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Mating Strategy Equilibria

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Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science
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Synonyms

Evolutionary stable strategies

Definition

Mating strategy equilibria refers to alternative mating phenotypes being maintained in a population in an evolutionarily stable equilibrium.

Introduction

In terms of evolutionary game theory, a “strategy” is a genetically determined decision rule that regulates how different behavioral phenotypes (tactics) are manifested (Gross 1996).

Evolutionary strategies are stable; if after reaching a critical proportion within a population, no other alternate strategy can do better (Maynard-Smith 1982). Behavioral strategies can include multiple distinct phenotypes (tactics) that are maintained at an evolutionary stable equilibrium. This is often seen with “alternative mating tactics” in which individuals adopt different behavioral phenotypes to access mates. This section will discuss how alternative mating tactics can evolve and be maintained within populations in a stable equilibrium.

Alternative Strategies

An alternative mating strategy is a...

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References

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Correspondence to Charlyn Partridge .

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Partridge, C. (2017). Mating Strategy Equilibria. In: Shackelford, T., Weekes-Shackelford, V. (eds) Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_2697-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_2697-1

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-16999-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-16999-6

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