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The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration pp 263–275Cite as

Palgrave Macmillan

Toleration of Moral Offense

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Abstract

The focus of this chapter is on offensive words and implications in interpersonal exchanges, specifically false and baseless attacks on a person’s behavior, character, and dignity as a human being. The idea of moral offenses is explained by analogy with what is offensive under codes of honor. Four kinds of moral offense are distinguished, and two kinds of respect for persons are explained. To illustrate, it is argued that self-respect gives us reason not to tolerate moral offenses while respect for others gives us reason sometimes to tolerate them. Hard cases call for judgment and more attention to how resist moral offenses, when we should, and how to tolerate them, when we must, with due respect for humanity.

Keywords

  • Toleration
  • Offenses
  • Moral
  • Respect
  • Self-Respect
  • Character
  • Kantian
  • Dignity
  • Honor
  • Humanity
  • Status
  • Standing
  • Resistance

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  • DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2_47
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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA

    Thomas E. Hill Jr

Authors
  1. Thomas E. Hill Jr
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Correspondence to Thomas E. Hill Jr .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia

    Dr. Mitja Sardoč

Section Editor information

  1. Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia

    Mitja Sardoč

  2. Faculty of the Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Ljubljana, Slovenia

    Mitja Sardoč

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Hill, T.E. (2022). Toleration of Moral Offense. In: Sardoč, M. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of Toleration. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-42121-2_47

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