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Repeated or Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma

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Behavioral game theory; Evolutionary psychology; Human computer interaction; Prisoner’s dilemma


Formalizing Strategic Interactions


In prisoner’s dilemma, and its group-level version – public goods – players face a nearly identical problem of exploitation by free riders or defectors. Product-services like TripAdvisor, Airbnb, Uber, etc., all rely on continued feedback from their users to produce and share vital information in a game-theoretic format. These businesses are somehow able to dodge the free-rider problem that has puzzled economists for decades. While they may seem like commonplace practices to a customer, the underbellies of these large markets reveal subtle and sophisticated architectures interacting with behavioral research. A quick step back into the theory may help formalize why this is worth investigating.

Game Theory and Its Behavioral Ally

Game theory presents a set of powerful mathematical frameworks that has wide-ranging formal...


  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Public Good Game
  • Salient Incentive
  • Human Player
  • Behavioral Game Theory

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Correspondence to Chinmay Aradhye .

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Aradhye, C. (2016). Repeated or Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. In: Weekes-Shackelford, V., Shackelford, T., Weekes-Shackelford, V. (eds) Encyclopedia of Evolutionary Psychological Science. Springer, Cham.

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