In Philosophy
In philosophy, the modern notion of “personal responsibility” consists of two threads woven together: one entailing what we should do and the other what we can do. In the political, normative sense, being responsible is acting out the duties that flow from our position in the social order and our status as moral agents. Immanuel Kant (Kant 1785) argued that we had – as rational agents – a responsibility to act only in ways that could be made into universal law (i.e., without human institutions falling apart as result). The second, metaphysical thread involves our ability to be the determining cause of our own actions. For most philosophers, this means that personal responsibly rests on the possibility that we could have done otherwise. Accordingly, this type of responsibility is closely associated with the notion of free will. Kant argued that the fact we should fulfill our personal duties and responsibilities proved that we are, indeed, free to do so; or, in other...
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
References
Freud, S. (1949). The ego and the id. London: Hogarth.
Kant, I. (1785). Grounding for the metaphysics of morals (trans: Ellington, J.W. (3rd ed.)). Hackett.
Maslow, A. H. (1954). Motivation and personality. New York: Harper.
Rogers, C. (1951). Client centred therapy. London: Constable.
Rogers, C. R., Stevens, B., Gendlin, E. T., Shlien, J. M., & Van Dusen, W. (1967). Person to person: The problem of being human, a new trend in psychology. Lafayette: Real People Press.
Skinner, B.F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. Middlesex: Penguin Books.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Section Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2017 Springer International Publishing AG
About this entry
Cite this entry
Stewart, B.A. (2017). Personal Responsibility. In: Zeigler-Hill, V., Shackelford, T. (eds) Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_1493-1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-28099-8_1493-1
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-28099-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-28099-8
eBook Packages: Springer Reference Behavioral Science and PsychologyReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences