Infinite Horizon Concave Games with Coupled Constraints

  • Dean Carlson
  • Alain Haurie
  • Georges Zaccour
Living reference work entry


In this chapter, we expose a full theory for infinite-horizon concave differential games with coupled state-constraints. Concave games provide an attractive setting for many applications of differential games in economics, management science and engineering, and state coupling constraints happen to be quite natural features in many of these applications. After recalling the results of Rosen (1965) regarding existence and uniqueness of equilibrium of concave game with coupling contraints, we introduce the classical model of Ramsey and presents the Hamiltonian systems approach for its treatment. Next, we extend to a differential game setting the Hamiltonian systems approach and this formalism to the case of coupled state-constraints. Finally, we extend the theory to the case of discounted rewards.


Concave Games Coupling Constraints Differential Games Global Change Game Hamilonian Systems Oligopoly Game Ramsey Model Rosen Equilibrium 


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Mathematical ReviewsAmerican Mathematical SocietyAnn ArborUSA
  2. 2.ORDECSYS and University of GenevaGenevaSwitzerland
  3. 3.GERADHEC MontrealMontréalCanada
  4. 4.GERADHEC MontrealMontréalCanada
  5. 5.Département de sciences de la décision, GERADHEC MontrealMontréalCanada

Section editors and affiliations

  • Tamer Basar
    • 1
  • Georges Zaccour
    • 2
  1. 1.Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of IllinoisUrbanaUSA
  2. 2.Département de sciences de la décisionHEC MontrealMontrealCanada

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