Moral Instincts and Morality
Moral instincts, or otherwise social intuitions, are unconscious abilities that differentiate between right and wrong actions.
Since the advent of psychology, Bargh (1989) stated that people access substantial types of knowledge without phenomenological cognizance. According to Reber (1993), awareness and phenomenological cognizance are comparatively new concepts in comparison to other functions of the brain considered to be unconscious. Lately, some scientific disciplines such as evolutionary psychology and cognitive sciences proposed intuitionist approaches to human functioning (Klein 2003).
Long ago, gut feelings were considered unreasonable. Now, however, things have changed significantly, and often reasoning is considered needless (Cummins 2003). Certain theories, like the moral intuitionist theories, emphasize people’s sudden instinct reactions that they exhibit toward others. As per this...
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