Encyclopedia of Social Network Analysis and Mining

2018 Edition
| Editors: Reda Alhajj, Jon Rokne

Game Theory and Social Networks

  • Jae C. Oh
  • Kishan Mehrotra
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-7131-2_175



Bayesian Games

Games with incomplete information about characteristics of other players

Ex Ante Payoff

It means “before the event.” It means, in Bayesian games, the expected payoff value before certain information is revealed

Ex Post Payoff

It means “actual.” It means, in Bayesian games, the expected payoff value after certain information is revealed

Extended Form Games

A way to describe a game in a treelike structure representing sequential moves of players

Mixed Strategy

A player’s strategy choices with a probability value associated with each choice

Nash Equilibrium

A lock-in strategy profile of a game in which none of the players can benefit by changing their strategies unilaterally while others keep their chosen strategies

Normal Form Games

A way to describe games in a matrix form representing simultaneous plays

Positive/Negative Externalities

Activities that would...

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© Springer Science+Business Media LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer ScienceSyracuse UniversitySyracuseUSA

Section editors and affiliations

  • Irwin King
    • 1
  • Jie Tang
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Science and EngineeringThe Chinese University of Hong KongShatinHong Kong
  2. 2.Department of Computer Science and TechnologyTsinghua UniversityBeijingChina