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Expectancy Theory in Organizations

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Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance
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Synonyms

Ideal bureaucracy of organizational theory; Instrumentality theory; Participative management; Path-goal theory

Definition

People will be motivated to the degree that they believe that effort will yield acceptable performance (expectancy), the performance will be rewarded (force/instrumentality), and the value of the rewards is highly positive (valence) (Vroom 1964).

A person’s motivation is a function of effort-to-performance expectancies, performance-to-outcome expectances, and perceived attractiveness of outcome (Lawler 1981).

Introduction

Expectancy theories gained popularity in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s (Vroom 1964; Porter and Lawler 1968; Lawler 1981). Victor Vroom’s (1964) theory posits that people will be motivated to the degree that they believe that (1) effort will yield acceptable performance (expectancy), (2) performance will be rewarded (force/instrumentality), and (3) the value of the rewards is highly positive (valence). The interactive combination of all...

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Correspondence to Anna A. Filipova .

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Filipova, A.A. (2022). Expectancy Theory in Organizations. In: Farazmand, A. (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66252-3_3002

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