Abstract
The theory of mind (ToM) refers to how people understand their own thoughts and feelings and those of other beings. It is a crucial cognitive mechanism for social interactions and communication. It helps us to predict, to explain, and to manipulate behaviors or mental states. Moreover, this skill is shared by almost all human beings beyond early childhood.
The literature presents different explicit false-belief tasks as a means of investigating ToM in children (e.g., one of the most famous is known as the Sally-Anne task). Although children younger than 4 years usually fail in these explicit tasks, it cannot be excluded that some less complex forms of understanding mental states develop earlier. So, in order to investigate the precursors that anticipate the emergence of a more mature representational system, many recent studies on infants’ beliefs have demonstrated, in the last decade, a very early sensitivity specifically to the false beliefs of others by using implicit looking-time tasks. This entry starts with the definition of the theory of mind and its history, before moving on to summarize developmental research in this area. Finally, it focuses on the relation between theory of mind and the possible with some reflections on how an increasing consciousness of the variety of situations that the possible presents to us could allow people to choose the best alternative for themselves and others.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Apperly, I. A., & Butterfill, S. A. (2009). Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states? Psychological Review, 116, 953–970.
Astington, J. W., Harris, P. L., & Olson, D. R. (1988). Developing theories of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Baillargeon, R., Scott, R. M., & He, Z. (2010). False-belief understanding in infants. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(3), 110–118.
Baron-Cohen, S. (1991). Precursors to a theory of mind: Understanding attention in others. In A. Whiten (Ed.), Natural theories of mind: Evolution, development and simulation of everyday mindreading (pp. 233–251). Oxford: Blackwell.
Baron-Cohen, S. (2000). Theory of mind and autism: A fifteen year review. In S. Baron-Cohen, H. Tager-Flusberg, & D. J. Cohen (Eds.), Understanding other minds: Perspectives from developmental cognitive neuroscience (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A. M., & Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37–46.
Bretherton, I., McNew, S., & Beeghley-Smith, M. (1981). Early person knowledge as expressed in gestural and verbal communication: When do infants acquire a “theory of mind”? In M. E. Lamb & L. R. Sherrod (Eds.), Infant social cognition (pp. 333–373). Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2008). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12(5), 187–192.
Callaghan, T., Rochat, P., Lillard, A., Claux, M. L., Odden, H., Itakura, S., … Singh, S. (2005). Synchrony in the onset of mental-state reasoning: Evidence from five cultures. Psychological Science, 16, 378–384.
Doherty, M. (2009). Theory of mind. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Erikson, M. G. (2007). The meaning of the future: Toward a more specific definition of possible selves. Review of General Psychology, 11(4), 348–358.
Fletcher-Watson, S., & Happè, F. (2019). Autism: A new introduction to psychological theory and current debate. New York: Routledge.
Fodor, J. A. (1978). Propositional attitudes. The Monist, 61, 501–523.
Frye, D., & Moore, C. (1991). Children’s theories of mind. Mental states and social understanding. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Glăveanu, V. P. (2018). The possible as a field of inquiry. Europe’s Journal of Psychology, 14(3), 519–530.
Heyes, C. (2014). False belief in infancy: A fresh look. Developmental Science, 17(5), 647–659.
Kovács, Á. M., Téglás, E., & Endress, A. D. (2010). The social sense: Susceptibility to others’ beliefs in human infants and adults. Science, 330, 1830–1834.
Lewis, C., & Mitchell, P. (Eds.) (1994). Children’s early understanding of mind: Origins and development. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
MacNamara, J., Baker, E., & Olson, C. (1976). Four-year-olds’ understanding of pretend, forget, and know: Evidence for propositional operations. Child Development, 47, 62–70. https://doi.org/10.2307/1128283.
Mitchell, P. (1997). Introduction to theory of mind: Children, autism and apes. London: Edward Arnold Publishers.
Mitchell, P., & Lacohée, H. (1991). Children’s early understanding of false belief. Cognition, 39, 107–127.
Moore, C. (1996). Theories of mind in infancy. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 14, 19–40.
Onishi, K. H., & Baillargeon, R. (2005). Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs? Science, 308(5719), 255–258.
Rakoczy, H. (2012). Do infants have a theory of mind? British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30, 59–74.
Rakoczy, H. (2017). Theory of mind. In B. Hopkins, E. Geangu, & S. Linkenauger (Eds.), The Cambridge encyclopedia of child development (pp. 505–512). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Seligman, M. E. P., Railton, P., Baumeister, R. F., & Sripada, C. (2013). Navigating into the future or driven by the past. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(2), 119–141.
Senju, A., Southgate, V., Snape, C., Leonard, M., & Csibra, G. (2011). Do 18-month-olds really attribute mental states to others? Psychological Science, 22(7), 878–880.
Shultz, T. R., & Cloghesy, K. (1981). Development of recursive awareness of intention. Developmental Psychology, 17, 456–471.
Shultz, T. R., Wells, D., & Sarda, M. (1980). The development of the ability to distinguish intended actions from mistakes, reflexes, and passive movements. British Journal of Social & Clinical Psychology, 19, 301–310.
Song, H., & Baillargeon, R. (2008). Infants’ reasoning about others’ false perceptions. Developmental Psychology, 44(6), 1789–1795.
Southgate, V., Senju, A., & Csibra, G. (2007). Action anticipation through attribution of false belief by 2-year-olds. Psychological Science, 18(7), 587–592.
Surian, L., & Geraci, A. (2012). Where will the triangle look for it? Attributing false beliefs to a geometric shape at 17 months. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 30(1), 30–44.
Surian, L., Caldi, S., & Sperber, D. (2007). Attribution of beliefs by 13-month-old infants. Psychological Science, 18(7), 580–586.
Wellman, H. M. (2017). The development of theory of mind: Historical reflections. Child Development Perspectives, 11, 207–214.
Wellman, H. M., Cross, D., & Watson, J. (2001). Metaanalysis of theory-of-mind development: The truth about false belief. Child Development, 72, 655–684.
Whiten, A. (1991). Natural theories of mind. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Wimmer, H., & Perner, J. (1983). Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children’s understanding of deception. Cognition, 13(1), 103–128.
Zittoun, T., & de Saint-Laurent, C. (2015). Life-creativity: Imagining one’s life. In V. P. Glăveanu, A. Gillespie, & J. Valsiner (Eds.), Rethinking creativity: Contributions from cultural psychology (pp. 58–75). London: Routledge.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Section Editor information
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2022 Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this entry
Cite this entry
Franchin, L. (2022). Theory of Mind. In: Glăveanu, V.P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of the Possible. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90913-0_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90913-0_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-90912-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-030-90913-0
eBook Packages: Behavioral Science and PsychologyReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences