Encyclopedia of Algorithms

2016 Edition
| Editors: Ming-Yang Kao

Market Games and Content Distribution

  • Vahab S. Mirrokni
Reference work entry
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-2864-4_218

Years and Authors of Summarized Original Work

  • 2005; Mirrokni

Problem Definition

This chapter studies market games for their performance and convergence of the equilibrium points. The main application is the content distribution in cellular networks in which a service provider needs to provide data to users. The service provider can use several cache locations to store and provide the data. The assumption is that cache locations are selfish agents (resident subscribers) who want to maximize their own profit. Most of the results apply to a general framework of monotone two-sided markets.

Uncoordinated Two-Sided Markets

Various economic interactions can be modeled as two-sided markets. A two-sided market consists of two disjoint groups of agents: active agents and passive agents. Each agent has a preference list over the agents of the other side, and can be matched to one (or many) of the agents in the other side. A central solution concept to these markets are stable matchings,...


Congestion games Market sharing games Stable matching Valid-Utility games 
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Recommended Reading

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Authors and Affiliations

  • Vahab S. Mirrokni
    • 1
  1. 1.Theory GroupMicrosoft ResearchRedmondUSA