Molinism in Renaissance Philosophy

Abstract

Molinism is a theological and philosophical theory developed during the late sixteenth century by Luis de Molina. In particular, Molinism tries to explain the relation between God’s foreknowledge and human free will, thanks to the elaboration of the so-called middle knowledge, by means of which God foreknows what each man would do in any possible condition, but conserves the logical possibility of doing the opposite of what God has foreknown. Therefore, Molinism promotes a conception of synchronic contingency according to which something could logically be or not be in the same moment in God’s mind before his voluntary act of creation. This approach should therefore guarantee the importance of human free will in the economy of salvation together with God’s sovereign decision. However, it was harshly criticized by both the Thomist and the Augustinian-minded Catholic traditions. This entry will first provide a historical introduction, in which attention will be paid to the so-called De auxiliis Controversy between the Dominicans and Jesuits concerning the relationship between divine grace and free will. Secondly, it will consider the theoretical premise of Molinism: John Duns Scotus’ synchronic contingency and its difference from diachronic contingency. Finally, it will address Molina’s development of a threefold conception of divine knowledge, paying particular attention to “middle knowledge,” the central notion of Molinism.