For children, self-awareness begins as a rudimentary understanding that one is separate from the environment. In older children and adults, self-awareness is a psychological state where attention is focused inwardly, toward one’s self-concept. Self-awareness has many consequences for thoughts, feelings, and behavior.
Self-awareness is notoriously difficult to define, as are many elusive self-related terms. “Self-awareness” often reflects several types or levels of self-awareness that include: a basic sense that one is separate from the outside world, a sense of bodily self-awareness where people (and some animals) can recognize themselves in mirrors, and a more advanced form of self-awareness, where someone can turn attention inwards toward an elaborate self-concept.
While self-awareness means many things to many researchers and theorists, most agree that it develops...
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