Formalizing Strategic Interactions
In prisoner’s dilemma, and its group-level version – public goods – players face a nearly identical problem of exploitation by free riders or defectors. Product-services like TripAdvisor, Airbnb, Uber, etc., all rely on continued feedback from their users to produce and share vital information in a game-theoretic format. These businesses are somehow able to dodge the free-rider problem that has puzzled economists for decades. While they may seem like commonplace practices to a customer, the underbellies of these large markets reveal subtle and sophisticated architectures interacting with behavioral research. A quick step back into the theory may help formalize why this is worth investigating.
Game Theory and Its Behavioral Ally
Game theory presents a set of powerful mathematical frameworks that has wide-ranging formal...
- Nash Equilibrium
- Public Good Game
- Salient Incentive
- Human Player
- Behavioral Game Theory
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Aradhye, C. (2016). Repeated or Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Weekes-Shackelford, V., Shackelford, T., Weekes-Shackelford, V. (eds) Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-16999-6_1221-1
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Online ISBN: 978-3-319-16999-6
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