modern public organizations, betterment, improvement, reorganization, reorientation, and transformation are a commonplace pursuit. These initiatives are founded on the fact that public organizations do not exist in a theoretical vacuum. They exist in a given context, and consequently, they have to respond to demands, pressures, and stimuli that emanate from both the internal and external environments. This response, encapsulated in betterment, improvement, reorganization, reorientation, and transformation initiatives, is collectively called administrative reform. Administrative reform is a reaction to a perceived problem with the aim of improving current processes. For expository purposes, the key term, administrative reforms, must be defined. Khan (1980: 57) states that these are “…efforts which call for or lead to changes in the bureaucratic system of a country intended to change the existing and established practices, behaviours and structures within it.” Caiden (1969: 65) says that “the need for administrative reform arises from the malfunctioning of the natural processes of administrative change.” Using Caiden’s logic, “administrative reform is the artificial inducement of administrative transformation, against resistance” (ibid.). Three characteristics define its distinctive features: (i) moral purpose (e.g., to improve the status quo), (ii) artificial transformation, and (iii) administrative resistance (ibid.).

Administrative reform is predicated on the philosophies of movements and schools of thought such as New Public Management, New Public Service, and New Public Governance. The other influence in the post-NPM era is the whole-of-government approach. In recent years, many countries have undertaken administrative reform as a crucial step towards strengthening their economy and better management of their social development (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 1997: 3). In both developed and developing countries, the state is the driving force in administrative reform initiatives, particularly in the latter case where the administrative apparatus is yet to be modernized so that it fully comports with the three 3Es of management. In the case of most developing countries, administrative reform is externally driven by multilateral organizations such as the World Bank and European Commission. Largely, these reforms are girded in principles of New Public Management. In some developing countries, though, the process of reform is internally driven. Such an example is Botswana. After then President Ketumile Masire (1980–1998) visited Singapore in mid-1992, he was impressed by the country’s Work Improvement Teams (WITs) movement. On his return, he introduced the WITs movement and the Botswana National Productivity Centre was established in December 1993.

In light of the dire need for administrative reforms in developing countries, some multilateral organizations help in this endeavor. An example is the United Nations Programme in Public Administration and Finance. The United Nations initiative supports developing countries and countries in economic transition in their efforts to reform their public administration structures (ibid.). In a similar vein, the United Nations produces World Public Sector Reform reports which focus on various reform initiatives. For example, the second World Public Sector Reform report in 2003, titled World Public Sector Report 2003; e-government at the crossroads, focused on e-government as a reform initiative (see United Nations 2003). In a similar-minded fashion, regional bodies – for example, the African Union (see New Partnership for Africa’s Development) – and subregional bodies – for example, the Southern African Development Community – are concerned with administrative reform issues. At a national level, there are many and different fora that discuss administrative reform issues. Some examples are: (i) Annual Public Sector Innovation Conferences in South Africa (e.g., the 2017 Annual Public Sector Innovation Conference, in its 11th year, took place on 30 and 31 August 2017 and focused on service delivery innovation within the context of the 4th industrial revolution) and Botswana (Public Service Conventions – the 2017 Public Service Convention was held on 12 June 2017; see, e.g., Botswana Press Agency 2017).

Administrative reforms are efforts to improve institutions or processes. Among others, they create public value. Public value refers to the value created by government through services, laws regulation, and other actions (Kelly et al. 2010: 4). Public value goes to the heart of the social contract because “the legitimacy of government as a whole generally depends on how well it creates value” (ibid.). In this regard, economic theory assumes that economic units being individuals, households, firms, and governments are homo economicus (economic men). In this regard, governments must optimize by maximizing benefits and minimizing costs of administrative reforms. So, reforms, if correctly applied, will favorably circumstance governments to increase public value, notably, through service delivery. Failure to add value can result in service delivery protests as it often happens in South Africa (dubbed “the protest capital of the world”; e.g., see Coetzer and Terblanche 2013).

Political Economy of Administrative Reforms

Political Economy Analysis (PEA), deriving from Political Economy, “is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time” (DFID 2009: 4). It focuses on three variables: (i) actors/players, (ii) institutions, and (iii) ideas. In this regard, for one to fully understand administrative reforms, one, inescapably, needs to understand actors/players, institutions, and ideas that come to play in the space of administrative reforms. This is so because administrative reforms, like other processes, do not happen in a vacuum. Thus, they are mediated in a crucible of actors/players, institutions, and ideas. Political Economy Analysis questions such as these are important: (i) Who are the key actors/players? Are they endogenous or exogenous? (ii) What are the key administrative institutions? What are their capacities, capabilities and independence and/or autonomy? and (iii) What are the key ideas that provide the impetus for administrative reform? What are the motivators of administrative reforms? What are the centrifugal (enablers) and centripetal (dis-enablers) forces?

Thus, the application of PEA allows the observer, researcher, or similar-minded persons to go beyond the surface of administrative reforms. This is akin to peeling off layers of the proverbial onion to get to the core of the onion. Thus, in this regard, PEA is a very powerful tool for understanding the dynamics of administrative reforms. This is so because administrative reforms, arguably, have had positive impact in some regions in the developed world, but this record has not been duplicated in the developing world, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. This brings to the fore the overarching question; why are administrative reforms, generally, not producing the desired fruit in the developing world, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa? This question is pertinent in Sub-Saharan Africa in the post-global economic crisis period. Most economies are dependent on primary products, for example, mineral-led economies (e.g., Botswana) and oil-producing economies (e.g., Angola, Libya and Nigeria) and post-2008, they are experiencing subdued demand, hence, falling prices for their products. Chronic fiscal stress has become their lot, hence, the need for administrative reforms. The administrative reforms would result in a “biggest bang for the buck” and also increase the public value. As variously documented in the literature, the record from administrative reforms in Africa presents a mixed record: few successes and many failures (e.g., see Karyeija 2012). To understand why, one must go beyond the surface through PEA.

Contextuality of Administrative Reforms

Related to PEA is the idea of contextuality; that is, the context in which administrative reforms are carried out. Contextuality is key to the success or failure of administrative reform (Khan 1991: 60). Therefore, as much as administrative reform is firmly rooted in public bureaucracies, there is a need to consider the economic, social, and political context. In view of the foregoing, Khan advises that “reform, therefore, needs to be viewed from a systemic view” (ibid.). Therefore, based on Khan’s logic, it can be argued that the economic, social, and political context can either be an enabler or dis-enabler of administrative reforms. That is, it can either positively or negatively affect the success of administrative reforms. As homo economicus, administrative reforms implementers must maximize and minimize enablers and dis-enablers, respectively. In this regard, governments, together with multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and European Commission, must be alive to the enabling or dis-enabling propensities of the founding economic, social, and political context.

Just like PEA, paying regard to the founding economic, social, and political context will very favorably circumstance implementing governments, together with cooperating multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and European Commission, to implement administrative reforms. In a related vein, scanning the founding economic, social, and political context will necessitate a SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) exercise. Once the SWOT exercise has been done, administrative reforms can be rolled out.

Administrative Reforms in Sub-Saharan Countries

The legacy of colonialization is that almost all Sub-Saharan countries were underdeveloped when they attained independence, mostly in the 1960s. Thus, big public sectors were formed in order to deal with issues of underdevelopment. By the dawn of the 1980s, there was disenchantment with the performance of the state. This led to a wave of public sector reforms. Ayee (2008), one of the pre-eminent scholars on public sector reforms in Africa, has divided public sector reforms in Africa into three phases: (i) reforms of the 1980s, (ii) reforms of the mid-1990s to early 2000, and (iii) post-2000 reforms. The 1980s saw the imposition of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by the Bretton Woods institutions, International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Thus, most administrative reforms were introduced as part of the SAPs package. Added to the SAPs were Reaganism and Thatcherism: cutback policies of the United States President Ronald Reagan and United Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Overall, the record of the SAPs in terms of re-engineering African economies and public sectors was mixed: a few successes and many failures.

The mid-1990s to early 2000 saw an explosion of public sector reforms, particularly, New Public Management (NPM), together with the emphasis on good governance (its principal proponent being the World Bank). Subsequent to NPM and post-mid-1990s to early 2000, there were other reform packages such as New Public Service, New Public Governance, and the whole-of-government approach. Finally, post the global economic crisis, whose high noon was experienced in 2009 when the global economy contracted, there are moves to reform economies and public services in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is so because most Sub-Saharan countries are faced with chronic fiscal stress. This is due to the fact that most are primary products-reliant that have been experiencing price falls since 2009.

If one periodizes administrative reform in Africa as beginning in the 1980s, it is evident that the subregion has been experimenting with reforms for nearly 40 years. After nearly 40 years of reforms in Africa, what is the record? Admittedly, this is an area that is currently the subject of continuing scholarly enquiry. Notwithstanding, there is a body of evidence, for example, Ayee (2008), Economic Commission for Africa (2013), and Karyeija (2012), which demonstrates that the record is mixed: a few successes and many failures. There are many reasons for the dismal record. For instance, Karyeija (2012: 105) argues that there are critical areas that need to be considered when discussing public sector reform (PSR) in Africa. Some are: (1) there is need to acknowledge the importance of culture and context, because at times local values contradict the content of reform efforts, (2) PSR need both political support and support from the civil society, (3) PSR take time to bear fruit, (4) incremental implementation may be better, (5) not all support for PSR is altruistic, (6) corruption still hinders reform in Africa, (7) there is a need to revisit the role of donors, (8) first things first – let us create a credible public sector before we reform it, and (9) ownership of reform programs by African governments and other stakeholders is necessary.

Enhancing Administrative Reforms in Sub-Saharan Countries

Based on a review of limited literature, it can be concluded that the fruit of administrative reforms in Sub-Saharan countries is yet to be realized. It is imperative that there must be concerted efforts to ensure that administrative reforms in Sub-Saharan countries bear fruit. Among others, doing would result in an increased public value that will be in good service of the social contract whose deficit is apparent in Sub-Saharan Africa. Post-2009, primary products-reliant economies are faced with subdued demand, hence, falling prices that translate into constrained revenue envelopes. These fiscal pressures mean that there is a need to ensure the “biggest bang for the buck.” Added to these are pressures from a rights-asserting and assertive citizenry. In the modern day, the public service customer is not very meek, accepting of shoddy service. He/she is rights-asserting and assertive as amply instanced by deep pockets of service delivery protests. In this regard, South Africa, dubbed in some circles as the capital of protests (e.g., see Coetzer and Terblanche 2013), offers very instructive lessons on what rights-asserting and assertive citizens can do in the face of a public sector that does not satisfactorily deliver. Therefore, given the foregoing pressures and demands, being a reduced revenue envelope post-2008 and rights-asserting and assertive citizens, there is a dire need to re-think the architecture of administrative reforms in Africa as next proposed.

Political Economy Analysis of administrative reforms: As previously stated, administrative reforms do not, and cannot, happen in a theoretical vacuum. Among others, they happen within a political economy that, chiefly, entails players/actors, institutions, and ideas. Given the political economy of administrative reforms, it is imperative to adopt a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) approach towards the implementation of administrative reforms in Sub-Saharan Africa. PEA will enable the implementers of administrative reforms to scratch beyond the surface of the matrix of administrative reforms. In this regard, and in reference to institutions of governance of which Obama decried in September 2009 that “Africa doesn’t need strongmen, it needs strong institutions,” that “development depends upon good governance,” and “that is the ‘ingredient which has been missing in far too many places, for far too long’” (Sunday Times 2009), there is a need to ask whether Sub-Saharan Africa is endowed with strong institutions that have the capacity to carry out administrative reforms. If, as Obama claims, there is a deficit of strong institutions in Africa, PEA will help African governments to diagnose the cause of the deficit of strong institutions with a view to find a cure. Thus, the PEA approach will enable governments to have a 360-degree appreciation of players/actors, institutions, and ideas that populate the space of administrative reforms.

Contextuality of reforms: Related to PEA is the idea of contextuality, that is, the context in which administrative reforms are being carried out. As correctly pointed out by Khan (1991: 60), “contextuality is key to the success or failure of administrative reform.” Therefore, African governments must pay heed to the economic, social, and political context in which administrative reforms are predicated upon. A lot of contextual questions arise in this regard. Examples are: (i) Is there a grand coalition of ideas around the necessity of administrative reforms? (ii) Is there political buy-in from the highest office for reforms? What interests are threatened by the implementation of administrative reforms? In a related vein, administrative reforms are inimical to practices such as corruption in the public service and society in general. In other words, administrative reforms cannot thrive in the face of deep-rooted and endemic corruption. It is common knowledge that with the exception of a few cases such as Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius, corruption is deep-rooted and endemic in Africa (see various Transparency International reports on corruption in Africa), detracting from the fruit of administrative reform. Thus, corruption is an important contextual factor to consider.

Capacity to implement administrative reforms: Largely due to a lack of application of professional project management techniques in many Sub-Saharan African countries, implementation is problematic. Needless to say, implementation is key to the success of any and every endeavor. Successful implementation ensures that intentions are brought to fruition. Given the fact that often, indeed almost always, projects and programs are not delivered as per the Project Management Triple Constraint of cost, time, and scope, or not implemented at all, there is no reason to expect that administrative reforms do not suffer from the same malaise. Therefore, there is a need to improve on the architecture of public sector implementation in Africa so that administrative reforms are successfully implemented.

Monitoring & Evaluation (M & E) of administrative reforms: M & E are critical to project and program success. On the one hand, monitoring allows the implementer to check if he/she is on track in terms of project objectives and goals. On the other, evaluation enables the implementer to answer questions such as what happened? what went right and wrong? and what lessons can be carried forward? It is common knowledge that most projects and programs in Sub-Saharan African countries fail due to a lack of a robust M & E framework. In this regard, given weak M & E frameworks in many Sub-Saharan African countries, it is very imperative to develop a results-based M & E framework to monitor and evaluate administrative reforms. Very vitally, the M & E framework must have indicators to ensure effective M & E of administrative reforms.

Nonstate actors: While the state is the chief implementer of administrative reforms, the role played by nonstate actors in this enterprise is very important. This is so because nonstate actors are critical stakeholders without whose participation and support, projects, and programs (including administrative reforms) will fail. In many Sub-Saharan African countries, there is an adversarial relationship between the state and nonstate actors. At times, the former, without adducing evidence, accuses the latter of pursuing insurrectionary foreign (read western) agendas, inclusive of illegal regime change. As a result, nonstate actors are not afforded sufficient space, if not zero space, to participate in public life. Therefore, there is a need for a paradigm shift regarding state and nonstate actors relationships.

Strengthening parliament to oversee the executive: In many Sub-Saharan African countries (Botswana being an example), the principle of primus inter pares (first among equals) is more honored in the breach than the observance. Thus, parliament is very weak, subservient, and subject to the whims and caprices of the executive arm of the government. In the end, it fails to exact accountability for performance (being results and no results) from the executive arm of the government. Therefore, there is an imperative need to strengthen parliament to enable it to oversee the executive, including accountability for the delivery (or none thereof) of administrative reforms. Furthermore, there is a need to create a select parliamentary committee to receive implementation reports on administrative reforms. Relatedly, there is a need to move beyond a practice where parliamentary committees, save the Public Accounts Committee, are talk shops whose recommendations the executive arm of the government can choose to ignore. Thus, the law, inclusive of parliamentary standing orders, must be amended to compel the government to act on recommendations of parliamentary committees.

Conclusion

The state plays a very pivotal role in social and economic development in the developing world. For the state to capably discharge its social and economic obligations to the citizenry, hence, deliver on the social contract, it must be able and capable. To build ability and capability, the state must continually renew and reinvent itself through many variants of reforms, for example, administrative reforms. The overarching aim of administrative reforms is to improve the performance of the state bureaucracy. Betterment, improvement, reorganization, reorientation, and transformation, which are commonplace phrases in the lexicon of reforms, go to the heart of administrative reforms. Since the 1980s, Sub-Saharan African countries have introduced a raft of administrative reforms to, among others, increase public value and better deliver on the social contract. As much as there is dearth of empirical studies on the efficacy of administrative reforms in Sub-Saharan African countries, few available works point out to a mixed record: a few success and many failures. The causes of failures are varied. Notably, many causative factors can be blamed on the implementers, for example, lack of capable administrative institutions to carry out administrative reforms, deep-rooted and endemic corruption, and lackadaisical political support for administrative reforms from the first offices. Given the importance of reforming administrative systems in Sub-Saharan African countries, particularly post-2009, there is an imperative need to reconfigure the architecture of administrative reforms. Among others, political economy analysis and contextuality of administrative reforms are key. Beyond the foregoing two factors, there are key policy issues that reformers in Sub-Saharan Africa must consider. Examples are: building implementation capacity, establishing results-based monitoring and evaluation frameworks, cultivating cordial state and nonstate relationships to enable the latter to exercise oversight on the executive arm of the government and, finally, strengthening parliament to exact accountability for results, inclusive of implementation of administrative reforms, from the executive. Finally, doing so will ensure value for money from reforms.

Cross-References