Formal Rulemaking in Public Administration

  • Sara R. Jordan
Living reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1028-1

Synonyms

Definition

Formal rulemaking is one of three forms of administrative rulemaking in the United States: informal (notice and comment), hybrid, and formal (hearing). Formal rulemaking involves agencies holding hearings – on the record and presided over by an administrative law judge – to adjudicate a rule when that rule unduly affects the life or livelihood of a small group of individuals or organizations. Formal rulemaking does not require “notice and comment” as the hearing serves this purpose. Formal rulemaking does require most of the mechanisms of civil law procedure including cross-examination and the judgment of an administrative law judge.

Formal rulemaking is prompted when the authorizing legislation stipulates agencies are required to promulgate rules “on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.”

Introduction

When most citizens or scholars think of rulemaking, they think of the website regulations.gov and...

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References

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Virginia Polytechnic University and State InstituteBlacksburgUSA