Keywords

Introduction

The complexion of war and armed conflict that European militaries engage in has changed substantially in recent years. Increasingly, military organizations must deal with unpredictable, unsettled, and complex conditions and adversaries (NATO 2013a, 2021). New hybrid and multi-domain threats are becoming more severe, demanding increased attention to space, cyberspace, information systems, electronic warfare, artificial intelligence (AI), and autonomous weapons forces (NATO 2021, 2020, 2022; TRADOC 2017; USAFSG 2017; Coker 2015). Lone-wolves and non-state-actors – including hacker groups, cartels, human-trafficking organizations, and terror organizations – now have instrument of power parity in many respects, blurring the lines between state actors, civilians, and groups of combatants. At the same time, Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and 2022 invasion of Ukraine; increasing tensions between large nation-state adversaries in the Artic; and fluxes of refugees from Africa and the Middle East influence European security perspectives in ways that were unimagined a few decades ago. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and NATO leaders are increasingly facing volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) operating environments, where each mission has unique challenges, and existing doctrine and standard operational procedures (SOP) are unable to account for all situations that military personnel and decision-makers might face (NATO 2022). Therefore, military leaders must be able to think creatively and tailor each mission and operation to navigate those scenarios (ibid.: 1–1, 5–2). Future military leaders need technological competence, creativity, critical thinking skills, and the ability to build relationships based on trust, respect, and confidence (ibid.: 1–2). Additionally, they must “be comfortable with ambiguity, complexity and rapid change and see challenges as opportunities to grow rather than fail” (ibid.: 4–9).

These new and dynamic threats not only inform needed leadership skills but also increase the need for and relevance of design as one possible approach to military organization, leadership, and command in European and international military contexts (e.g., Porkoláb and Zweibelson 2018; Beaulieu-Brossard and Dufort 2017; Pettit and Toczek 2017; Jackson 2013; Zweibelson 2017; Banach 2009). In increasingly complex conflict and operational environments, European military scholars, strategists, and planners have noted classical military planning models fall short, and traditional doctrines are insufficient (Sookermany 2013; Pikner and Spisák 2013; Schaefer 2009; Bousquet 2008; Heltberg and Dahl 2019). Design thinking offers perspectives and methods that are generally considered well-suited for developing tailored and creative solutions to complex, multi-dimensional problems (Dorst 2011; Simon 1996; Schön 1983; Rowe 1987), and which address core needs in the current European military context.

This chapter provides an overview of the current state of military design in European defense forces. It describes the diversity of European military design uptakes and shows how military design is increasingly on the agenda in Europe, despite remaining relatively niche vis-à-vis institutionalized military planning doctrine and practice. Five subsections underpin and substantiate this conclusion. The first defines military design and explains how it differs from military planning. The second reviews the contemporary state of design among armed forces in Europe. The third presents three illustrative cases of design in European military organizations. The fourth considers possible future avenues of European military design research and practice. The fifth summarizes the main arguments and observations of the chapter in a brief conclusion.

Military Design and Planning

In recent years, military scholars have been increasingly occupied with understanding how design theory and practice entail new perceptions, approaches, and methodologies that are at odds with deeply rooted forms of sensemaking within military organizations (Wrigley et al. 2021; Pettit and Toczek 2017; Paparone et al. 2008; Beaulieu-Brossard and Dufort 2017). Understanding how the design approach differs from traditional military planning is key for grasping the current state of affairs in Europe to the extent that classical military operations planning and hierarchical organizational principles continue to form the backbone of defense forces in Europe. Outlining the distinction between military design and planning thus helps to better illuminate both the opportunities and obstacles for design as an emerging phenomenon in European military organizations.

Design thinking has evolved over the past decades as a conglomerate of methods and theories that aim to deal with complex problems (Nelson and Stolterman 2012; Simon 1996; Rowe 1987; Schön 1983; Rittel and Webber 1973). It combines insights and explorations across a range of disciplines, including complexity theory, critical theory, systems theory, creativity studies, and civilian design methodologies (Porkoláb and Zweibelson 2018; Beaulieu-Brossard and Dufort 2017; Rowe 1987). In 1969, economist and Nobel laureate Herbert Simon (1996: 111) suggested viewing design as a distinct science and way of thinking, focused on creating “the artificial” with respect to not only technological innovation but also social and political solutions to “ill-structured” problems of organizational development and social design. Simon (1996: 106) describes the design process as “problem-solving without a goal.” This kind of thinking does not preclude designers from designing for an end product (or end state) but maintains that the understanding of multiple propositions regarding desired end states and their actual design are part of the design process. Hence, design requires continuous openness toward the end state and iterative development of the means to get there by all stakeholders and parties involved. This basic view of design aligns with the notion that contemporary militaries are engaged in ongoing geopolitical competition and evolving security challenges with multiple and conflicting interests at play. These require continuous problem-solving without setting an initial end state and where notions of “victory” and “defeat” have in some ways lost meaning (cf. Sinek 2019).

In the evolving literature on the subject, scholars have taken design to denote a process that includes a number of practical methods. One way to describe this process is developing a mindset that is seeking to be aware of how one views and constructs the world, and the implications this has for engagement in it (Nelson and Stolterman 2012; Dorst 2011; von Thienen et al. 2011; Boland and Collopy 2004). Designers need to engage in critical and constructive reflective questioning and master the ability to rework the framing of problems and problem contexts continuously. As such, design has even been described as a distinct culture of inquiry and action (Wrigley et al. 2021; Nelson and Stolterman 2012). Central design values include empathy, divergent thinking, challenging assumptions, involvement of stakeholders, stewarding divergence (i.e., bringing together differences and assuming holistic approaches), and navigating the unknown (e.g., Wrigley et al. 2021; Nelson and Stolterman 2012; Dorst 2011; von Thienen et al. 2011). Heltberg and Dahl (2019: 170) note how design also relates to specific perceptions or notions of “knowledge” – notions of “what knowledge is” and “what kind of knowledge is valuable.” In organizations that perceive and value knowledge as fixed and discrete, as “an asset that someone can have,” the design mindset and the use of design tools are often challenged. Based on a case study of the Course of Action brainstorming that takes place in the military operational planning process, Heltberg and Dahl (ibid.) show how this perception of knowledge hampers the suspension of conclusions; the ability and willingness to continuously reframe problem understandings; and efforts to work collaboratively in order to create new, holistic solutions.

Design methodologies are participatory and encompass phases such as exploration, ideation, modeling by use of visual or hands-on material, prototyping, and testing (Wrigley et al. 2021; Nelson and Stolterman 2012; von Thienen et al. 2011). In design thinking, the participants do not assume that the design task begins with a definable problem that stakeholders can simply describe, analyze, and then solve. Instead, the more they try to understand the problem and their needs and wants (the “desiderata”), the more the problem or challenge is reframed, or indeed, completely changed. There is thus a “coevolution” of the design problem and the design solution (Dorst 2006: 10). Different stakeholders engage with context-specific knowledge, perspectives, interests, and concerns whereby design processes feature a continuous exploration of problem-framing and solutions (Boland and Collopy 2004; Dorst 2006). Design methodologies stress the need for working collaboratively and inclusively across organizational entities to address complex problems.

The design approach deviates from classical military operations planning in at least three crucial ways: problem understanding, inclusion of stakeholders, and basic world-view. First, classical military operations planning follows a linear, continuously convergent process, whereby the problem is first described and then analyzed in a supposedly objective way, then strategies and plans are developed in increasing detail (NATO 2019 3–1 and 4-4; NATO 2013a; Zweibelson 2017: 155; Lauder 2009). Although Western military planning, including European military planning, does include feedback loops, it still to a large extent relies on getting the first problem definition and analysis “right.” In contrast, the design approach features a continuous triple-loop learning process that seeks out multiple problem-framings and many ways of dealing with the problem(s) along with a continuous attention toward one’s own values and assumptions.

Second, while classical military operations planning often include many participants, these participants are usually selected from within the military organization, based on their organizational belonging, (i.e., by their functions and expertise among the planning staff). Stakeholders external to the military organization are only included to a limited extent and usually with reference to their specific expertise or doctrine-defined function such as Cultural Advisor or Legal Advisor. Adhering to doctrines and organizational hierarchies might therefore restrict the inclusion of divergent perspectives in the planning process. While some parts of the European defense are developing small and agile-matrixed organizations for specific purposes, European militaries largely organize themselves as modern bureaucracies divided into distinct branches, sections, and expert entities. This organizational form sits well with the planning paradigm, but its tendency to create isolated silos that lack horizontal integration complicates both intra- and inter-organizational coordination and collaboration promulgated by the design approach.

Finally, the classical military problem-solving approach largely rests on the assumption that the world is knowable, foreseeable, and manageable through systematic observation, analysis, and repeatable processes (Paparone 2013; Gracier 2017; Martin 2017; Jackson 2013; Naveh et al. 2009; Lauder 2009; Banach 2009; Bousquet 2008). Drawing from systems theory and complexity theory, design emphasizes the existence of multiple perspectives, as well as emergent and adaptive patterns of behavior. As such, design and classical military problem-solving processes seem not only at odds in their practical approaches but also in their theoretical foundations and assumptions.

While European defense forces continue to adhere to the institutionalized and codified forms of military planning and organization, design is becoming an emerging niche across the continent. For example, Scandinavia and other North and Central European countries provide a fertile social and political context for design uptake in society at-large. They are high-trust societies with low social power distance (Krogh et al. 2022). Their public school systems introduce and harness several of the values that design promulgates, including empathy, problem-framing, creativity, collaboration, and “reflective thinking” (Agger et al. 2015). Their military cultures are less hierarchical, and their operational planning “staff-driven” rather than “commander-driven.” Furthermore their defence forces generally accept that lower-ranking soldiers influence and challenge their commander in delineated planning processes (Libel 2016). In recent decades, many European defense forces have further been reconfigured into smaller, professional, agile forces that are structured and organized to be able to plug into larger operations and campaigns such as NATO operations or other combined engagements (Frisell and Pallin 2021; King 2011: 33–40; Howorth 2002). These organizational features are all conducive to design thinking, since they support exploratory problem understanding and problem-solving processes that involve both higher- and lower-ranking officers, as well as international collaborators with different world-views. Nevertheless, the design movement remains nascent in European defense forces, which we now move on to consider in detail.

Prevalence and Use of Military Design in Europe

While European defense forces have retained their overall approach to operational planning, the design approach to complex problem-solving is gradually finding its way into their military doctrines, practices, and educational curricula, although still in somewhat limited and experimental ways (cf. Porkoláb and Zweibelson 2018; Wrigley et al. 2021).

In the NATO body of doctrines, to which most European countries adhere, there is a growing awareness and acknowledgement of the interconnectivity and codependence among things, organizations, and domains. There is also a broader recognition of the need to think holistically and systemically. Consider for instance the NATO Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD) and its “comprehensive approach” (NATO 2013a). The COPD is the basic document for planning staffs within the NATO military command structure and the NATO force structure. It provides a common framework for collaborative operations planning within a comprehensive approach strategy. Inherent to the comprehensive approach is NATO’s recognition that “the military alone cannot resolve a crisis or conflict. There is a need for more deliberate and inclusive planning and action (…) that allow for both military and non-military resources and efforts to be marshalled with a greater unity of purpose” (NATO 2013a: 1–2). NATO leadership documents also emphasize the increased need for both critical and creative thinking and praxis (NATO 2020); which are also central to the important concept of “multi-domain operations”. Likewise, the current armed conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated the need for creativity both in planning and on the battlefield, including the capability to expand domain dimensions, for instance in regard to information activities.

However, NATO doctrinal support for design is still limited and perhaps in some respects declining. First, it can be argued that the few NATO doctrines mentioning design predominantly include the notion in word only, as they do not further elaborate on how to work with it in practice. Second, even though the COPD notes that the operating environments of modern crises are typically complex and continually changing (NATO 2013a: 1.6.), the established NATO planning process – the “Joint Operational Planning Process” – remains informed by the military functionalist paradigm (Paparone 2013; Pikner and Spisák 2013; Zweibelson 2017: 155). In other words, the overall process maintains a linear, causal, and somewhat mechanistic approach to planning and problem-solving. Third, the 2013 version of the NATO Joint Planning doctrine, AJP-5, mentioned design as one of three analytical approaches within Operational Art that might be pursued by commander and planning staffs (NATO 2013b: 2.10). However, this entire section on design as a possible approach was removed in the 2019 version of the AJP-5 (NATO 2019), leaving European defense forces wondering if NATO still approves of the approach or not.

Equally, very few European countries include design in national doctrine. Take the Dutch Army, which introduced design methods into their planning doctrine in 2014. The 2014 D.P. 3.2. Land Operations identifies three possible methods to be used in operations planning. One of these methods is “tactical design” (Van der Veer 2018). The publication notes that tactical design is not a NATO term but in line with UK tactical planning concepts. While the publication does not elaborate further on the concept of tactical design, it was nevertheless one of the first among European military doctrines – and remains today one of very few – to include design into planning frameworks. Jackson (2020) notes with reference to the UK doctrine publication Understanding and Decision-Making (UK MoD 2016) that British doctrine “stands out because it expresses many design concepts while avoiding the word ‘design’ entirely” (Jackson 2020: 34). It has been argued that other European nations are also approaching design perspectives in their doctrine, without directly labelling its design. Zweibelson et al. (2017) suggest one such example to be the Handbook on Civilian-Military Cooperation published in 2016 by the Swedish Armed Forces (Forsvarsmakten 2016). They also point to the Swedish Chief of Armed Forces’ and the Civil Contingencies Agency’s Director General’s launch of a Joint Strategic Planning Procedure for the Total Defence as an example (Zweibelson et al. 2017). These doctrinal developments toward whole-of-government and even whole-of-society approaches fit well with design’s holistic and inclusive focus. However, as these examples show, design is generally still not included in any keystone European military doctrines, and the doctrinal underpinning of design in Europe remains weak for the time being.

Operating under an unstable institutionalization of design at the strategic level, European defense forces have generally adopted design and its appurtenant approaches and methodologies in a less systematic and more “bracketed” fashion at various levels and within various sections of the military organizations. In the absence of a comprehensive approach to introducing design as an integral part of their formal training, European militaries have so far mainly relied on grassroots efforts, smaller communities of practice, specific projects, and singular educational courses. In contrast to, for instance, the United States and Canadian defense forces, Europeans have generally been reluctant toward using “design” as a term that designates a specific path or a distinct community within their military organizations. They consider it more as a methodological tool set that fits well with existing leadership trends valuing diversity, inclusion, critical thinking, and creative practices.

The inspiration for adopting design methodologies among European defense forces stems primarily from other militaries, notably the United States, Canada, and Israel, from where committed military analysts and practitioners have contributed to engaging the Europeans in the design dialogue. Through the transatlantic cooperation in NATO, developments in the United States and Canada also make an impact in Europe. However, commercial design methodologies employed by private companies (such as IDEO), public design institutions (such as Stanford D-School, the Danish Design Center, and MIT), and academia also serve as important inspiration. Defense colleges in Hungary, Poland, Denmark, and France, to name a few, have hosted innovation and design conferences in recent years to highlight the relevance of design-related theories and perspectives for military analysis and practice. Concurrently, a variety of design thinking methodologies based in complexity theory, systems theory, innovation theory, and constructivist thought have been included in the teaching curricula of the design courses taught at various European defense colleges. For instance, the French École de Guerre has worked with design thinking as part of its courses since 2021; Sweden has taught design through the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) since 2019; and Poland has expanded its own style of design into its Captain, Major, and Colonel education since 2018 (Harezlak et al. 2020). The NATO School in Oberammergau has provided annual design courses based on an adaptation of JSOU design since 2018. After a period of disruption due to COVID-19, however, it remains to be seen whether these will be resumed. The NATO school also provides an Alternative Analysis Course which builds on critical thinking theories and teaches alternative analysis techniques in support of problem-solving and decision-making. This course is currently still available.

The lack of a common NATO or European doctrine on design – and the absence of a single institution teaching design for all European militaries – results in considerable variance with respect to how European militaries understand and value different aspects of design. The following section presents three illustrative cases of recent design practices in European defense forces.

Illustrating the Evolving Design Niche in European Defense Forces

While currently still a niche in Europe, the design agenda develops at multiple levels and settings in European defense forces. This includes, for example, research-based calls for change and military design recommendations in commissioned reports, design teaching at European defense colleges, and design approaches to strategic and operational analysis and praxis. Countries such as France, the UK, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Denmark have experimented with applying design approaches in relation to a variety of defense-related themes.

In this section, three specific examples illustrate the evolving European interest in military design and its application: the Emergent Concepts Team (ECT) that applies a military design approach in the UK Ministry of Defence; the design course Design Thinking in a Military Context at the Royal Danish Defence College; and the organizational redesign of the École de Guerre in Paris. The first example relates to practice, the second to education, and the third to organizational change. All three cases provide an in-depth contextual feel of the European variations in the design field.

The Emergent Concepts Team in the UK Ministry of Defence

In 2020, Colonel Edward Hayward established the Emergent Concepts Team (ECT) to address complex strategic and operational issues and problems in the UK Defence. Commissioned by the UK Ministry of Defence but operating cross-functionally and inter-organizationally, the ECT reached out to ministries, other public authorities, and academia. The team was staffed with one full-time position (Hayward) who mobilized relevant resources inside and outside of the military depending on the specific problem to be addressed. The aim was to link diverse thinkers and practitioners and to apply theories from diverse fields to consider issues that were deemed systemic, messy, and complex or even chaotic by those who were tasked with handling them. While the ECT was initially limited in scope, it soon built up and eventually included some 60 people – coming and going depending on the subject – working on myriad projects. Examples of issues considered by the team range from strategic competition analyses to operational issues, for example, the future of conflict, artificial intelligence (AI), and decision-making, as well as organizational challenges such as mental health and force structure. Among other things, the ECT developed a psychological targeting tool, a new concept for Risk Analysis, and suggested a restructuring of Army reporting to favor perishable insight over the many updates that are otherwise part of the usual battle rhythm in military headquarters.

The method developed for the team included seeking to understand the multitude of factors and perspectives that were framing and shaping the issue or the problem to be addressed. In this step, the key perspective was to see all related issues and problems as entangled parts of a complex, adaptive system. It was central for the ECT to be aware of how they as analysts were actively creating, selecting, and using their problem-framing (for instance, in regard to the establishment of the boundaries and decisions around what to include within their view on the system). Hayward succinctly describes this process as paying particular attention to “the awkward things that people tend to leave out” (cf. personal communication with Hayward, 2022). To do this, Hayward spent time and effort selecting and then sustaining diverse, bespoke networks for each project, with the aim of combining these cross-disciplinary perspectives and experiences to create novel solutions. “The ultimate success,” Hayward notes, “was not just bringing new people from lots of different areas to work together on a project and devise new outcomes, but to forge this super team to work on new areas that were not usually in their field and bring their past skills to bear in new ways – and create new learning as a combined perspective” (cf. personal communication with Hayward, 2022).

At the same time, the team was oriented toward praxis and aimed at turning the design inquiry into something useful such as a brief or a set of questions or recommendations. In this, they were preoccupied with locating responsibilities, ownership, and outcomes in order to support decision-making (including the identification of what decisions need to be made). Being able to find the right strategic sponsors for any project and to understand what they required – as opposed to what they might initially be seeking – was important. The ECT did not consider design versus planning in an either-or perspective but worked on linking the two approaches as both-and (cf. personal communication with Hayward).

Hayward notes that while the ECT took important steps in advancing design thinking in the UK Ministry of Defence, it did face a number of challenges along the way. One challenge concerned the organizational anchoring of the ECT. The team was, by its own design, “wrapped around” the extant military structure in order to build and integrate around the military system. This provided some freedom of methods and ensured that the team was working for the entire organization, where a variety of people (including high-ranking generals) came to them with requests for support. On the other hand, Hayward notes that while this structure meant that the team had broad access to relevant networks, it was also challenged by capacity, since new networks of participants had to be created for every single project. Furthermore, the loose anchorage meant that the team had little authority to implement or shepherd the changes they recommended. Hence, it can also be considered whether the work of the ECT would have been better served if carried out by central agents/units more firmly anchored within the organization (cf. personal communication with Hayward, 2022). The experiences of the ECT demonstrate how design methodologies can illuminate new opportunities in military organizations, while highlighting the importance of considering the organizational nesting of design initiatives and approaches.

Design Teaching at the Royal Danish Defence College

The introduction of design methodologies in European defense forces is underpinned by education at the European defense colleges. In recent years, various European defense colleges have tried to facilitate design learning through various ways of combining theory and practice. One example of an attempt to do this is the design course Design Thinking in a Military Context, provided by the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC) for students at Master’s level since 2018. Akin to the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) approach, this course is framed as a mixture of theory and practice with a strong emphasis on embedding design practice in a meaningful way in the specific military organizational context and practice. Prior to the coursework, participants are asked to describe one case from their present work – a task, a vision, or a problem – that they are actively involved in and working on, and which includes multiple stakeholders. Throughout the course, participants work on their case by continuously relating it to theory and practice. Moreover, they must conduct micro-interventions, interviews, and experiments in their working life throughout the duration of the course. In this way the students are able to learn and experiment with applying design not only as theory but as a set of practices in their military working life. By this approach, the RDDC is also able to get continuous feedback as to what works and what are specific challenges in regard to applying design methodologies in a military setting.

A research-based evaluation of the 2018 and 2019 courses investigated how elements from design thinking and practice are selected, translated, and enacted by participants (Heltberg 2022). The evaluation also had a broader focus on what participants experienced as opportunities and challenges as a result of introducing and using design concepts and methodologies in a military context. The evaluation shows that RDDC students found it particularly important to take organizational structures and cultural issues into account when introducing design in military contexts. In this regard, the evaluation identified three types of organizational challenges that arose when applying design practices specifically in a military setting. These were labelled “invisible,” “homeless,” and “transversal” challenges (Heltberg 2022). It was noted that the “design gaze” at times foregrounded problems or challenges that had otherwise been rendered homeless or invisible, either by institutional sectioning and the general allocation of tasks and concerns to specific persons or entities, or by an institutional preponderance to taking for granted that existing procedures, solutions, and ways-of-doing are optimal. Furthermore, it was noted that while singular staffs in military organizations may know and have sympathy for design approaches, the actual use of design methodologies is easily challenged. To a varying degree, course participants found it difficult to take up and apply design methodologies by themselves in a military organization that is hierarchically sectioned and structured and is still relying on traditional planning methodologies. (Heltberg 2022). Based on this insight, the RDDC decided in 2019 to provide a specific design course for staff working together in one and the same branch. The aim was to ease the implementation and routinization of design methodologies, as staff who were already working together would concurrently be introduced to design methodologies. Due to subsequent structural changes in the organization, the possible effects of the course were not followed and documented.

The Organizational Redesign of the École de Guerre

As a third example to demonstrate the current diversity of the uptake and development of military design in Europe, this section turns to the experiences related to the organizational redesign of the École de Guerre in Paris. (This section primarily builds on information retrieved from https://ecoledeguerre.paris (Nov. 2022) and personal communication with Rear-Admiral (ret.) Pierre-Marie Borgeal, former Director of the Department of Leadership and Innovation at the École de Guerre.)

Founded in 1751 by Louis XV, the French École de Guerre has educated officers from all branches of the military, including a substantial number of officers from countries abroad. In 2015, the school embarked on a design journey dedicated to transforming its educational approach and program. While the school wanted to maintain its high standards in operational planning, it also wanted to prepare officers – practically and intellectually – for the various levels of complexity they would encounter in the future. This included preparing officers for the battles of influence they would have to wage within the military bureaucracy. The school also wanted the students to learn to develop and share sensemaking in an emergent world and to act purposely and astutely in the mist of complexity and uncertainty. A key tenant behind the transformation was the proposition that military leaders will face unprecedented levels of intellectual as well as practical diversity, complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability in future. Rather than providing students only with “fixed” knowledge that might soon become obsolete, the school wanted to grow military leaders characterized by open-mindedness, responsiveness, initiative, creativity, commitment, the ability to act outside of one’s comfort zone, and the understanding of decision logics and systems thinking.

In the exploratory phase of the transformation journey where all staff were involved, one approach was to conduct experiments among small groups of students. If an experiment worked well, the school would expand the solution. As a key didactic and organizing factor, students were encouraged to explore any and all domains they found pertinent to their education. Accordingly, they were asked to initiate, set up, manage, and participate in relevant thematic “committees.” Examples of committees students created included “Nuclear Deterrence” and “Thinking Differently and Innovation.” Each committee then reached out to staffs and external experts to inform relevant inquiries. In this way, students were given greater active responsibility for their own learning, which created an atmosphere of experimentation, transformation, and enthusiasm. This also provided the school with timely, continuous feedback as to where students needed to learn and develop. Additionally, this networked-based organization created significant agility, giving the school freedom to enrich courses and curricula depending on desiderata and staff validation.

The transformation of the education approach and program was embedded in a so-called ‘9 Pillars pedagogical design concept’, with three pillars supporting each of three dimensions. The three pillars supporting the mindset dimension focused on: (i) Personalization; (ii) Accountability/empowerment; and (iii) Open-mindedness. The three pillars underpinning the intellectual and operational dimension focused on: (i) Understanding our conflicting world; (ii) Understanding the defense/security sector eco-system, policies, and military room for action; and (iii) Leading operations. Finally, the three pillars sustaining the reflexivity and the leadership dimension focused on: (i) Learning about oneself; (ii) Thinking differently (out of the box), having a creative mindset; (iii) Influencing and convincing.

The staffs designing and undertaking the transformation were not acquainted with design theory when they began the project. However, when they later encountered design approaches – among other things due to a partnership with the Canadian Forces College – they realized how their journey had in all aspects been a design journey: “a reflexive, conceptual, practical, and experimental approach to creating an entire new education programme for future military leaders,” says Pierre-Marie Borgeal. Without knowing of design methodologies, they were nevertheless able to explore and make use of design concepts and practices in their consolidation of the new educational approach. For instance, they incorporated activities related to debating, networking, and team collaboration into the school curricula in order to enhance officers’ self-reflection, as well as their ability to transform and apply more flexible frames of reference, and to understand and shape their interactions with the operating environment. One key take-away from the transformation process, according to Borgeal, was the realization of the power that lies in connecting multiple perspectives and knowledge domains open-mindedly and creatively to build a shared awareness and find new ways to grasp an emerging reality in a complex and changing world.

Today, the transformation has set up staffs and students with a mindset of openness and curiosity to consolidate or conduct further changes where needed. In the words of Borgeal, the officers “are given the fundamentals to be able to create what is needed, but does not yet exist,” so that the French armed forces become continuously more relevant and efficient in a world that emerges from itself at an accelerated speed.

Future Avenues for Military Design Research and Practice

The European militaries of today are bound to specific practices and ways of thinking through doctrines, norms, values, recruitment processes, and education. NATO doctrines influence European militaries, and while the withdrawal of design as a distinct focus in the Joint Allied Doctrine certainly does not support the development of design in European defense forces, many national defense institutions have, as shown, experimented with and incorporated design approaches in strategic or operational planning efforts. NATO leadership development and its future orientations also seem to align clearly with many of the fundamental propositions foregrounded by design thinking.

Academic research and practice-oriented analyses alike have pointed to the relevance of continuously developing and including design approaches in defense forces. In this vein, a number of contributions point to concrete development opportunities. Among these are commissioned reports, although the impacts of these recommendations are still to be seen. For example, in a report commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Defence, the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies has recommended that the Dutch military use design methodology for developing innovative and legitimate stabilization operations (De Spiegeleire et al. 2014). Particularly, they propose that key public and private stakeholders come together to co-design a number of stabilization options and assess them based on collaboratively developed criteria. The assessed options should then inform a political decision-making process prior to a military operational planning process. The suggested model serves as a case of possible military design in a European context, but remains a tabletop exercise that awaits implementation.

In a journal article discussing possible German responses to the increasingly complex battlefield of the twenty-first century, Colonel Christof Schaefer (2009) suggested that the German army engage in institutional military design. He argues that new interagency design groups should develop new visions, strategies, and lines of effort across functions and link innovative ideas to relevant decision-making at all levels of the institutional hierarchy. Schaefer is particularly interested in these changes taking place at the ministerial level and the higher commands and offices. He suggests that the design groups should foster organizational development by deliberately bringing about “creative tension” between military or political leaders. The recommendations demonstrate how European debates on military design involve arguments relating to current challenges for more comprehensive integration of design approaches and practices in defense ministries and organizations.

The European defense colleges also play an important role in building design knowledge, skills, and capabilities at all levels of the military organizations (cf. Libel 2016). Developing methods for teaching design is thus important for advancing design within military communities in Europe. Design teachers should bear in mind that military design is still a niche in Europe. They must facilitate the interest in design thinking in a military setting and work in the participants’ “zone of proximal development.” This means linking new knowledge to known concepts and scaffolding learning of new skills on the grounds of existing competencies. Focusing on connections between military planning and design, particularly how design can inform planning and become a “planning ally,” is therefore conducive for design learning in the current European context. An instructive metaphor is the cooperation between architects, engineers, and construction workers: architects creatively construct a holistic vision that engineers translate into plans that builders follow through specific actions or activities. In much the same way, design helps construct scenarios and pathways for action that help military designers, planners, and operators to better understand and navigate contemporary threat landscapes (Olsen 2018). While the conceptual distinction between military planning and design is initially helpful for clarifying how design differs from known practices, teachers should help close the gap again in order to promote the uptake of design methodologies, knowledge practices, and modes of reasoning in European defense forces.

For the same reason, European defense colleges and military personnel should consider how institutionalized military capabilities can support the uptake of design methodologies. One such capability is military fixedness, which makes military organizations and its members ready to act with sparse information and high risk. Another is the widespread capability of working with tangible materials such as maps, overlays, and terrain tables as tools for thinking and creation, which is also central to design. Understanding and working with these and other relevant connections between the new design approach and more traditional planning approaches that have long dominated European military organizations is an important avenue for military design research and practice in Europe.

It remains open as to how to approach this institutionally. An example of a possible way forward in this regard comes from the Royal Danish Defence College (RDDC). Staff at the RDDC have considered the possibility of establishing a recurrent “design workshop” or “design lab,” possibly with a fixed duration limited to a few months per year. In the lab, staff, teams, or units from all parts of the defense would have the possibility of bringing up current tasks and problems for consideration, and working on them with support from an in-house design team. The aim would be to introduce design methodologies to address specific problems in order to provide new solutions and create a space for trying out new ways of approaching and dealing with complex problems in the military organization.

This strategy of “institutional bracketing” would provide participants with a role where it would be legitimate to think and act differently while engaged in the lab: They would have the opportunity to reframe problems and assigned end-states, challenge assumptions, bring up wild ideas, make mistakes, and so forth. At the same time, it would provide the organization with a safe zone: it could rest assured that the enactments would not question or undermine the entire system but remain confined to specific spaces and challenges. Yet this approach may also be the Achilles’ heel of the strategy, namely that design would then only unfold within limited spaces and therefore never really disturb or fundamentally enrich the organization at-large. However, this is a point that has two sides to it: organizational change can either be made slowly or quickly, depending among other things upon the appetite for change. As of yet, this suggestion remains on the drawing board.

As the above examples demonstrate, developing design in European defense forces also requires substantial shifts in institutionalized mindsets. To mention a few, there is not just one correct definition of a complex problem, there is not just one optimal solution or end state, and the goal is not always to get things right without making mistakes. Working across intra- and inter-organizational boundaries must become an institutionalized mantra and embedded organizational principle in order to attune European defense forces to the increasingly complex, unstable, and unforeseeable battlefield of today and tomorrow.

Concluding Remarks: Military Design as an Evolving Niche in Europe

To conclude, recent changes in warfare have generated a sense of urgency among military practitioners in European defense forces, who recognize the need for novel design approaches and methods for understanding and managing contemporary threats and conflict. Providing an overview of the current state of European military design, this chapter has shown how military design is an evolving niche in European defense forces. It has defined military design as an alternative to a still strongly institutionalized military planning doctrine; shown how the design agenda has evolved at multiple levels and settings in European defense forces; and presented illustrative cases and recommendations for further integration of design approaches and practices in European military organizations and defense colleges.

European military design continues to develop as military scholars, strategists, planners, and teachers continue to explore new and innovative ways of deploying design methodologies in military practice. European researchers and academics advance the theoretical frameworks for design-inspired approaches and practices; European defense ministries and organizations form design teams and labs that provide institutional spaces for creative problem-solving; and European defense colleges offer educational courses that build design knowledge, skills, and capabilities at all levels of the military organizations. Even though European defense forces have generally adopted design in a bracketed fashion, these grassroots efforts and small communities of practice hold the potential to grow into a more mature military design sector in Europe. As of today, however, design remains one of several methodological tools, which military personnel may use to construct scenarios and pathways for action that help European soldiers navigate contemporary and future threat landscapes.

Cross-References